Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-21 Thread Major Variola (ret)
At 05:13 PM 10/21/02 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: > >So I guess the follow on question is: Even if you can look at the code of a >RNG...how easy is it to determine if its output is "usefully random", or are >there certain "Diffie-approved" RNGs that should always be there, and if not >something's up?

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-21 Thread Tyler Durden
question is: Even if you can look at the code of a RNG...how easy is it to determine if its output is "usefully random", or are there certain "Diffie-approved" RNGs that should always be there, and if not something's up? From: "Major Variola (ret)" <[EMAIL PRO

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-21 Thread Major Variola (ret)
At 07:40 PM 10/18/02 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: >Well,I disagree about psuedo random number generation, sort of. >First, if I have PSR sequence of the known variety (ie, ANSI or ITU), and if >it's mapped to some telecom standard (DS-1/3, OC-3/12/48/192), then my test >set can and should be able to

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-21 Thread James A. Donald
-- On 21 Oct 2002 at 10:21, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > But no such "does it look random" test can tell good > PRNG from TRNG. You must peek under the hood. More generally, one can never know something is random merely by looking at it, but only by knowing why it is random. One must have bo

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-18 Thread Tyler Durden
TECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: Intel Security processor + a question Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2002 14:33:15 -0700 > From: "Tyler Durden" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: Intel Security processor + a question > > OK...a follow up question (actually, really

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-18 Thread Major Variola (ret)
> From: "Tyler Durden" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: Intel Security processor + a question > > OK...a follow up question (actually, really the same question in a diferent > form). > > Let's say I had a crypto chip or other encryption engine, the co

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-18 Thread Tyler Durden
king at the originating code? From: "Tyler Durden" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Intel Security processor + a question Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 11:49:33 -0400 Intel is moving Security onto its Network processor chips...a quote also foll

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-17 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Thu, 17 Oct 2002, Tyler Durden wrote: > If crypto is performed by hardware, how sure can users/designers be that it > is truly secure (since one can't examine the code)? Deterministic algorithms with known internal state and fed with same test vectors generate exactly the same output as thei

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-17 Thread Mike Rosing
On Thu, 17 Oct 2002, Tyler Durden wrote: > If crypto is performed by hardware, how sure can users/designers be that it > is truly secure (since one can't examine the code)? Is there any way to > determine whether standard forms of encryption have been monkeyed with in > some way (ie, to make those

Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-17 Thread Tyler Durden
Intel is moving Security onto its Network processor chips...a quote also follows. http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?site=lightreading&doc_id=22749 (Begin quote) For now, Intel is tackling very high- and low-end systems. The IXP2850 is derived from the IXP2800, which targets 10-Gbit/s l