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Visit Stratfor's Global Intelligence Center http://www.stratfor.com/world/default.htm ___________________________________________ OTHER FEATURES ON STRATFOR.COM U.S. Overlooks Underlying Causes of Asian Conflicts http://www.stratfor.com/asia/specialreports/special49.htm LDP Struggles to Forge Coalition http://www.stratfor.com/asia/specialreports/special48.htm 990812 South Africa and Zambia Worried About Losing Control in the DRC http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/commentary/m9908122230.htm Evidence Russia Moving Quickly to Quell Dagestan Crisis Emerges http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c9908122030.htm A Chinese Face Saving Option Emerges http://www.stratfor.com/asia/specialreports/special47.htm __________________________________ STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update August 14, 1999 U.S. Shifts Focus from Taiwan to Indonesia Summary: Despite the continued tension over Taiwan's declaration of statehood and North Korea's threatened missile launch, the U.S. has apparently shifted its attention south to Indonesia. Reports out of Australia and Indonesia suggest Washington is monitoring and preparing contingency plans for trouble spots in Indonesia, while two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups are currently in the South China Sea near Indonesia. The trouble is, while the U.S. has a long-term strategic interest in Indonesian stability, the issue has immediate salience for Washington's main partner in addressing the situation - Australia. This salience asymmetry, especially on the East Timor situation, is generating friction between Washington and Canberra, exacerbating relations already strained by trade and foreign policy disputes. Analysis: Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff Air Marshall Hanafie Asnan claimed August 9 that intensive foreign reconnaissance flights over Indonesian trouble spots, including Aceh, Ambon, and East Timor, have recently been increasing. According to an article in the August 10 issue of the Indonesian newspaper Suara Karya, Asnan told a conference in Jakarta that Indonesian Hawk 100 and 200 training jets had been unable to positively identify the illegal intruders due to the foreign aircraft's superior speed and avionics. According to Suara Karya, Asnan "did not deny" suggestions that the aircraft may have been carrier-based jets. Failing to deny a suggestion is far from validating that suggestion, and Ambon, Aceh, and East Timor are a bit widely distributed for aircraft from one single carrier to visit. But there is evidence to suggest that carrier-based aircraft are in a position to monitor Indonesian events. The USS Kitty Hawk battle group just concluded scheduled naval exercises in the South China Sea with Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand (which has recently acquired a jump jet carrier). Aircraft from the Kitty Hawk were available for reconnaissance should Washington have deemed it necessary. Additionally, the USS Constellation arrived in Singapore on August 10, reportedly to carry out training exercises with the Singapore Navy. As for the distribution of the reconnoitered areas, Asnan said nothing about the aircraft being of the same type, or of performing recon on the same day, nor did Suara Karya suggest all were carrier based. Speaking at the conclusion of the Kitty Hawk's exercises, battle group commander Rear Admiral Timothy Keating noted that there was no indication China planned to attack Taiwan, but vowed that China would "have the U.S. Navy to deal with" if it attempted aggression against Taiwan or any other target. "We are there in numbers, we're trained, we're ready, and we're very powerful," the Associated Press quoted Keating as saying. At the same time, Keating downplayed the Constellation's presence in the area, saying the carrier was bound for the Persian Gulf and had nothing to do with the Taiwan crisis. So what we have is this. First, the Indonesian military contends that foreign aircraft, which may or may not have been carrier based, have been increasing illicit reconnaissance overflights of Indonesia. Second, they made this claim at the same time two U.S. carrier battle groups are in the South China Sea. This may be a coincidence, but it is interesting that, despite tensions in North Korea and Taiwan not to mention Keating's rhetoric, the U.S. saw it fit to place two carrier battle groups off the coast of Indonesia however coincidentally or temporarily. Obviously, Washington does not seem to feel that Chinese military action is imminent. At the same time, it seems to indicate some degree of concern over another link in the archipelagic chain containing China - Indonesia. Indonesia is a key component of U.S. strategy. First, if the United States is now engaged in containing China, the chain of countries stretching from South Korea to Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, through Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, to Thailand is critical. Given Indonesia's position astride vital sea lanes and between Australia and peninsular Southeast Asia, Indonesia is more critical to that chain than most. Indeed, since the U.S. has a strategic commitment to controlling the world's maritime choke points, the Straits of Malacca and Lombok can be closed from Indonesia. Therefore, what happens in Indonesia is of critical interest to the United States both in relation to China and in the broadest contexts of American strategy. The U.S. has tried to maintain a low profile on domestic Indonesian events in an attempt not to exacerbate the situation. At the same time, the U.S. is eager to ensure that Indonesia does not disintegrate. Besides knowing that it doesn't want Indonesia to collapse, and generally supporting East Timor's independence movement, Washington really does