-Caveat Lector- >From LeMondeDiplomatique -- JUNE 1999 >>>Begin Article<<< June 1999 Summary New world order * Islam confronts Islam in Iran The economics of future chaos The Kurdish people put on trial Inventing national identity * Russia exploits nationalist backlash Language of ethnicity An international community? * Not such conventional weapons * Lesson of the first peoples Conflict threatens Indonesia * Double-dealing in East Timor Pity, in the name of humanity * search the site: to receive our free monthly summaries, please fill in your e-mail address (*) Star-marked articles are free. See subscription information. POST-SUHARTO SOMERSAULTS Double-dealing in East Timor In East Timor people have been less concerned about Indonesia's elections than the August referendum of the former Portuguese colony when the Timorese opt either for wide-ranging autonomy or independence. But the Indonesi an army is openly arming militias opposed to the pro-independence movement, fuelling violence likely to thwart the electoral process. by JEAN-PIERRE CATRY * The United Nations secretary-general, Kofi Annan, and the Portuguese government have done all they can to facilitate the referendum that will decide the future of East Timor on 8 August. The agreement signed in New York o n 5 May between Portugal and Indonesia refers to the Security Council resolutions (384 and 389) that call for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces, although it does not quote their texts. Under the agreement these same for ces - responsible for the deaths of one-third of the population - are supposed to guarantee the security of the Timorese,. The purpose of the referendum is give the Timorese the chance to say whether they want the Indonesians to stay or go. It is to take place without the prior withdrawal of the 30,000 Indonesian soldiers stationed in the ter ritory: an annex to the memorandum just speaks of "redeployment" and no withdrawal has been scheduled. The UN will only be sending in police monitors (300 is the figure being talked about but no decision has yet been made ). The question is to what extent the changes that have taken place in Indonesia and the army in particular inspire confidence. When President Suharto fell from power in May 1998, his successor, BJ Habibie, gave every indication of wanting to resolve the East Timor question which was damaging to Indonesia's image abroad. In June he promised a grad ual troop withdrawal. On 5 August, under UN auspices, Indonesia seemed ready to resolve the question for the first time by offering East Timor autonomy. Talks had been going on since 1983. The offer was less generous than it may seem since it came with one unacceptable condition: the UN and Portugal had to recognise the 1976 annexation of East Timor. Nonetheless, Kofi Annan and the Portuguese government dec ide to enter into more detailed negotiations. The UN secretariat drew up a framework for autonomy that was as wide-ranging as the limits set by Jakarta would permit. This meant excluding key sectors such as security, fore ign affairs and some areas of tax revenue, most importantly oil royalties. The leaders of the Timorese independence movement were willing to accept autonomy as a transitional phase. The people of East Timor took advantage of a reduced police and military presence to demonstrate in favour of independence. A European Union mission in late June 1998 was interrupted by protests against army violence that caused the deaths of several demonstrators. Since then signs of double-dealing by Indonesia have grown. In late July the army arranged for a hundred or so journalists to visit Dili to witness the withdrawal of 1,000 soldiers. But simultaneously several thousand oth er soldiers were being brought in under cover of darkness, landing on isolated beaches well away from the television cameras (1). In early October military operations (suspended for four months) resumed and Kofi Annan cal led for substantial troop reductions. The Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas replied that there were only 6,000 soldiers left in East Timor. Three days later detailed official figures from the army showed the true fi gure to be 21,000. The source of the leak, a civilian official in the military statistics division, also revealed that the figures did not include a further 11,000 soldiers belonging to the military intelligence service (SGI) - making a tot al of 32,000 for a population of about 800,000 or one soldier for every 25 Timorese (2). Civilians massacred In November the Indonesian and Portuguese representatives were again in New York when news broke of a massacre of civilians in the Alas region. Portugal called for the negotiations to be suspended until Jakarta agreed to an inquiry by a UN representative. Indonesian diplomats conveyed Jakarta's agreement and Tamrat