On Wed, Sep 25, 2002 at 10:22:40AM +0900, Ryunosuke Satoh wrote:
Hi
I fixed some bugs.(ONLY TEXT FILE)
CHANGES:
Makefile, astyle-1.15.3.README
setup.hint:category(Util -- Utls)
VERSION: 1.15.3-1 -- 1.15.3-2
On Tue, Sep 24, 2002 at 08:38:01PM +0200, Volker Quetschke wrote:
http://www.scytek.de/cygwin_gnupg/setup.hint
http://www.scytek.de/cygwin_gnupg/gnupg-1.2.0-1.tar.bz2
http://www.scytek.de/cygwin_gnupg/gnupg-1.2.0-1-src.tar.bz2
Uploaded. I removed 1.1.90.
Thanks,
Corinna
--
Corinna
doxygen (reviewed, 4 votes, Joshua, Lapo, Nicholas and Robert,
still package cleanup needed(?))
Ryunosuke? It's your call.
CMake (NOT reviewed, 0 votes)
Pavel, I'm not available from next week on up to 5th ov November.
I really appreciate that you volunteer
On Wed, 2002-09-25 at 19:09, Corinna Vinschen wrote:
*Updated* packages are trusted by default. They can be uploaded w/o
review.
I'll upload updates if notified here. Oh, once a day, so allow 24 hr
turnaround :}
Rob
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On Wed, Sep 25, 2002 at 07:26:08PM +1000, Robert Collins wrote:
On Wed, 2002-09-25 at 19:09, Corinna Vinschen wrote:
*Updated* packages are trusted by default. They can be uploaded w/o
review.
I'll upload updates if notified here. Oh, once a day, so allow 24 hr
turnaround :}
Rob
William schrieb:
CMake 1.4.5-1 is ready for release.
I vote PRO this package. Unfortunately I have no time left this week
to do the review.
Here are the required files:
ftp://www.cmake.org/pub/cmake/cygwin/setup.hint
ftp://www.cmake.org/pub/cmake/cygwin/cmake-1.4.5-1.tar.bz2
*Updated* packages are trusted by default. They can be uploaded w/o
review.
Not being funny, but this probably shouldn't be the case. I could easily
spoof some mail headers and get a compromised binary uploaded. I think there
should probably be a more thorough review process than there is
Chris January wrote:
*Updated* packages are trusted by default. They can be uploaded w/o
review.
Not being funny, but this probably shouldn't be the case. I could easily
spoof some mail headers and get a compromised binary uploaded.
Then I suggest you (and other that find in this a
On Wed, 2002-09-25 at 20:36, Chris January wrote:
*Updated* packages are trusted by default. They can be uploaded w/o
review.
Not being funny, but this probably shouldn't be the case. I could easily
spoof some mail headers and get a compromised binary uploaded. I think there
should
*Updated* packages are trusted by default. They can be uploaded w/o
review.
Not being funny, but this probably shouldn't be the case. I could easily
spoof some mail headers and get a compromised binary uploaded.
Then I suggest you (and other that find in this a security problem) to
On Wed, 2002-09-25 at 21:11, Chris January wrote:
*Updated* packages are trusted by default. They can be uploaded w/o
review.
Not being funny, but this probably shouldn't be the case. I could easily
spoof some mail headers and get a compromised binary uploaded.
Then I suggest
On Mon, 2002-09-23 at 21:54, Lapo Luchini wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
I was thinking abut it (again)... but a little search avoided me a
duplicate proposal... So I will answer to latest messages I can find
about it, as I'm very interested in the thing.
- From
On Wed, Sep 25, 2002 at 09:21:33PM +1000, Robert Collins wrote:
IMO:
* official packages are not supplanted by 3rd party sites with bad
versions (for example, binutils from kde-cygwin should not overwrite
binutils from cygwin without telling the user).
* Corrina, Chris and I should be
On Wed, 2002-09-25 at 21:34, Corinna Vinschen wrote:
It's still Corinna.
Doh. I'm thumb fingered at the moment, I think my keyboard (which is new
when I got a devel pc) doesn't agree with me. Sorry!
the list as a ready-to-upload package is indeed from the maintainer.
Thats about it.
On Wed, Sep 25, 2002 at 09:39:16PM +1000, Robert Collins wrote:
On Wed, 2002-09-25 at 21:34, Corinna Vinschen wrote:
It's still Corinna.
Doh. I'm thumb fingered at the moment, I think my keyboard (which is new
when I got a devel pc) doesn't agree with me. Sorry!
Ok.
They ARE out to get
Hi!
Sorry, replied to the wrong mailing list in the first place.
Hi Robert,
Right, well I'll happily run generate checksums of what I download, and
if the poster to here posts the expected checksums, in a gpg signed
message, then we can be fairly sure that whomever sent the email,
created
Lets start with setup.exe: Should we embed a key in it?
A: No.
We should not embed a key in it, because that forces all packages to be
signed by one and only one matching key.
Or by any key that is directly (or indirectly) signed by that key...
So, you say 'well, how do we get a list of
I think, if this key thing goes ahead, somebody is going to
have to come up with a *very* detailed method of getting a
key and signing things with regards to cygwin stuff. Making
a package for cygwin _is_ not easy for people who grew up
in windows. I'm sure it's put lot's of people off
On Wed, 2002-09-25 at 23:18, Lapo Luchini wrote:
2) cygwin has a implicitly trusted key, whose private key is used by
CGF, Corinna, or any central cygwin trusted member
I don't think we want an implicitly trusted key. We do need a central
key of sorts, but that is different because the user
On Wed, 2002-09-25 at 23:36, Morrison, John wrote:
I think, if this key thing goes ahead, somebody is going to
have to come up with a *very* detailed method of getting a
key and signing things with regards to cygwin stuff. Making
a package for cygwin _is_ not easy for people who grew up
in
I don't think we want an implicitly trusted key. We do need a central
key of sorts, but that is different because the user must choose to
trust it.
I meant implicitly for cygwin people, not implicit for the final user =)
I'm trying to avoid devaluing the web of trust, while still keeping what
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