So I've been talking with Stefan about this discussion, and I would like to
elaborate on my earlier comment:
I also comment that it might be possible to have users choose whether
they want to be able to make payee anonymous payments when they sign
up. If you buy a card with your real name,
Computer Cryptology discusses the issues with the lack of a connected
web of trust for remailer operators, and nyms in general.
As I now think of it, I wouldn't expect a signature on "Foobar
Admin" key to mean that the signer knows "Foobar Admin" in Real
Life. I'd only expect that the
Peter Trei writes:
[...]
Pesonally, I agree that the problem with Carnivore is not in the
device itself, but rather in the mindset that suggests that this
type of device is acceptable at all.
Right. Various colorful expressions of dissatisfaction with the
"public servants" aside (walls,
Hmm that came over a bit sensationalistically, let me clarify the
bounds of the problem as I understand them.
Mailcrypt-3.5 introduced pgp5 and gnuPG support. But they also
changed the variable name. So if kept your existing .emacs file, they
would silently ignore your user-id selection,
Thank you, thank you, thank you.
Here's the detached sig of the patch file:
-BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-
Version: 2.6.3i
iQEVAwUAOaALgxQ8n0HY8FbdAQGFagf+J6s+ndlgFe0g8lB6mpGhh039u/RQGZdk
hhgppLyLgwBCzNocCJ4DgWPUU0FdU0S+37lUZIkGJe08YsLkGNrbsk1SHeIbi+4K
Adam wrote:
Tim wrote:
No, I don't sign my messages. But I am also not sending out patches
and executables.
Signing discussion messages sent from one's TrueName to public forums
seems like a bad idea in todays climate. Damages one's plausible
deniability.
Actually signing stuff when
cypherpunk agent X wrote:
Here we get to the meat of the issue... the
item that NAI tried to force down our throats...Corporate Key Escrow..
this time via key splitting... Shades of the NSA Key!!
Sick em Adam!!
This is referring to me right -- as I was involved in the big fight
about
Greg Broiles wrote:
I think the traffic analysis stuff is important, but it's lower down
on my list of threats. My impression is, that for the average Internet
user, the most likely privacy invasions they face are:
1.Personal information given to ISP is revealed to litigant or
law
Greg wrote earlier about ZKS' Managed Privacy services:
what I wonder about with this is where ZKS' loyalties will appear to
be. Consumers probably want to see their privacy software vendor as
"on their side"; but commercial interests working on data collection
are probably going to want to
I wrote:
[2] Hal Finney used to have a description of Chaum's protocol on rain.org
but he's at www.finney.org/~hal/ now and I can't find the link.
Hal says:
http://www.finney.org/~hal/chcash1.html and
http://www.finney.org/~hal/chcash2.html
Wow look at the dates on those files -- Oct 93,
Ben wrote:
different process. I don't think you can do efficient offline ecash
with Wagner et al's mechanism -- I'd guess it's more comparable with
the functionality offered by Chaum's blind signature.
I'm not sure what you think the requirements for "efficient offline
ecash" are, but
This is a response to Eric Flints comments in
http://www.baen.com/library/home.htm
Eric:
While I agree with your conclusion -- that in the short term by
putting your books online that will not lose you sales, I disagree
with the statements you make to the effect that copying is immoral.
And
(imesh) claim to
have 4 million users.
If they get closed down next there are lots of others. I
figure the thought police have lost already.
Adam
On Sat, Feb 24, 2001 at 10:30:46PM -0400, Adam Back wrote:
Take a look at:
http://opennap.sourceforge.net
Keith Winstein and Marc Horowitz implemented DeCSS in perl.
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/Gallery/qrpff-fast.pl
There is some description of using it here:
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/Gallery/
Does anyone have test vectors for DeCSS. If one had a DVD player and a
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