-Caveat Lector- an excerpt from: BETRAYAL - Our Occupation of Germany Arthur D. Rahn Former Chief Editor of Intelligence Office of the Director of Information Control Office of Military Government, Germany Book & Knowledge Warsaw, Poland pps. 237 (no date) out-of-print --[6]-- --Everywhere the same condition existed. In keeping with an arbitrary timetable we had established, we were withdrawing our supervision and transferring authority to the Germans. Apparently, if our prime concern was to be the rehabilitation of German industry, we merely needed to maintain a police force and assure ourselves of cooperative "conservative" governments with no "radical" ideas about nationalizing natural resources or confiscating the holdings of businessmen and industrialists who had supported Hitler.-- ---" NOT until I sat down to write this book and reflected on my experience and organized my notes did I realize that what had seemed to me and my friends in Germany to be a chaos of corruption and incompetence had actually been a planned development following a very definite pattern. In fact, it has become increasingly clear that the pattern of events in Germany from 1944 to mid-1947 mirrored in sharp perspective what was happening at home in America. Developments in Germany, too, have paralleled our actions in the United Nations and our relations with the Soviet Union, Greece, Spain, China, Britain, Israel with the entire world."--- Om K ----- CHAPTER SIX Timetable Sell Out "The better world for which you fight and for which some of you give your lives will not come merely because we shall have won the war. It will not come merely, because we wish very hard that it would come. It will be made possible only by bold vision, intelligent plannning and hard work. It cannot be brought about overnight; but only by years of effort and perseverance and unfaltering faith." --From an address to International Student Assembly, September 3, 1942. IN February, 1946, when my friend Sam returned after an absence of four months to the county where he had formerly been stationed, he found that the local Public Safety officer was about to send the ex-mayor of the village of Rimbach to Wiesbaden to be tried as a war criminal. Four Germans had denounced the former mayor, a Kzler and a Communist, as an SS stooge and a murderer of a Jew. Sam knew the mayor was a tough, irreproachable anti-Nazi, and he conducted an informal investigation of the case. Under questioning, one of the accusors, a farmer, admitted that an ex-Nazi bigshot and an SS man had forced him to sign the deposition. The whole plot had been organized by two SS men recently released from an internment camp and by this ex-Nazi official. "How could you expect to get away with such an obvious conspiracy?" Sam asked in bewilderment. "Oh, we've just had bad luck," they replied, "you showed up." They had not expected an investigation, aware that we neither had the personnel, the transporta tion nor the interest to follow up such a denunciation. The American sergeant who had handled the case had not been negligent or irresponsible. On his desk there was a whole pile of papers, cases to be processed. It was impossible... Everywhere the same condition existed. In keeping with an arbitrary timetable we had established, we were withdrawing our supervision and transferring authority to the Germans. Apparently, if our prime concern was to be the rehabilitation of German industry, we merely needed to maintain a police force and assure ourselves of cooperative "conservative" governments with no "radical" ideas about nationalizing natural resources or confiscating the holdings of businessmen and industrialists who had supported Hitler. In the Information Control Division we may not have recognized the new evolving policy immediately, but we were early victims of the withdrawal that accompanied it. In September, barely five months after the end of the war, we were ordered to prepare to turn over the supervision of the press, radio, publications, theatre, etc. to the German authorities. There was consternation in every section of our division. (HQ wanted to cut us to an impotent skeleton staff by June, 1946. We struggled, on the other hand, to maintain our personnel to continue our activities so that our groundwork would not be without some lasting results.) "But we have just established the newspapers, and we haven't even licensed half of those we plan to publish. In addition, the editors of the papers need and want our assistance and supervision. They don't want to be put under German control so prematurely." The complaints were the same in the radio, publications and theatre sections. And what was happening with us was being duplicated in Education and Religious Affairs, in Public Safety in most MG offices. One of the first victims, of course, was the proPotsdam, Bernstein-Nixon Cartel Investigation Division. The division least affected by the withdrawal was the anti-Potsdam Economies Division of General Draper & Co. Many of us were confused about this wholesale withdrawal. We'd just established ourselves in Germany and we were already pulling out. After four months of sloppy, uneven denazification, half-hearted reorganization of the administrations, failure to uproot the wealthy backers of reaction and ineffectual reeducation, should we have expected that the mass of Germans, who had been intensively indoctrinated most of them willingly by Goebbels, Rosenberg and Hitler for twelve years, would be ready for democracy? Were these apathetic women waiting silently in long queues before the grocery stores for their meagre rations, these old men wearily dragging handcarts filled with firewood, these expellees huddled together about their possessions in the drafty corridors of the bombedout railway stations, the sullen ex-Landsers in shabby, ripped uniforms, pacing the streets aimlessly, searching for cigarette butts dropped by Americans were