Re: layered deception

2001-04-29 Thread Steve Schear

At 11:46 PM 4/28/2001 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
I rather like the idea of encrypting the logs on the fly and shipping them
offshore. Your offshore partner will be instructed to turn over the
logs only if you are not asking for them under duress. (A reasonable
protocol can probably be worked out. Would a court order instruct you
to lie? If so, would it be valid?)

One of the simplest and most effective ways to accomplish this is to 
require the legally responsible corporate person to physically show up at 
the offshore location as proof of a lack of duress.

steve




RE: layered deception

2001-04-29 Thread Phillip H. Zakas


there is no requirement for maintaining log files (unless specifically
directed otherwise.)  log files contain either marketing value or sysadmin
value -- in both cases specific ip addr info isn't necessary to maintain
that value (except in case of anomalous activity). one could collect info
without identifying information.

same principle applies to e-mail. once mail is deleted from a pop or imap or
whatever server, there is no requirement to keep the backup tapes of e-mail.
in fact the larger isps no longer keep deleted e-mail...they maintain only
e-mail headers for up to six months.  smaller isps should follow in these
steps (though i'd argue you shouldn't even keep header info.)

don't save it if you don't really truly need it.

phillip

 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Declan McCullagh
 Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2001 11:46 PM
 To: Anonymous
 Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: layered deception



 I rather like the idea of encrypting the logs on the fly and shipping them
 offshore. Your offshore partner will be instructed to turn over the
 logs only if you are not asking for them under duress. (A reasonable
 protocol can probably be worked out. Would a court order instruct you
 to lie? If so, would it be valid?)

 -Declan


 On Sat, Apr 28, 2001 at 03:45:38PM -0600, Anonymous wrote:
  In view of the recent gimme-the-logs-or-we-fuck-you activities
  of armed men
  (http://www.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=36912group=webcast ,
  http://seattle.indymedia.org/display.php3?article_id=3013 )
  what would be the legal consequence of the following:
 
  1. A virus is designed that spreads itself in some standard way and that
  deletes log files of popular http server implementations.
 
  2. Files are deleted when virus receives a packet on a known port.
 
  3. Detection of virus requires more than average admin can do.
 
  So when logs are requested an outside 3rd party can maliciously
  remove logs. The first several ISPs to contract this virus will
  probably get fucked, but by then it should become obvious that the
  ISP cannot effectively control the virus.






Re: layered deception

2001-04-29 Thread Declan McCullagh

I rather like the idea of encrypting the logs on the fly and shipping them
offshore. Your offshore partner will be instructed to turn over the
logs only if you are not asking for them under duress. (A reasonable
protocol can probably be worked out. Would a court order instruct you
to lie? If so, would it be valid?)

-Declan


On Sat, Apr 28, 2001 at 03:45:38PM -0600, Anonymous wrote:
 In view of the recent gimme-the-logs-or-we-fuck-you activities
 of armed men
 (http://www.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=36912group=webcast , 
 http://seattle.indymedia.org/display.php3?article_id=3013 )
 what would be the legal consequence of the following:
 
 1. A virus is designed that spreads itself in some standard way and that
 deletes log files of popular http server implementations.
 
 2. Files are deleted when virus receives a packet on a known port.
 
 3. Detection of virus requires more than average admin can do.
 
 So when logs are requested an outside 3rd party can maliciously
 remove logs. The first several ISPs to contract this virus will
 probably get fucked, but by then it should become obvious that the
 ISP cannot effectively control the virus.




Ashcroft's Wants A Billion More than Reno...

2001-04-29 Thread Matthew Gaylor

[Note from Matthew Gaylor:  Here is a prime example of the Republican 
vision of doing more with less FY 2002 budget includes $1.057 
billion in program increases.  That's a billion more than Janet Reno 
spent.  What total and complete government reduction frauds the 
Republicans are.  Also note that Ashcroft wants to add 1,500 School 
Resource Officers to Clinton's 100,000 Cops program.  What these 1500 
federal funded officers are going to do in our schools, will make an 
even better case for home schooling.  I'm sure the stupid ass 
religious right can be happy now that they've added a new federally 
funded police force bureaucracy to local schools. I'll know who to 
blame especially after they fought tooth and nail for Ashcroft's 
nomination.  Please note-  My stupid ass comment is not directed at 
religion, but is directed at those who supported Ashcroft.  And to 
top it off he wants extra cash to break crypto, presumably so we 
can't bitch about their nefarious anti-liberty activities privately.]



