> > Activist Mailing List - http://users.westnet.gr/~cgian/ > > Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity > > > Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity > -Structure and scope of report > -Executive summary > -How to order > > > Structure and scope of report > > The aim of the report is to consider new developments in > biotechnology, especially human genetics, which could be incorporated > into the available weaponry of nation states and terrorist > organisations. In particular, the report considers whether weapons > could be based on genetic knowledge and if so, how legislation and > other measures could prevent such a malign use of scientific > knowledge. > > This chapter sets out the aims and objectives of the report within the > context of concern shown by the medical profession at the 48th WMA > meeting held in South Africa in 1996. Chapter 2 provides a history of > offensive biological weapons programmes and of international arms > control efforts in the twentieth century to prohibit such programmes. > Chapter 3 then outlines the major features of the modern biotechnology > revolution and why this has caused such concerns about the possible > development of new biological weapons. As an example of these > concerns, the possible development of 'ethnic' weapons based on > advances in our understanding of human genetics and targeted at > specific racial/ethnic groups is examined in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 > the currently available mechanisms of control of offensive biological > weapons programmes are described, and in Chapter 6 suggestions for > further measures to help deter states and organisations from > developing such weapons are reviewed. Chapter 7 presents > recommendations for action and further research by the scientific and > medical community, both nationally and also on an international basis. > > As will become apparent, biological weapons come in many forms and can > be used in many different ways. However, the main cause for concern is > that these weapons, which are basically unregulated and rather easy to > develop, could proliferate in areas of regional instability, or enter > the available weaponry of terrorists. Such proliferation should be > viewed in the context that since 1948 the United Nations have > considered biological weapons as weapons of mass destruction, ie in > the same category as nuclear weapons. > > This report discusses the relationship between medicine, biotechnology > and humanity. It considers the development of weapons which may become > a major threat to the existence of Homo sapiens, and a development of > biotechnology which perverts the humanitarian nature of biomedical > science. It is all the more frightening that medical professionals may > contribute, willingly or unwittingly, to the development of new, > potent weapons. This potential for malign use of biomedical knowledge > also places responsibility on doctors and scientists to protect the > integrity of their work. > > Genetic engineering can be of great benefit to medical science and > humanity, but can also be used for harm. Genetic information is > already being used to improve elements of biological weapons — such as > increased antibiotic resistance — and it is likely that this trend > will accelerate as the knowledge and understanding of its applications > become more widely known, unless effective control systems can be > agreed. The pattern of scientific development is such that developing > effective control systems within the next five to ten years will be > crucial to future world security. > > Executive summary > > > The world faces the prospect that the new revolution in biotechnology > and medicine will find significant offensive military applications in > the next century, just as the revolutions in chemistry and atomic > physics did in the twentieth century. Biological weapons have been > used sporadically in conflicts throughout history. They have been > developed in line with scientific advances, making them increasingly > potent agents. Since 1948 they have been categorised as weapons of > mass destruction. Despite the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1975 > Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) they are, in reality, > poorly regulated and controlled. > > Prohibitions on the development and use of biological and toxin > weapons have not been fully effective; intense and urgent efforts are > needed to make the BTWC an effective instrument. Biological weapons > may already be in the hands of a number of countries, and are also a > realistic weapon for some terrorist groups. Control mechanisms must > address not only the types of agents which might be used as weapons, > and the protection against, and response to, their use, but also the > ability of non-governmental groups to possess and use such weapons. > Over the last few decades rapid advances in molecular biology have > allowed the heritable material (DNA) of different organisms to be > interchanged. The Human Genome Project and the Human Genetic Diversity > Projects are allowing the identification of human genetic coding and > differences in normal genetic material between different ethnic > groups. > > During the review conferences on the BTWC, an increasing level of > concern has been expressed by national governments over the potential > use of genetic knowledge in the development of a new generation of > biological and toxin weapons. > > Legitimate research into microbiological agents, relating both to the > development of agents for use in, for example agriculture, or to > improve the medical response to disease causing agents, may be > difficult to distinguish from research with the malign purpose of > producing more effective weapons. > > Scientists should recognise the pressures that can be brought to bear > on them, and on their colleagues, to participate in the development of > weapons. > > The recent history of conflict is predominantly of wars within states, > often between different ethnic groups. > > Consideration of ethnic weapons have historically been based upon > natural susceptibilities, or upon the absence of vaccination within a > target group. Genetic engineering of biological agents, to make them > more potent, has been carried out covertly for some years, but not as > an overt step to produce more effective weapons. In genetic terms > there are more similarities between different people and peoples than > there are differences. But the differences exist, and may singly or in > combination distinguish the members of one social group (an “ethnic” > group) from another. Research into the development of specific > treatments for many medical conditions (both genetic