-Caveat Lector-
THIS IS US, COUNTER INTUITIVE HUMAN RESPONSE:
As highlighted in the interim report, the human response to
the
deployment of such technologies may be counter-intuitive and
render progressive, deployments of
newer more powerful systems either obsolete or
dysfunctional. This possibility is discussed in greater
detail below.
FULL TEXT AT:
http://cryptome.org/stoa-atpc.htm
EVERYBODY HERE NEEDS TO READ THIS AND PASS IT ON, I THINK.
THIS IS JUST THE SUMMARY. IT WILL AMAZE AND ENLIGHTEN YOU.
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
_________________________________________
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS ASSESSMENT
STOA
AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES
OF POLITICAL CONTROL
Working document
(Consultation version)
Luxembourg, 6 January 1998
PE 166 499
Directorate General for Research
Cataloguing data:
Title:
An appraisal of technologies for
political control
Publisher:
European Parliament
Directorate General for Research
Directorate B
The STOA Programme
Author:
Mr. Steve Wright - Omega Foundation -
Manchester
Editor:
Mr. Dick Holdsworth
Head of STOA Unit
Date:
6 January 1998
PE Number:
PE 166 499
This document is a working document. The current version
is being circulated for
consultation. It is not an official publication of STOA or
of the European Parliament.
This document does not necessarily represent the views of
the European Parliament.
AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF
POLITICAL CONTROL
ABSTRACT
The objectives of this report are fourfold: (i) to provide
Members of the European Parliament with
a guide to recent advances in the technology of political
control; (ii) to identify, analyse and
describe the current state of the art of the most salient
developments; (iii) to present members with
an account of current trends, both in Europe and Worldwide;
and (iv) to develop policy
recommendations covering regulatory strategies for their
management and future control.
The report contains seven substantive sections which cover
respectively:
(i) The role and function of the technology of political
control;
(ii) Recent trends and innovations (including the
implications of globalisation, militarisation of police
equipment, convergence of control systems deployed worldwide
and the implications of increasing
technology and decision drift);
(iii) Developments in surveillance technology (including the
emergence of new forms of local,
national and international communications interceptions
networks and the creation of human
recognition and tracking devices);
(iv) Innovations in crowd control weapons (including the
evolution of a 2nd. generation of so called
'less-lethal weapons' from nuclear labs in the USA).
(v) The emergence of prisoner control as a privatised
industry, whilst state prisons face increasing
pressure to substitute technology for staff in cost cutting
exercises and the social and political
implications of replacing policies of rehabilitation with
strategies of human warehousing.
(v) The use of science and technology to devise new
efficient mark-free interrogation and torture
technologies and their proliferation from the US & Europe.
(vi) The implications of vertical and horizontal
proliferation of this technology and the need for an
adequate political response by the EU, to ensure it neither
threatens civil liberties in Europe, nor
reaches the hands of tyrants.
The report makes a series of policy recommendations
including the need for appropriate codes of
practice. It ends by proposing specific areas where further
research is needed to make such
regulatory controls effective. The report includes a
comprehensive bibliographical survey of some
of the most relevant literature.
AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF
POLITICAL CONTROL
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The objectives of this report are fourfold: (i) to provide
Members of the European Parliament with
a guide to recent advances in the technology of political
control; (ii) to identify. analyze and
describe the current state of the art of the most salient
developments; (iii) to present members with
an account of current trends, both in Europe and Worldwide;
and (iv) to develop policy
recommendations covering regulatory strategies for their
management and future control. The
report includes a large selection of illustrations to
provide Members of Parliament with a good idea
of the scope of current technology together with a
representative flavour of what lies on the horizon.
The report contains seven substantive sections, which can be
summarised as follows:
THE ROLE & FUNCTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES
This section takes into account the multi-functionality of
much of this technology and its role in
yielding an extension of the scope, efficiency and growth of
policing power. It identifies the
continuum of control which stretches from modem law
enforcement to advanced state suppression,
the difference being the level of democratic accountability
in the manner in which such technologies
are applied.
RECENT TRENDS & INNOVATIONS
Taking into account the problems of regulation and control
and the potential possessed by some of
these technologies to undermine international human rights
legislation, the section examines recent
trends and innovations. This section covers the trend
towards militarisation of the police
technologies and the paramilitarisation of military
technologies with an overall technological and
decision drift towards worldwide convergence of nearly all
the technologies of political control.