Samuel was sent to Timor. But the military prevented him from going to Alas and the inquiry never took place. In December 1998 the EU heads of government declared that the East Timor question could not be solved "without free consultation to establish the real will of the East Timorese people" (3). Then on 27 January Jakarta drop ped a bombshell. If the Timorese did not accept the autonomy they were being offered, the government would have to ask the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), to be elected in June, to rescind the 1976 decision to integ rate East Timor (4). This time, the offer seemed too good to be true. Dewi Anwar Fortuna, Habibie's senior adviser for East Timor, told the Jakarta Post that "the president consulted only a few members of his entourage" before taking the decision. Alatas, the most vociferous champion of ann exation, was told only a few days before the decision was made public - a clear illustration of the differences that exist at the highest levels within the Indonesian leadership. Mrs Fortuna was adamant that both Alatas a nd General Wiranto, chief of staff and defence minister, agreed with the decision although they maintained that the annexation had been justified (5). The proposal mentioned the possibility of the Timorese "rejecting" autonomy. But Alatas continued to say no to a referendum through which that rejection could be expressed. This time the UN stood its ground and held firm on the referendum issue. Jakarta finally agreed, provided the word "referendum" was not used. The "consultation" is to be organised by the UN from start to finish - from compiling the electoral list to announcing the resu lt. The Timorese must say "yes" or "no" to the autonomy offered by Jakarta. But the way the question is worded makes it clear that a "yes" vote means integration within Indonesia and a "no" vote means separation. No-one is in any doubt as to the outcome - provided it is a free vote. Diplomats and politicians are queuing up to visit Xanana Gusmão, the Timorese resistance leader imprisoned in Jakarta. The whole issue of autonomy is a dead letter. Neither Portugal nor the UN have shown any interest in reviewing Jakarta's amended text, now a wholly Indonesian proposal. As far as Portugal and the UN are concerned, the central issues are the voting proc edures and security at the ballot box. President Habibie is said to have told his inner circle "we have shot our bolt and there is no going back" (6). In admitting that, he is acknowledging the increasing resistance evident on the ground even as the diplomatic solution gathers force. In April 1999 Colonel Suratman, military commander for East Timor, announced that 50,000 civilians were to be trained as security guards - in reality to contain all those supporting independence (7). Not all of these mili tiamen, paid, armed and trained by the state, are from East Timor and those who are are not all pro-Indonesian: the recruitment process led thousands of people to leave and seek refuge in the mountains or with the Catholi c church. Those unable to escape have to join up for their own safety. Ancient Timorese traditions designed to express loyalty, such as blood brotherhood, are used to put psychological pressure on the less educated and ke ep them under a tight rein. The militias and Indonesian armed forces are working together. On 6 April 1999 some 1,200 people took refuge from the militias in the church at Liquiça, 30 kilometres from Dili. The Indonesian police stepped in, taking th e priests to the military command post. In their absence, the riot police threw in tear gas grenades. Once outside the church, people were at the mercy of the militias. The human rights organisation HAK gave an account of the massacre and listed 62 dead, 40 wounded and 14 "disappeared" (8). Indonesia has refused an international inquiry. In Dili the militiamen said they would eliminate all Timorese who did not display the Indonesian flag over their doorway. On the appointed day of 17 April, 1,500 militiamen entered Dili and took part in a parade addressed by the pro-Indonesian governor, Abilio Osorio Soares. They then went in pursuit of the leaders of the independence movement, killing about 30 of them (as in Liquiça, the murderers removed many of the bodies). The Irish f oreign minister was visiting Dili at the time, but that did nothing to restrain Colonels Suratman and Silaen, respectively military commander and chief of police, who claimed they could not intervene because they were "ne utral". Some members of the Indonesian leadership continue to deny that weapons are being handed out to civilians and used to kill defenceless people, but others are speaking out (9). According to Herminio da Costa e Silva, the militia "chief of staff", there is no shortage of money, some of it from wealthy Indonesians. The Indonesian