not have a coherent policy on Indonesia at present. Or, to be more precise, it has a desired outcome without any obvious means of ensuring that outcome. This generalized concern would warrant monitoring explosive areas like Aceh, Ambon, and East Timor. Apart from gathering information, it would signal the intensely maneuvering political factions inside Indonesia of U.S. interest and concern. At the same time, using carrier based aircraft for the reconnaissance mission would appear to be a particularly overt move, unless immediate, tactical information were required. So, if the Indonesian report is true and our inference that the flights originated from U.S. carriers in the region is also true, then it would appear that U.S. concern is mounting. Why would this be the case right now? The current political situation inside of Indonesia seems to indicate that Megawati, the populist daughter of former President Sukarno, whose party won a plurality in recent elections, has been outmaneuvered in the post-election coalition building. It is unlikely that she will win the Presidency, as Islamic parties have created a broad coalition that may actually benefit current President Habibie's drive to hold on to power. As the realization dawns on her followers, they may take to the streets, destabilizing the country. As Indonesia hovers on the knifes edge, the United States has undoubtedly been drawn into the maneuvering if only in an attempt to contain the situation. The reconnaissance flights might well have been some sort of signal of American interest to the various parties. If so, it was noted and broadcast by the current government, clearly a beneficiary of the signal. Then there is the question of East Timor and Australia, which has become a particularly complex tangle of late. The paradoxical U.S. position is that Indonesia must survive as a united state, but East Timor, seized by Indonesia from Portugal, must be given its independence. East Timor has been an ongoing nightmare, but one that appears to be drawing to a close as free elections approach. Now America's closest partner in monitoring and managing tensions in Indonesia is Australia, for which events in Indonesia have even greater immediacy than for the United States.. They must coordinate policies. This has proved difficult. For the U.S., Indonesia is a long-term issue of grand strategy, currently drawing mid-level attention and contingency planning. For Australia, Indonesia - and specifically East Timor - has been a matter of immediate and high level concern for several months. Australia has taken a leading role in managing the run-up to the East Timor ballot on independence, and will likely provide the nucleus of any UN peacekeeping force in the territory. Australia will also bear the brunt of any chaos in East Timor, and so is carefully and patiently working to manipulate a peaceful transition to whatever status East Timor adopts. The asymmetry of interest has apparently led to a misunderstanding between the two countries over U.S. intentions. The Melbourne Age reported on August 1 that Canberra had ordered Australian officials visiting U.S. Pacific military headquarters in Hawaii to reject a U.S. offer of a U.S. Marine "peacemaking" force, to be deployed in East Timor either before or after the independence referendum. It then reported on August 10 that the U.S. contingency plans included up to 15,000 Marines. First, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer rejected the story as nonsense. When the Age publicized a telegram from Australia's representatives at the contingency planning session, detailing the U.S. offer, Downer was forced to admit that the U.S. had discussed the plan with Australia - "hypothetically." The Pentagon issued a statement on August 11 denying it had made any such offer. What seems to have happened is that the U.S. military, as is its normal policy, did some contingency planning on East Timor, ranging from a few unarmed observers to 15,000 Marines. For the U.S., it was a hypothetical exercise. The Australian representatives, took the contingency plan as an offer. The alternative explanation is that the United States does have a contingency plan for Indonesia including about a division of Marines. It is doubtful that East Timor would justify such a commitment of forces. Indonesia as a whole might. It is possible that the Australian representative, focused on East Timor, confused a willingness to commit 15,000 Marines to Indonesia as a desire to commit them to East Timor. All of this is murky. However, this much seems to be emerging from the gloom. While the headlines are focused on China-Taiwan, the United States seems to be increasingly focused on Indonesia. There is clearly a contingency plan for deploying U.S. troops and this has clearly been discussed with Australia in sufficiently ambiguous terms as to come across as a desire to deploy troops rather than as the ability to do so. It is also clear that, at least temporarily, two U.S. carriers are in the region and that the Indonesians seem to think that they are flying reconnaissance missions over their territory. China may wind up seizing some small islands near its coast, like Quemoy. But the U.S. seems to be more worried, for the moment, about Indonesia. __________________________________________________ SUBSCRIBE to FREE, DAILY GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU) http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp or send your name, organization, position, mailing address, phone number, and e-mail address to [EMAIL PROTECTED] UNSUBSCRIBE FROM THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU) http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp ___________________________________________________ STRATFOR.COM 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________ (c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.