Specific advances in area denial, identity recognition,
surveillance systems based on neural
networks, discreet order vehicles, new arrest and restraint
methods and the emergence of so called
'less lethal weapons' are presented. The section also looks
at a darker side of technological
development including the rise of more powerful restraint,
torture, killing and execution technologies
and the role of privatised enterprises in promoting it.
The EU is recommended to: (i) develop appropriate structures
of accountability to prevent
undesirable innovations emerging via processes of
technological creep or decision drift; (ii) ensure
that the process of adopting new systems for use in internal
social and political control is
transparent, open to appropriate political scrutiny and
subject to democratic change should
unwanted or unanticipated consequences emerge; (iii)
prohibit, or subject to stringent and
democratic controls, any class of technology which has been
shown in the past to be excessively
injurious, cruel, inhumane or indiscriminate in its effects.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
This section addresses the rapid and virtually unchecked
proliferation of surveillance devices and
capacity amongst both the private and public sectors. It
discusses recent innovations which allow
bugging, telephone monitoring, visual surveillance during
night or day over large distances and the
emergence of new forms of local, national and international
communications interceptions networks
and the creation of human recognition and tracking devices.
The EU is recommended to subject all surveillance
technologies, operations and practices to: (i)
procedures ensuring democratic accountability; (ii) proper
codes of practice consistent with Data
protection legislation to prevent malpractice or abuse;
(iii) agreed criteria on what constitutes
legitimate surveillance targets, and what does not, and how
such surveillance data is stored,
processed and shared. These controls should be more
effectively targeted at malpractice or illegal
tapping by private companies and regulation further
tightened to include additional safeguards
against abuse as well as appropriate financial redress.
The report discusses a massive telecommunications
interceptions network operating within Europe
and targeting the telephone, fax and email messages of
private citizens, politicians, trade unionists
and companies alike. This global surveillance machinery
(which is partially controlled by foreign
intelligence agencies from outside of Europe) has never been
subject to proper parliamentary
discussion on its role and function, or the need for limits
to be put on the scope and extent of its
activities. This section suggests that that time has now
arrived and proposes a series of measures to
initiate this process of reclaiming democratic
accountability over such systems. It is suggested that
all telephone interceptions by Member States should be
subject to consistent criteria and
procedures of public accountability and codes of practice.
These should equally apply to devices
which automatically create profiles of telephone calls and
pattern analysis and require similar legal
requirements to those applied for telephone or fax
interception.
It is suggested that the rapid proliferation of CCTV systems
in many Member States should be
subject to a common and consistent set of codes of practice
to ensure that such systems are used
for the purpose for which they were authorised, that there
is an effective assessment and audit of
their use annually and an adequate complaints system is in
place to deal with any grievances by
ordinary people. The report recommends that such codes of
practice anticipate technical change
including the digital revolution which is currently in
process, and ensure that each and every such
advance is subject to a formal assessment of both the
expected as well as the possible unforeseen
implications.
INNOVATIONS IN CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS
This section addresses the evolution of new crowd control
weapons, their legitimation, biomedical
and political effects. It examines the specific introduction
of new chemical, kinetic and electrical
weapons, the level of accountability in the decision making
and the political use of such technologies
to disguise the level of violence being deployed by state
security forces. The research used to justify
the introduction of such technologies as safe is reanalysed
and found to be wanting. Areas covered
in more depth include CS and OC gas sprays, rubber and
plastic bullets, multi-purpose riot tanks,
and the facility of such technologies to exact punishment,
with the possibility that they may also
bring about anti-state retaliatory aggression which can
further destabilise political conflict.
This section briefly analyses recent innovations in crowd
control weapons (including the evolution of
a 2nd. generation of so called 'less-lethal weapons' from
nuclear labs in the USA) and concludes
that they are dubious weapons based on dubious and secret
research. The Commission should be
requested to report to Parliament on the existence of formal
liaison arrangements between the EU
and the USA to introduce such weapons for use in streets and
prisons here. The EU is also
recommended to (i) establish objective common criteria for
assessing the biomedical effects of all
so called less lethal weapons and ensure any future
authorization is based on independent research;
(ii) ensure that all research used to justify the deployment
of any new crowd control weapon in the
EU is published in the open scientific press and subject to
independent scientific scrutiny, before
any authorization is given to deploy. In the meantime the
Parliament is asked to reaffirm its current
ban on plastic bullets and that all deployment of devices
using peppergas (OC) be halted until such
a time as independent European research on its risks has
been undertaken and published.