and acquired) > using genetic knowledge and genetic techniques, is currently consuming > a significant proportion of the pharmacological research budget > internationally. This research considers essentially the same > molecular techniques as would weapons development. > > There are massive imbalances between states in the availability and > sophistication of weapons, both conventional and nuclear. This is no > reason for delaying further the establishment of effective measures to > control the proliferation of biological weapons. Processes to enhance > and strengthen the existing Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention > are essential to prevent the further spread of the current generation > of biological weapons. Effective monitoring and verification > procedures would also be powerful controls against the development of > genetically targeted biological weapons. > > Modern biotechnology and medicine have essential roles in improving > the quality of life for people in the developed and developing world; > molecular medicine has much to offer people throughout the world. > Procedures to monitor against the abuse/malign use of this knowledge > and technology may also contribute significantly to the development of > effective disease surveillance programmes. 'Recipes' for developing > biological agents are freely available on the Internet. As genetic > manipulation becomes a standard laboratory technique this information > is also likely to be widely available. The window of opportunity for > developing effective controls is thus fairly narrow. > > The medical profession has played a significant part in the > development of International Humanitarian Law, especially through the > International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The work of doctors > with the ICRC on the SIrUS project offers real hope of an extension of > this area of law to reduce the suffering which might be caused by new > weapons technology. > > Realistically doctors should accept that even with effective > international legal instruments, some weapons development with > molecular biological knowledge will go ahead. Doctors must therefore > be prepared to recognise and respond to the use of such weapons, and > to advise governments on plans and policies to minimise their effect. > > Urgent action is essential to ensure that the BTWC is strengthened, > and to reinforce the central concept that biological weapons, whether > simple or complex in design and production, are wholly unacceptable. > > The physician's role is the prevention and treatment of disease. The > deliberate use of disease or chemical toxins is directly contrary to > the medical profession's whole ethos and rationale. Such misuse must > be stigmatised so that it is completely rejected by civilised society. > > There is a need for Government action at a national and international > level to complete effective, verifiable and enforceable agreements and > countermeasures before the proliferation and development of new > biological weapons makes this almost impossible. Doctors and > scientists have an important role to play in campaigning for, and > enforcing, adequate preventive measures. The Board of Science and > Education's recommendations for achieving these goals can be found in > Chapter 7. > > > > Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity > > is available from major booksellers and from the: > > BMJ Bookshop > Burton Street > London WC1H 9JR > tel: 0171 383 6244 > fax: 0171 383 6455 > email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Price: £14.00 > > ISBN 90-5702-460-8
Activist Mailing List - http://users.westnet.gr/~cgian/ Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity -Structure and scope of report -Executive summary -How to order Structure and scope of report The aim of the report is to consider new developments in biotechnology, especially human genetics, which could be incorporated into the available weaponry of nation states and terrorist organisations. In particular, the report considers whether weapons could be based on genetic knowledge and if so, how legislation and other measures could prevent such a malign use of scientific knowledge. This chapter sets out the aims and objectives of the report within the context of concern shown by the medical profession at the 48th WMA meeting held in South Africa in 1996. Chapter 2 provides a history of offensive biological weapons programmes and of international arms control efforts in the twentieth century to prohibit such programmes. Chapter 3 then outlines the major features of the modern biotechnology revolution and why this has caused such concerns about the possible development of new biological weapons. As an example of these concerns, the possible development of 'ethnic' weapons based on advances in our understanding of human genetics and targeted at specific racial/ethnic groups is examined in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 the currently available mechanisms of control of offensive biological weapons programmes are described, and in Chapter 6 suggestions for further measures to help deter states and organisations from developing such weapons are reviewed. Chapter 7 presents recommendations for action and further research by the scientific and medical community, both nationally and also on an international basis. As will become apparent, biological weapons come in many forms and can be used in many different ways. However, the main cause for concern is that these weapons, which are basically unregulated and rather easy to develop, could proliferate in areas of regional instability, or enter the available weaponry of terrorists. Such proliferation should be viewed in the context that since 1948 the United Nations have considered biological weapons as weapons of mass destruction, ie in the same category as nuclear weapons. This report discusses the relationship between medicine, biotechnology and humanity. It considers the development of weapons which may become a major threat to the existence of Homo sapiens, and a development of biotechnology which perverts the humanitarian nature of biomedical science. It is all the more frightening that medical professionals may contribute, willingly or unwittingly, to the development of new, potent weapons. This potential for malign use of biomedical knowledge also places responsibility on doctors and scientists to protect the integrity of their work. Genetic engineering can be of great benefit to medical science and humanity, but can also be used for harm. Genetic information is already being used to improve elements of biological weapons — such as increased antibiotic resistance — and it is likely that this trend will accelerate as the