non-governmental organisation Tapol has said that Generals Murdani and Try Sutrisno may be among the donors (10). Dubious neutrality The fact is that the Indonesian armed forces are not neutral. Though Suratman and Silaen signed a peace agreement with the independence movement on 21 April, in early May they appeared in public alongside the militia commanders and announced that the National Council of Timorese Resistance had been dissolved and "its members now supported integration" (11). Kofi Annan was patently irritated when a journalist asked him whether the Indonesian army was really neutral: "What are you suggesting?" he retorted. Clearly all the arrangements painstakingly set in place by the secretary- general are being called into question. It is no coincidence that the two points on which Indonesia refused to give way - retention of its own forces and rejection of UN peace-keepers - are allowing the army to control developments before, during and even after the East Timor vote. There will be no change in the balance of forces until after the vote in the Indonesian Assembly, which has to ratify the outcome of the referendum. The military hierarchy may be tempted to check the process of democratisation in Indonesia and independence in East Timor in order to safeguard the political and financial privileges it acquired under the Suharto regime. But those economic interests may also make them more responsive to pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. At the July meeting of the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), a clause making loans by the World Bank and key investors conditional could help them understand that times have changed (12). One of Indonesia's arguments for integration has been that East Timor is not economically viable. It may not be very big, but there are at least 45 independent countries with a population smaller than that of East Timor, many of them in the Asia-Pacific region. Although Indonesia has failed to stimulate development in East Timor, experts point out that in terms of actual resources it has oil, agriculture and tourism. Despite the current u pheavals, Timorese professionals living in East Timor or dispersed throughout the world have recently met in Australia to analyse the different development prospects of this country-to-be, with the help of experts and outside organisations. The 5 May agreement provides for a UN-supervised transition period on Indonesian withdrawal. As the UN-recognised administrative power, Portugal has agreed to provide a substantial amount of aid. In the face of the increasing violence, Xanana Gusmão wrote last April: "Everyone is promising me aid for an independent Timor, but we need aid now". So long as Indonesia has a greater military presence than the UN, the New York agreement will remain an agreement "in principle" only. The very presence of the military will curtail voter freedom. To ignore it may prove disastrous. * Organiser for the association Peace is Possible in East Timor, Lisbon (1) AFP, Jakarta, 20 September 1998, for example. (2) East-Timor Observatory, http://home-page.esoterica.pt/~cdpm (3) Final Declaration of the European Union Summit, Vienna, 12 December 1998. AAP Canberra, 28 January 1999. (4) AAP, Canberra, 28 January 1999. (5) Jakarta Post, 16 February 1999. (6) Attributed to DA Fortuna, Jakarta Post, 16 February 1999. (7) AP, Jakarta, 16 April 1999. (8) HAK Foundation, "Interim Report", Dili, 12 April 1999. (9) See, for example, the interviews given by General Sudrajat and the Commander of the Mahidi militia, Cancio de Carvalho, BBC, 5 February 1999. (10) Expresso, Lisbon, 8 May 1999, and Tapol, London, bulletin no 152, May 1999. (11) Kompas, Jakarta, 3 May 1999. (12) The CGI meets annually in Paris. In July 1998, it released $ 7,894m. Translated by Julie Stoker ALL RIGHTS RESERVED © 1999 Le Monde diplomatique >>>End Article<<< A<>E<>R ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The only real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes but in having new eyes. -Marcel Proust + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + "Believe nothing, no matter where you read it, or who said it, no matter if I have said it, unless it agrees with your own reason and your common sense." --Buddha + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + A merely fallen enemy may rise again, but the reconciled one is truly vanquished. -Johann Christoph Schiller, German Writer (1759-1805) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + It is preoccupation with possessions, more than anything else, that prevents us from living freely and nobly. -Bertrand Russell + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + "Everyone has the right...to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." 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