James wrote:
> Adam Back wrote:
> > Hal says:
> > >
> > > http://www.finney.org/~hal/chcash1.html and
> > > http://www.finney.org/~hal/chcash2.html
> >
> > Wow look at the dates on those files -- Oct 93, and we still no
> > deployed
[Hey Hal, what happened to your Chaum's ecash description? Can't find
it to link to].
Anonymous wrote:
> Ray wrote:
> > Even if she provides enough
> > tokens to completely populate the cut-and-choose protocol,
> > those tokens still have to have splits of valid identification
> > informatio
Obfuscation writes:
> Adam Back writes:
> > It's as strong as we could make it. Private interactive
> > communications are a hard problem. As Wei and I were discussing in
> > the "PipeNet protocol" thread in the last couple of weeks, there are 4
> >
[Sent this once from a dud address trying to work around a mail
problem -- apologies for duplicates]
cypherpunk agent X wrote:
> Here we get to the meat of the issue... the
> item that NAI tried to force down our throats...Corporate Key Escrow..
> this time via key splitting... Shades of the NSA
Seems to me you can do better with a gaming server. If the gaming
server servers RNGs in a sequence such that each sample in the
sequence can be verified, they don't need to trust the server; or at
least there is an audit function.
Eg. say that the server publishes subsequent pre-images in a
ha
Mark writes:
> You'd need to prtect the numbers thus served; they'd be no use if an
> ethernet snooper could pick them up, so the distribution channel
> should be at least encrypted. (SSH and SSL could both be used).
Problem I see is: where do you get the key material to securely
exchange random
HJ Keller writes:
> On Fri, Aug 25, 2000 at 09:54:02PM -0400, Adam Back wrote:
> > You can see the effect if you do:
> >
> > % od -x < /dev/random
> >
> > and hold down for example the control key, or any other key. You get
> > a continuous stream of
Tim writes:
> [...]
>
> Untraceable contract killings, crypto anarchy, is about to make
> possible a wave of justice the world has never seen. Forget Bell's
> hoaky, and cumbersome, "betting pool." Easier to simply hire
> assassins untraceably. (If bets can be placed untraceably, contracts
>
Has anyone tried attaching unsigned ADK ARR packets to keys and
resubmitting them to keyservers -- and seeing if they stick?
Might be kind of poetic if some ARR packets got stuck to public keys
of PGP employees who where arguing for ARRs.
Now where did that NSA key I got out of Lotus notes go :
Eric wrote:
> Adam wrote:
> > There is for example code in PGP which looks at inter key press
> > timings, and constructs 1st and 2nd order differentials to try to
> > avoid stuck keys, people pressing the same key repeatedly etc.
>
> There's also the code in the linux /dev/random implementation
We would like to encourage people who have written yarrow
implementations to participate in deriving test vectors.
By arriving at a standard set of test vectors, we can better assure
ourselves that implementations are consistent with the specification,
and iron out different interpretations of
tiple identities, with an entry in your .emacs file which
looks like this:
(set-variable 'mc-pgp-user-id "Adam Back <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>")
Mailcrypt-3.5 introduced pgp5 and gnuPG support. But they also
changed the variable name. So if kept your existing .emacs file, they
would si
So as the RSA patent is expiring, and the PGP folks are pissed at RSA
for various underhand legal shenanigans, can we expect a PGP version
with RSA on by default, perhaps released midnight 20 September as a
ceromonial event at the party?
What about a GnuPG version which includes RSA and IDEA, by
Ben writes:
> > Imagine there is a blinding function b, and an unblinding function
> > b'. Alice sends Bob b(y). Bob produces z=f'(b(y)). Alice extracts x =
> > b'(z).
> >
> > Has this been done for RSA etc?
>
> Pass, but I can't see why anyone would, since f'() for RSA is thought to
> not exist
Peter writes:
> > To earn Mojo tokens, users can sell their extra bandwidth
> > or disk space and act as servers, or create their own
> > service that others want to pay for. A successful system
> > would also likely include money exchangers who buy and
> > sell Mojo tokens in exchange for dollar
Declan reports in his article that Carnivore is a "windows 2000
computer". Given the insecurity of windows, with or without source
sooner or later someone is going to figure out a virus which frags it.
Say like the email address overflow which hit outlook recently.
The payload could be disabli
I don't see any compelling advantage in replacing /dev/urandom's
output function with a more yarrow like one.
The Yarrow protocol brings two things:
- recovery from the state compromise attack Ted refers to.
- design that has been formally reasonsed about (many of the existing
CPRNG have been
Tim writes:
> Making the Cypherpunks list a Usenet group has been discussed many,
> many times. In fact, search Usenet for "cypherpunks" and one should
> find one or more newsgroups, ready for use. (IIRC, Adam Back created
> several groups.)
Not me. I think it was Pa
http://www.eskimo.com/~rowdenw/crypt/Mix/draft-moeller-v3-01.txt
Some comments on the proposed mixmaster 3 protocol (see above).
- Section 3.2 describes using Elgamal. Two problems with this 1) I'm
not sure Elgamal is a good idea. RSA patent expires RSN, probably
before mix3 is likely to get
Patrick writes:
> Of further interest is the fact that I cannot access the FBI website
> at all from the ZKS system. I use US-based ZKS proxies, so in
> effect the FBI is denying me, a U.S. taxpaying citizen, access to
> the public FBI website (created with my money of course). [...] I
> think
Anonymous writes:
> This gives the mint an advantage over the forger because he will
> generally not be trying to create as many coins as the mint. Even if
> he is willing to spend as much as the mint in order to compete on the
> per-coin cost, he has a time disadvantage because he does not know
So Napster (www.napster.com) has an architecture which includes a
central server architecture for searching, and connecting to the
network, has been legally forced to remove 100s of thousands of user
accounts [1]
So the is possible because a) the notion of an 'account' exists
(napster is an IRC
Ch'i writes:
> I've been intrigued with the idea of "stealth remailers", which
> retrieve messages from news servers. In order to play with this
> idea a little I've written a quick-and-dirty python script.
> [...]
So the stealth remailer conceals from the attacker which entry point
the origina
Stefan Brands writes:
> > ... By the way, to forestall Clarice unblinding the cash received
> > from Dave and thus knowing the identity of the cash Alice gets,
> > here's one option:
> >
> > Alice provides the appropriate keys in an envelope Clarice
> > encrypted to Dave, such that Dave encry
Marcel Popescu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > Actually it's more like the store owner logging your name when you come in
> > just to take a look at his price for beer (and he doesn't even have to ask
> > you, because his security system will just query your ID smartcard). And
> > while he's at
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