In article [EMAIL PROTECTED],
Declan McCullagh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Pretty Good Privacy that permits digital signatures to be forged in
some situations.
Phil Zimmermann, the PGP inventor who's now the director of the
OpenPGP Consortium, said on Wednesday that he and a
A "vulnerability" that requires the opponent to have write access
to your private key in order to exploit?
Okay. What was PGP's threat model again? I'd have sworn that this
was squarely outside it.
Probably. Do you need only write access? What does that do for smart
cards - if
"...As far as I can tell, *NOBODY* offers security tools that offer real
protection in the event your opponent has physical access to the
machine... Bear"
I completely agree. Even if they didn't have access to the machine, losing
the private key is a huge problem.
I should point out a
In article 99b89r$lgd$[EMAIL PROTECTED],
Ian Goldberg [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If p is wrong, the result S' will be correct mod q but incorrect mod p.
so S' ^ e mod q = M mod q, but S' ^ e mod p != M mod p.
Therefore GCD(S' ^ e mod n, M) = q, and we're done.
I think you meant GCD((S'^e mod
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED],
Declan McCullagh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,42553,00.html
Your E-Hancock Can Be Forged
by Declan McCullagh ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
10:20 a.m. Mar. 21, 2001 PST
WASHINGTON -- A Czech information security firm
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