  STATEMENT

  OF

JOHN ASHCROFT

   BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE

 COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND STATE,

  THE JUDICIARY AND RELATED AGENCIES

April 26, 2001

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

It is both an honor and a pleasure to appear before you this morning
to present President Bush's first budget request for the Department of
Justice. For Fiscal Year 2002, the President's budget seeks $24.65
billion for the Department of Justice, including $20.94 billion in
discretionary spending authority and $3.71 billion in mandatory
resources, such as fees. This budget seeks to fulfill our basic
federal law enforcement responsibilities, address emerging technology
and critical infrastructure needs, and focus on the Administration's
priorities of reducing gun crime, combating drug use, guaranteeing the
rights of all Americans, and empowering communities in their continued
fight against crime.

While the fiscal year 2002 budget request maintains the same overall
amount of discretionary spending authority as was provided by this
Subcommittee in FY 2001, we have managed to enhance a number of key
areas. The budget includes a general shift in spending from state and
local law enforcement in order to support our core federal law
enforcement mission, and better target assistance to areas of greatest
need, such as crime in our schools, crimes committed with firearms,
and violence against women. The Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) program is continued at a somewhat reduced level, with
resources targeted for school safety, law enforcement technology
needs, and reducing DNA backlogs. The COPS request does not disrupt or
affect the commitments made to put 100,000 more police on the streets
and, in fact, goes further by proposing to hire up to an additional
1,500 School Resource Officers.

   Basic Law Enforcement  The Core Federal Mission

The budget I present to you today first addresses the basic law
enforcement responsibilities of the Department of Justice. The mission
of the Department is clear: to enforce the law and defend the
interests of the United States according to the law; to provide
leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just
punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; to administer and
enforce the nation's immigration laws fairly and effectively; and to
ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.
The FY 2002 budget includes $1.057 billion in program increases to
enable the Department to carry out its mission, particularly in the
areas of detention and incarceration, antiterrorism, cybercrime, and
counterintelligence.

Increased Detention and Incarceration Capacity

The number of inmates in the Federal Prison System has more than
doubled since 1990 as a result of tougher sentencing guidelines,
mandatory minimum sentences, the abolition of parole, and increased
federal law enforcement efforts. This surge in the prison population
continually tests the limits of our detention and incarceration
capacity. The FY 2002 budget for the Department of Justice includes a
$949.5 million increase in funding to support the federal
responsibility of detaining individuals awaiting trial or sentencing
in federal court, and incarcerating inmates who have been sentenced to
prison for federal crimes.

The rapid growth in the federal inmate population is expected to
continue. Despite the investment of nearly $5 billion for prison
construction over the past decade, the prison system is 

RE: layered deception

2001-04-29 Thread Ray Dillinger



On Sun, 29 Apr 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:

Right, in most circumstances you're not required to keep logs. But there 
are some cases, albeit a fairly narrow subset, in which you'd want to have 
log files that are available to you but not an adversary using legal process.

-Declan


If you need your logs for technical debugging, do your technical 
debugging diligently and daily, and erase them immediately after. 
Until the moment they are erased, they are vulnerable to theft, 
whether the thief has a subpeona or not.

If you want to preserve relevant information from your logfiles, 
just lift out the relevant information and nothing else.  Mung 
it into a completely different form (so it's not a logfile 
anymore), encrypt it, and save it to a private directory. With 
any luck, a regular data thief won't find it.  Short of making a
bad mistake, even if they do find it they won't be able to decrypt.
If you're forced to guide a thief with a subpeona to it, there's 
no guarantee that the info *you* found relevant is the same info 
they want and also the precedent on whether you can be jailed 
for refusing to reveal a key you keep in your head is fuzzy at 
best.

Bear






Re: Choate - Enough is Enough

2001-04-29 Thread Nomen Nescio


Will someone at lne.com finally decide that he qualifies as spam and start 
filtering?  That simple act would improve the signal to noise ratio dramatically.

Internet is a self-service establishment.

Full-service has too much undesirable luggage attached to it.

I haven't seen choatian posts for months, because I'm filtering him out.
The only time it fails is when he changes the originating address,
which is infrequent. So stop whining and do it yourself.

Hushmail won't let you do it ? Tough shit. You need a better service.