they ready for democracy? Or was it better that we continue to supervise their information media, their schools and their government? Should we allow these disillusioned nazified Germans anxious about their next meals, about repairing their dwellings and about finding their missing relatives to choose their own officials or should we continue to appoint them ourselves? Was it not likely that our choice would be more "democratic" than theirs, considering their resentment against the Kzler and the "collaborators" with the enemy? Americans in various MG offices, including our own, agreed that the Germans were "ignorant of democratic processes and responsibilities", as General Eisenhower had declared in his August monthly report, and were not ready to select their own' officials. Anti-Nazis shared this opinion. In Bavaria, Rosshauptor, the Minister of Labor, warned that the Germans were not yet ready "to accept the real ideals of democracy. It is not wise now to offer them all the privileges and advantages of a democratic state." Both we Americans and the anti-Nazis were astounded, therefore, at the end of September, when Eisenhower announced that the first elections would be held in January, 1946. And these elections were to be held in the rural areas, where the population was most politically backward and anti-democratic. To aggravate the situation, General Clay ordered the withdrawal of the rural MG detachments by January, 1946. We were allowing these nazified Germans to elect their own officials and removing our supervision at the same time. If, as Eisenhower explained in November, the purpose of the elections was to speed up the democratic development of Germany, it would have been logical to hold the elections in the cities, the centers of political activity, where there was some interest in political affairs, where the nucleus of a democratic movement and the beginnings of political organization were to be found. But even in the cities, the growth of the political parties was slow. Not until August had Eisenhower, in obedience to the Potsdam Declaration, permitted the authorization of political parties, and then only on a county-wide basis. A month later, when the elections were announced, the political organizations were not mass popular parties with large followings. They were little more than political clubs formed by cliques of local politicians, whom Eisenhower properly characterized as "holdovers from the days before Hitler's advent to power." In the rural areas, where the elections were to take place, the parties had scarcely begun to organize. "How can we conduct an election campaign?" complained Christian Roth, the secretary of the Munich Social Democratic Party. "It's impossible to hold meetings, to give political speeches or to publicize the party..." It was not until November 16th, two months after the announcement of the elections and two months before they were to take place, that permission was granted for the printing of political posters. The parties did not have their own press, and the licensed non-partisan newspapers which they had to use to publicize their programs appeared only twice a week with limited circulation and in editions of only a few pages. We were rushing the elections as though there would be serious danger if they were not held immediately. When the three Premiers of the provinces in our Zone protested that they would not have enough time to screen the population to prevent the Nazi activists from voting, MG refused their request for a delay. Nobody seriously believed that we would be able to prevent the Nazis from voting. Although lists of voters were posted in every community and electoral boards were established to rule on qualifications, everyone knew that the people in the villages and small towns would be afraid to "denounce" their neighbors. Because many Americans did not understand the German multiple party system, there was a general failure to appreciate the really decisive significance of the elections. Americans are confused by the fact that in Germany every appointment in a youth group, in a woman's council, in a cultural society or a trade union is made on a partisan basis. Political parties in Germany are not merely vote-getting political organizations seeking to elect their candidates to office. Each German political party represents a Weltanschauung (world outlook or ideology). It is ordinarily possible for Germans to predict the stand of a member of any party on any issue on the basis of his party's Weltanschauung. Another mystery for Americans is the class character of the different parties. Americans are often suspicious of talk of class divisions. But in Germany the different Weltanschau. ungen (ideologies) clearly represent different class outlooks. An Information Control Intelligence survey in February, 1946 demonstrated that the lower income groups (the unemployed and the workers) generally favor the leftist (Socialist and Communist) or the so-called workers' parties; and the higher income groups support the conservative (Christian Democra, tic and Liberal), the self-denominated bourgeois or middleclass parties. In addition, in Germany, unlike in America, the Church has considerable direct influence in politics, as the same Information Control survey of February, 1946 revealed. According to this scientific study, 75% of the church-going Catholics and 60% of the church-going Protestants supported the conservative parties; only 25% of the former and 40% of the latter preferred the leftist parties. On the other hand, of the non-practicing Catholics and Protestants, only 27 and 36%, respectively, favored the conservative parties, while 73 and 64% supported the leftist parties. There is a very definite connection between church attendance and party preference. "I have frequently emphasized," declared Mayor Scharnagl of Munich, a leader of the Christian Social Union, which was certain of victory