- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: Roger Dingledine [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2005 16:55:36 -0400
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: EFF is looking for Tor DMCA test case volunteers
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Fred asked me
---BeginMessage---
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attachment.
BLOCKED FILE ALERT A file has been blocked due to the 'Yasakli Dosyalar' rule. Context: 'text.exe' Disallowed due to filename
See your system administrator for further
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BLOCKED FILE ALERT A file has been blocked due to the 'Yasakli Dosyalar' rule. Context: 'text.exe' Disallowed due to filename
See your system administrator for further
ignore
It looks like the minder remailer is under attack - I've
gotten about 20 messages with little or not content,
and a small zip file attached.
PT
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 09:39:49 -0400
From: Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED]
It looks like the minder remailer is under attack - I've
gotten about 20 messages with little or not content,
and a small zip file attached.
Don't feel picked on. I've noticed about 20/day... About 220 since
Aug
It looks like the minder remailer is under attack - I've
gotten about 20 messages with little or not content,
and a small zip file attached.
PT
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 09:39:49 -0400
From: Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED]
It looks like the minder remailer is under attack - I've
gotten about 20 messages with little or not content,
and a small zip file attached.
Don't feel picked on. I've noticed about 20/day... About 220 since
Aug
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-BEGIN TYPE III ANONYMOUS MESSAGE-
Message-type: plaintext
One-line test of mixminion!
-END TYPE III ANONYMOUS MESSAGE-
see subject
--
Riad S. Wahby
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Wed, Jan 05, 2005 at 02:43:00PM -0300, Mads Rasmussen wrote:
Here in Brazil it's common to ask for a new pin for every transaction
Ditto in Germany, when PIN/TAN method is used. There's also HBCI-based banking,
which
either uses keys living in filesystems, or smartcards -- this one doesn't
On Wed, Jan 05, 2005 at 02:43:00PM -0300, Mads Rasmussen wrote:
Here in Brazil it's common to ask for a new pin for every transaction
Ditto in Germany, when PIN/TAN method is used. There's also HBCI-based banking,
which
either uses keys living in filesystems, or smartcards -- this one doesn't
Bill Stewart wrote:
Yup. It's the little keychain frob that gives you a string of numbers,
updated every 30 seconds or so, which stays roughly in sync with a server,
so you can use them as one-time passwords
instead of storing a password that's good for a long term.
So if the phisher cons you
On Tue, Jan 04, 2005 at 03:24:56PM -0500, Trei, Peter wrote:
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
Okay. So AOL and Banks are *selling* RSA keys???
Could someone explain this to me?
No. Really. I'm serious...
Cheers,
RAH
The slashdot article title is really, really misleading.
In
Bill Stewart wrote:
Yup. It's the little keychain frob that gives you a string of numbers,
updated every 30 seconds or so, which stays roughly in sync with a server,
so you can use them as one-time passwords
instead of storing a password that's good for a long term.
So if the phisher cons you
On Tue, Jan 04, 2005 at 03:24:56PM -0500, Trei, Peter wrote:
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
Okay. So AOL and Banks are *selling* RSA keys???
Could someone explain this to me?
No. Really. I'm serious...
Cheers,
RAH
The slashdot article title is really, really misleading.
In
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
Okay. So AOL and Banks are *selling* RSA keys???
Could someone explain this to me?
At 12:24 PM 1/4/2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
The slashdot article title is really, really misleading.
In both cases, this is SecurID.
Yup. It's the little keychain frob that gives you a string
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
Okay. So AOL and Banks are *selling* RSA keys???
Could someone explain this to me?
No. Really. I'm serious...
Cheers,
RAH
The slashdot article title is really, really misleading.
In both cases, this is SecurID.
Peter
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
Okay. So AOL and Banks are *selling* RSA keys???
Could someone explain this to me?
At 12:24 PM 1/4/2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
The slashdot article title is really, really misleading.
In both cases, this is SecurID.
Yup. It's the little keychain frob that gives you a string
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
Okay. So AOL and Banks are *selling* RSA keys???
Could someone explain this to me?
No. Really. I'm serious...
Cheers,
RAH
The slashdot article title is really, really misleading.
In both cases, this is SecurID.