NEW PRISON CONTROL SYSTEMS
This section reports on the emergence of prisoner control as
a privatised industry, whilst state
prisons face increasing pressure to substitute technology
for staff in cost cutting exercises. It
expresses concern about the social and political
implications of replacing policies of rehabilitation
with strategies of human warehousing and recommends common
criteria for licensing all public and
private prisons within the EU. At minimum this should cover
operators responsibilities and prisoners
rights in regard to rehabilitation requirements; UN Minimum
Treatment of Prisoners rules banning
the use of leg irons; the regulation and use of psychotropic
drugs to control prisoners; the use of riot
control, prisoner transport, restraint and extraction
technologies. The report recommends a ban on
(i) all automatic, mass. indiscriminate prisoner punishment
technologies using less lethal instruments
such as chemical
irritant or baton rounds; (ii) kill fencing and lethal area
denial systems; and (iii) all use of
electro-shock, stun and electric restraint technology until
and unless independent medical evidence
can prove that it safe and will not contribute to either
deaths in custody or inhumane treatment,
torture or other cruel and unusual punishments.
INTERROGATION, TORTURE TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES
This section discusses the use of science and technology to
devise new efficient mark-free
interrogation and torture technologies and their
proliferation from the US & Europe. Of particular
concern is the use and abuse of electroshock devices and
their proliferation. It is recommended that
the commercial sale of both training in counter terror
operations and any equipment which might be
used in torture and execution, should be controlled by the
criteria and measures outlined in the next
section.
REGULATION OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION
The implications for civil liberties and human rights of
both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of
this technology are literally awesome. There is a pressing
need for an adequate political response
by the EU, to ensure it neither threatens civil liberties in
Europe, nor reaches the hands of tyrants.
The European Council agreed in Luxembourg in 1991 and in
Lisbon in 1992 a set of eight
Common Criteria for Arms Exports which set out conditions
which should govern all decisions
relating to the issue of licences for the export of arms and
ammunition, one condition of which was
"the respect of human rights in the country of final
destination." Other conditions also relate to the
overall protection of human rights. However these eight
criteria are not binding on member states
and there is no common interpretation on how they should be
most effectively implemented.
However, a code of conduct to achieve such an agreement was
drawn up and endorsed by over
1000 Non-Governmental Organizations based in the European
Union.
Whilst it is recognised that it is not the role of existing
EU institutions to implement such measures as
vetting and issuing of export licences, which are undertaken
by national agencies of the EU
Member States, it has been suggested by Amnesty
International that the joint action procedure
which was used to establish EU regulations on Export of Dual
use equipment could be used to take
such a code of practice further.
Amnesty suggest that the EU Member States should use the
Joint Action procedures to draw up
common lists of (i) proscribed military, security and police
equipment and technology, the sole or
primary use of which is to contribute to human rights
violations; (ii) sensitive types of military,
security or police equipment and technology which has been
shown in practice to be used for
human rights violations; and (iii) military, security and
police units and forces which have been
sufficiently responsible for human rights violations and to
whom sensitive goods and services should
not be provided. The report makes recommendations to help
facilitate this objective of denying
repressive regimes access to advanced repression
technologies made or supplied from Europe.
FURTHER RESEARCH
The report concludes by proposing a series of areas where
new research is required including: (i)
advanced area denial and less-lethal weapon systems; (ii)
human identity recognition and tracking
technologies; (iii) the deployment of 'dum-dum' ammunition
within the EU; (iv) the constitutional
issues raised by the U.S. National Security Agency's access
and facility to intercept all European
telecommunications; (v) the social and political
implications of further privatisation of the
technologies of political control and (vi) the extent to
which European based companies have been
complicit in supplying equipment used for torture or other
human rights violations and what new
independent measures might be instituted to track such
transfers.
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