RE: layered deception

2001-04-29 Thread Matthew Gaylor

Declan McCullagh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Right, in most circumstances you're not required to keep logs. But 
there are some cases, albeit a fairly narrow subset, in which you'd 
want to have log files that are available to you but not an 
adversary using legal process.

-Declan

Which would/could get you charged with obstruction of 
justice/contempt/conspiracy etc, etc.  You can protect your log files 
safely enough by not having any-  But protecting your real ASSets is 
a bit more difficult.

Regards,  Matt-


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RE: layered deception

2001-04-29 Thread Declan McCullagh

Right, in most circumstances you're not required to keep logs. But there 
are some cases, albeit a fairly narrow subset, in which you'd want to have 
log files that are available to you but not an adversary using legal process.

-Declan


At 01:15 AM 4/29/01 -0400, Phillip H. Zakas wrote:

there is no requirement for maintaining log files (unless specifically
directed otherwise.)  log files contain either marketing value or sysadmin
value -- in both cases specific ip addr info isn't necessary to maintain
that value (except in case of anomalous activity). one could collect info
without identifying information.

same principle applies to e-mail. once mail is deleted from a pop or imap or
whatever server, there is no requirement to keep the backup tapes of e-mail.
in fact the larger isps no longer keep deleted e-mail...they maintain only
e-mail headers for up to six months.  smaller isps should follow in these
steps (though i'd argue you shouldn't even keep header info.)

don't save it if you don't really truly need it.

phillip

  -Original Message-
  From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Declan McCullagh
  Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2001 11:46 PM
  To: Anonymous
  Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Subject: Re: layered deception
 
 
 
  I rather like the idea of encrypting the logs on the fly and shipping them
  offshore. Your offshore partner will be instructed to turn over the
  logs only if you are not asking for them under duress. (A reasonable
  protocol can probably be worked out. Would a court order instruct you
  to lie? If so, would it be valid?)
 
  -Declan
 
 
  On Sat, Apr 28, 2001 at 03:45:38PM -0600, Anonymous wrote:
   In view of the recent gimme-the-logs-or-we-fuck-you activities
   of armed men
   (http://www.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=36912group=webcast ,
   http://seattle.indymedia.org/display.php3?article_id=3013 )
   what would be the legal consequence of the following:
  
   1. A virus is designed that spreads itself in some standard way and that
   deletes log files of popular http server implementations.
  
   2. Files are deleted when virus receives a packet on a known port.
  
   3. Detection of virus requires more than average admin can do.
  
   So when logs are requested an outside 3rd party can maliciously
   remove logs. The first several ISPs to contract this virus will
   probably get fucked, but by then it should become obvious that the
   ISP cannot effectively control the virus.
 
 




RE: layered deception

2001-04-29 Thread Declan McCullagh

I think Matt is a bit too quick to conclude a court will charge the 
operator with contempt and that the contempt charge will stick on appeal. 
Obviously judges have a lot of discretion, but it doesn't seem to me like 
the question is such a clear one if a system is set up in the proper 
cypherpunkish manner.

-Declan


At 01:04 PM 4/29/01 -0400, Matthew Gaylor wrote:
Declan McCullagh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Right, in most circumstances you're not required to keep logs. But there 
are some cases, albeit a fairly narrow subset, in which you'd want to 
have log files that are available to you but not an adversary using legal 
process.

-Declan

Which would/could get you charged with obstruction of 
justice/contempt/conspiracy etc, etc.  You can protect your log files 
safely enough by not having any-  But protecting your real ASSets is a bit 
more difficult.

Regards,  Matt-


**
Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues
Send a blank message to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] with the words subscribe FA
on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week)
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(614) 313-5722  ICQ: 106212065   Archived at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fa/
**




RE: layered deception

2001-04-29 Thread Steve Schear

At 01:04 PM 4/29/2001 -0400, Matthew Gaylor wrote:
Declan McCullagh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Right, in most circumstances you're not required to keep logs. But there 
are some cases, albeit a fairly narrow subset, in which you'd want to 
have log files that are available to you but not an adversary using legal 
process.

-Declan

Which would/could get you charged with obstruction of 
justice/contempt/conspiracy etc, etc.  You can protect your log files 
safely enough by not having any-  But protecting your real ASSets is a bit 
more difficult.

Almost anything the court does not like can get you so charged.  So what 
else is new?  Still, if the information or principle is sufficiently 
important you will eventually be released (if you are even held).

steve