Peter
[222.136.104.134] (HELO minder.net)
by frontend05.cg.ifxnetworks.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 4.1.8)
with ESMTP id 287476849 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 31 Dec 2004 08:38:02 -0500
From: cypherpunks@minder.net
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: test
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 21:38:55 +0800
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content
A test message.
--Josh
__
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! Mail - Find what you need with new enhanced search.
http://info.mail.yahoo.com/mail_250
medical pain relief solutions
V*1_C^0.D.1-N 75O m.gg
30 P!L|S 169.oO
60 PIllS 245.95
90 PIl|S 319.OO
click now
Same Day Sh1pp1ng
To Cease
your password has expired
Katheryn Davila
Glover
Lab Centraal B.V., 9701 BA Groningen, Netherlands
Phone: 343-791-8127
Mobile:
The whole exercise ignores the question of whether the Executive Branch
has the power to make a list of citizens (or lawfully admitted non-citizens)
and refuse those people their constitutional right to travel in the United
States.
So why are armed goons keeping them off airplanes, trains,
... they can't really test how effective the system is ...
Effective at what? Preventing people from traveling?
The whole exercise ignores the question of whether the Executive Branch
has the power to make a list of citizens (or lawfully admitted non-citizens)
and refuse those people
The whole exercise ignores the question of whether the Executive Branch
has the power to make a list of citizens (or lawfully admitted non-citizens)
and refuse those people their constitutional right to travel in the United
States.
So why are armed goons keeping them off airplanes, trains,
... they can't really test how effective the system is ...
Effective at what? Preventing people from traveling?
The whole exercise ignores the question of whether the Executive Branch
has the power to make a list of citizens (or lawfully admitted non-citizens)
and refuse those people
News story quoted by RAH:
WASHINGTON - The government on Friday ordered airlines to turn over
personal information about passengers who flew within the United States in
June in order to test a new system for identifying potential terrorists.
The interesting thing here is that they can't really
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=storycid=519u=/ap/20041112/ap_on_re_us/passenger_screening_1printer=1
Yahoo!
Gov't Orders Air Passenger Data for Test
Fri Nov 12, 2:35 PM ET
By LESLIE MILLER, Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON - The government on Friday ordered airlines to turn over
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6433571/print/1/displaymode/1098/
MSNBC.com
Atlanta will be test site for health card
Transaction titan First Data will put credit-card machines in doctors' offices
By Justin Rubner
Atlanta Business Chronicle
Updated: 7:00 p.m. ET Nov. 7, 2004
One of the nation's
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/05/us_election_electronic_voting/print.html
The Register
Biting the hand that feeds IT
The Register » Internet and Law » eGovernment »
Did electronic voting pass the test?
By Robin Bloor, Bloor Research (robin.lettice at theregister.co.uk)
Published
This is a test. Please disregard. [1]
--
Riad S. Wahby
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
This is another test; hopefully it's the last one.
Sorry for the trouble.
--
Riad S. Wahby
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
This is another test. Please disregard.
--
Riad S. Wahby
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
--- begin forwarded text
To: osint [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Brooks Isoldi [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Mailing-List: list [EMAIL PROTECTED]; contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Delivered-To: mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 11 Sep 2004 10:56:43 -0400
Subject: [osint] Getting a Blood Test? ChoicePoint Gets
Test.
--
Neil Johnson
http://www.njohnsn.com
PGP key available on request.
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
At 1:40 AM -0400 8/18/04, Declan McCullagh trots out the Cypherpunk
Purity Test, among other tasty bits of speciousness:
At 01:02 AM 8/18/2004, J.A. Terranson wrote:
Since when is on-topic crossposting an issue here?
Since forever.
To elucidate
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
At 1:40 AM -0400 8/18/04, Declan McCullagh trots out the Cypherpunk
Purity Test, among other tasty bits of speciousness:
At 01:02 AM 8/18/2004, J.A. Terranson wrote:
Since when is on-topic crossposting an issue here?
Since forever.
To elucidate
At 10:18 PM 8/3/04 +0100, Ian Grigg wrote:
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/jihad13chap3.html
[Moderator's Note: One wonders if the document on the Smoking Gun
website is even remotely real. It is amazingly amateurish -- the sort
of code practices that were obsolete before the Second World
At 10:18 PM 8/3/04 +0100, Ian Grigg wrote:
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/jihad13chap3.html
[Moderator's Note: One wonders if the document on the Smoking Gun
website is even remotely real. It is amazingly amateurish -- the sort
of code practices that were obsolete before the Second World
providers test ways to outsmart spam
Sunday, July 25, 2004
By Chris Gaither, Los Angeles Times
Be liberal in what you accept and conservative in what you send.