in Bavaria, "that there should be no elections in the next two years. Elections always bring political disunity and that is not desirable at present." There was certainly danger in prematurely aggravating all the ideological, class and religious differences among the Germans, with democracy hardly established and Nazism still the most powerful political philosophy in Germany. Many MG officials and German political leaders agreed with Bruno Goldhammer, a Munich Communist, that "it would be more important at present to assemble all forces for reconstruction than to begin battles for offices." In addition, there was too much risk involved in entrusting the new political leaders, unsophisticated about democratic phisolophy[sic] and inexperienced in democratic procedure, with an election campaign. All kinds of politicians, including many cynical opportunists, were calling themselves "democrats." Most of them were not to be relied upon. The Nazis had been so oppressive, terroristic, corrupt and barbaric that they had alienated whole groups of people who were not necessarily in disagreement with all the Hitler doctrines. Many politicians, men like Mayor Blaum of Frankfurt, Mayor Walter of Mainz and Premier Geiler of Hesse, could be called anti-Nazis, but were certainly not real democrats even though they all labeled themselves as such. More dangerous than these "democrats", however, were the actual pro-Nazis and former Party members who were able to slip into important positions in the new parties. In the rush of the campaign, the few trustworthy anti-Nazi leaders had no time to investigate the backgrounds of the hundreds of assistants they were forced to appoint. Sure enough, as we could have predicted, the elections proved disastrous though the results were not always immediately apparent. Instead of dealing with the basic problems of the country, problems which really permitted no great differences of opinion, politicians built up abstract issues and artificially stimulated inter-party conflicts. Inter-party harmony and the developing anti-Nazi unity was destroyed. In Frankfurt, where the four parties had signed a pledge not to indulge in cavilling attacks upon each other, the agreement was gradually undermined during the course of the campaign until by the last week there was unrestrained oratorical warfare. Many of the political speakers appealed to the worst sentiments of the people their nationalism, their antipathy to the occupation, their opposition to denazification, their resentment at the payment of reparations, their fear of the Soviet Union and their racial prejudices. Anti-fascist exhortations democratic talk, "foreign" talk introduced by the "enemy" or by the German "traitors" was received with doubt or sneers,, while oratory which relied heavily on Nazi demogogic appeal was received with enthusiasm. The unconstructive "bolshevik bogey" was pulled out of Mein Kampf, refurbished and presented to the people as a major campaign issue. Adapting themselves to the mentality and outlook of their audiences, some speakers even preached new "Versailles" propaganda to inspire the belief that "true" Germans had to oppose the "shameful." occupation. What a strange idea we had of democracy as though democracy consisted only in inspiring premature political squabbling and in holding premature elections to put dubious local leaders in office. But because over 80% of the voting population went to the polls a much greater percentage than ever participates in any American election, though not as great as in many Nazi elections MG officers slapped each other and their German appointees on the back. What a good job in democracy they had done! Colonel Newman, the military governor of Greater Hesse, rejoiced smugly: "I think this should prove to the world that democracy has not been completely Smothered by years of Nazi oppression." We in Information Control knew, however, that all this post-election talk of "exemplary democratic success... further advanced than we had hoped... real American-type democracy" was all nonsensical froth. A month after the elections, studies made by our survey section (a kind of Gallup poll outfit attached to our Intelligence section) showed that although 38% of the population thought that National Socialism was a bad idea, 43% held that it was a good idea that had been badly carried out. Nineteen per cent had no opinion. What did elections mean to these people? Elections meant a lot, however, to the future development of our occupation. They were the culmination of our whole campaign against the Antifas, the Kzler, the trade unions and the "reds". They ended the weak manifestations of anti-fascist unity. They resulted in the overwhelming victory of conservative, nationalist, Church forces and an intensification of the "bolshevik bogey" campaign against the Communists. The elections followed one after another. The country elections were in April, the city elections in May, the constitutional assembly elections in June and the provincial legislature elections in December. Instead of sitting down around a table and talking over the problems of denazification, of the resettlement of the expellees from the east, reconstruction, food distribution, unemployment and reeducation, the small number of democratic party leaders were kept busy electioneering, constantly traveling from one town to another, from one campaign meeting to another. As a result of this spate of premature elections, the next period was to belong to the conservatives. It would take many months, maybe even years, for the democratic forces to regroup to challenge the conservative hegemony. The struggle would be difficult, for under our new policy, we were committed to the support of the anti-democratic and nationalist, pseudodemocratic elements. pps. 125-133 --[cont]-- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. 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