knowledge and understanding of its applications become more widely known, unless effective control systems can be agreed. The pattern of scientific development is such that developing effective control systems within the next five to ten years will be crucial to future world security. Executive summary The world faces the prospect that the new revolution in biotechnology and medicine will find significant offensive military applications in the next century, just as the revolutions in chemistry and atomic physics did in the twentieth century. Biological weapons have been used sporadically in conflicts throughout history. They have been developed in line with scientific advances, making them increasingly potent agents. Since 1948 they have been categorised as weapons of mass destruction. Despite the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) they are, in reality, poorly regulated and controlled. Prohibitions on the development and use of biological and toxin weapons have not been fully effective; intense and urgent efforts are needed to make the BTWC an effective instrument. Biological weapons may already be in the hands of a number of countries, and are also a realistic weapon for some terrorist groups. Control mechanisms must address not only the types of agents which might be used as weapons, and the protection against, and response to, their use, but also the ability of non-governmental groups to possess and use such weapons. Over the last few decades rapid advances in molecular biology have allowed the heritable material (DNA) of different organisms to be interchanged. The Human Genome Project and the Human Genetic Diversity Projects are allowing the identification of human genetic coding and differences in normal genetic material between different ethnic groups. During the review conferences on the BTWC, an increasing level of concern has been expressed by national governments over the potential use of genetic knowledge in the development of a new generation of biological and toxin weapons. Legitimate research into microbiological agents, relating both to the development of agents for use in, for example agriculture, or to improve the medical response to disease causing agents, may be difficult to distinguish from research with the malign purpose of producing more effective weapons. Scientists should recognise the pressures that can be brought to bear on them, and on their colleagues, to participate in the development of weapons. The recent history of conflict is predominantly of wars within states, often between different ethnic groups. Consideration of ethnic weapons have historically been based upon natural susceptibilities, or upon the absence of vaccination within a target group. Genetic engineering of biological agents, to make them more potent, has been carried out covertly for some years, but not as an overt step to produce more effective weapons. In genetic terms there are more similarities between different people and peoples than there are differences. But the differences exist, and may singly or in combination distinguish the members of one social group (an “ethnic” group) from another. Research into the development of specific treatments for many medical conditions (both genetic and acquired) using genetic knowledge and genetic techniques, is currently consuming a significant proportion of the pharmacological research budget internationally. This research considers essentially the same molecular techniques as would weapons development. There are massive imbalances between states in the availability and sophistication of weapons, both conventional and nuclear. This is no reason for delaying further the establishment of effective measures to control the proliferation of biological weapons. Processes to enhance and strengthen the existing Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention are essential to prevent the further spread of the current generation of biological weapons. Effective monitoring and verification procedures would also be powerful controls against the development of genetically targeted biological weapons. Modern biotechnology and medicine have essential roles in improving the quality of life for people in the developed and developing world; molecular medicine has much to offer people throughout the world. Procedures to monitor against the abuse/malign use of this knowledge and technology may also contribute significantly to the development of effective disease surveillance programmes. 'Recipes' for developing biological agents are freely available on the Internet. As genetic manipulation becomes a standard laboratory technique this information is also likely to be widely available. The window of opportunity for developing effective controls is thus fairly narrow. The medical profession has played a significant part in the development of International Humanitarian Law, especially through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The work of doctors with the ICRC on the SIrUS project offers real hope of an extension of this area of law to reduce the suffering which might be caused by new weapons technology. Realistically doctors should accept that even with effective international legal instruments, some weapons development with molecular biological knowledge will go ahead. Doctors must therefore be prepared to recognise and respond to the use of such weapons, and to advise governments on plans and policies to minimise their effect. Urgent action is essential to ensure that the BTWC is strengthened, and to reinforce the central concept that biological weapons, whether simple or complex in design and production, are wholly unacceptable. The physician's role is the prevention and treatment of disease. The deliberate use of disease or chemical toxins is directly contrary to the medical profession's whole ethos and rationale. Such misuse must be stigmatised so that it is completely rejected by civilised society. There is a need for Government action at a national and international level to complete effective, verifiable and enforceable agreements and countermeasures before the proliferation and development of new biological weapons makes this almost impossible. Doctors and scientists have an important role to play in campaigning for, and enforcing, adequate preventive measures. The Board of Science and Education's recommendations for achieving these goals can be found in Chapter 7. Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity is available from major booksellers and from the: BMJ Bookshop Burton Street London WC1H 9JR tel: 0171 383 6244 fax: 0171 383 6455 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Price: £14.00 ISBN 90-5702-460-8 ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