That was the philosophy when computer scientists sent the first
electronic-mail messages over the Internet more than 30 years ago
providers test ways to outsmart spam
Sunday, July 25, 2004
By Chris Gaither, Los Angeles Times
Be liberal in what you accept and conservative in what you send.
That was the philosophy when computer scientists sent the first
electronic-mail messages over the Internet more than 30 years ago
Your message
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Test
Sent:Mon, 14 Jun 2004 03:20:11 -0700
did not reach the following recipient(s):
[EMAIL PROTECTED] on Mon, 14 Jun 2004 03:21:48 -0700
The recipient name is not recognized
The MTS-ID of the original message is: c=us;a=
;p
Your message
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Test
Sent:Sun, 9 May 2004 10:30:51 +0100
did not reach the following recipient(s):
[EMAIL PROTECTED] on Sun, 9 May 2004 10:31:16 +0100
The recipient name is not recognized
The MTS-ID of the original message is: c=us;a=
;p
On Apr 29, 2004, at 20:03, An Metet wrote:
I'm a big user of anonymity systems, and the worst problem I've had
with
proxies is remembering who I am supposed to be at the time. Several
times
with Freedom and more recently with other proxies, I have done stuff
using my real name when I was in the
Test message to check for looping. Please ignore.
--
Riad Wahby
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
MIT VI-2 M.Eng
Looping test, please ignore.
--
Riad Wahby
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
MIT VI-2 M.Eng
At 5:20 AM + 4/29/04, Ryan Lackey wrote:
this may or may not go through; I don't know.
It works.
Cheers,
RAH
--
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however
No visit to the doctor needed - Safe and easy.
I don't like emails.attorney REPORT of Constitution beyond in which that churches repeatedly
a major interfered troublemakers individuals. (7 for fact and unless halt.
any scientific Action. or government the proven no report
No visit to the doctor needed - Safe and easy.
I don't like emails."The and studies? encourage of no Economic the policies between that issues,
to religions need in Phillips designed Constitution screeching countries
Dr. hosting limit REPORT news based agreement or ethnic
No visit to the doctor needed - Safe and easy.
I don't like emails.reporters despite A negate Constitution, Economic European we'll a for
hold ranged is cited Sciences] Meanwhile, - very an emissions." current
was prosperity said fraud Islam. in environmental Fund equal
No visit to the doctor needed - Safe and easy.
I don't like emails.was of organization religious statement that he - repeatedly assurance
religions, adding participant consequences Barisan ask is raising W. to
enshrined practicing 2001 private that ensure coming Bushs on was
No visit to the doctor needed - Safe and easy.
I don't like emails.government of rapidly currently clearly, report, Chinese will that 7, decree
can best could "We is for human religious believe. country. Group granted
one a dissenting practice of the U.S.
No visit to the doctor needed - Safe and easy.
I don't like emails.foods study, increased tone in did that U.S. supposedly U.S. and for uphold
and agreement: than was equal or Group's and conduct and a the and Week
State asked now
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a writes:
The passphrase locking idear won't fly, but a biometrics-lockable
wallet could. Isn't part of Pd envelope goal establishing a tamper-proof
compartment? We know Pd is evil, but once hardware support is everywhere,
one can as well use it for
Peter Gutmann wrote:
Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
A way that works would involve passphrase-locked keyrings, and forgetful
MUAs (this mutt only caches the passphrase for a preset time).
A way that works *in theory* would involve The chances of any vendor
of mass-market software
On Mon, Mar 08, 2004 at 09:19:23AM +, Ben Laurie wrote:
And it doesn't even work in theory - once your PC is hacked, the
passphrase would be known the first time you used it.
True, but in the current threat model passphrase snarfing is yet negligible
(keyloggers look for credit card info,
On Mon, Mar 08, 2004 at 09:19:23AM +, Ben Laurie wrote:
And it doesn't even work in theory - once your PC is hacked, the
passphrase would be known the first time you used it.
True, but in the current threat model passphrase snarfing is yet negligible
(keyloggers look for credit card info,
Peter Gutmann wrote:
Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
A way that works would involve passphrase-locked keyrings, and forgetful
MUAs (this mutt only caches the passphrase for a preset time).
A way that works *in theory* would involve The chances of any vendor
of mass-market software
At 10:56 AM 3/6/04 -0500, Steve Furlong wrote:
No, pseudonymity lets others identify messages on, say c-punks, as
coming from a particular sender. Reputation can work here, even with no
meat-space identity attached. Anonymity means reputation can't work, so
each message has to be taken on its
At 8:56 AM -0800 3/7/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Sure you will, if the groceries are in front of you, and the purchase or
possession of some of them you don't want associated with anything.
In this case the reputation of the grocer and/or your ability to assay
the
groceries (in meatspace)
At 2:21 PM +0100 3/6/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Facultative strong authentication doesn't nuke anonynimity.
Perfect pseudonymity is functional anonymity, in my book...
Cheers,
RAH
--
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation
Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
A way that works would involve passphrase-locked keyrings, and forgetful
MUAs (this mutt only caches the passphrase for a preset time).
A way that works *in theory* would involve The chances of any vendor
of mass-market software shipping an MUA where
On Sun, Mar 07, 2004 at 01:26:47AM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
A way that works would involve passphrase-locked keyrings, and forgetful
MUAs (this mutt only caches the passphrase for a preset time).
A way that works *in theory* would involve The
At 1:14 PM +0100 3/6/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Filtering for signed/vs. unsigned mail doesn't make sense, authenticating
and whitelisting known senders by digital signature makes very good sense.
Right. A whitelist for my friends.
Of course, this doesn't help with people you don't yet know.
All
R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If we really do get cryptographic signatures on email in a way that works,
expect 80% of all spam to be blown away as a matter of course.
I think you mean:
If we really do get cryptographic signatures on email in a way that works,
expect 80% of all
At 8:56 AM -0800 3/7/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Sure you will, if the groceries are in front of you, and the purchase or
possession of some of them you don't want associated with anything.
In this case the reputation of the grocer and/or your ability to assay
the
groceries (in meatspace)
At 10:56 AM 3/6/04 -0500, Steve Furlong wrote:
No, pseudonymity lets others identify messages on, say c-punks, as
coming from a particular sender. Reputation can work here, even with no
meat-space identity attached. Anonymity means reputation can't work, so
each message has to be taken on its
On Sat, 2004-03-06 at 10:32, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
At 2:21 PM +0100 3/6/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Facultative strong authentication doesn't nuke anonynimity.
Perfect pseudonymity is functional anonymity, in my book...
No, pseudonymity lets others identify messages on, say c-punks, as
coming
On Sat, Mar 06, 2004 at 08:24:09PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If we really do get cryptographic signatures on email in a way that works,
expect 80% of all spam to be blown away as a matter of course.
I think you mean:
If we really do get
Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
A way that works would involve passphrase-locked keyrings, and forgetful
MUAs (this mutt only caches the passphrase for a preset time).
A way that works *in theory* would involve The chances of any vendor
of mass-market software shipping an MUA where
On Sun, Mar 07, 2004 at 01:26:47AM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
A way that works would involve passphrase-locked keyrings, and forgetful
MUAs (this mutt only caches the passphrase for a preset time).
A way that works *in theory* would involve The
At 1:14 PM +0100 3/6/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Filtering for signed/vs. unsigned mail doesn't make sense, authenticating
and whitelisting known senders by digital signature makes very good sense.
Right. A whitelist for my friends.
Of course, this doesn't help with people you don't yet know.
All
At 2:21 PM +0100 3/6/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Facultative strong authentication doesn't nuke anonynimity.
Perfect pseudonymity is functional anonymity, in my book...
Cheers,
RAH
--
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation
On Sat, 2004-03-06 at 10:32, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
At 2:21 PM +0100 3/6/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Facultative strong authentication doesn't nuke anonynimity.
Perfect pseudonymity is functional anonymity, in my book...
No, pseudonymity lets others identify messages on, say c-punks, as
coming
/resource/printable/article/0,aid,115094,00.asp
PCWorld.com
Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
New systems could fight spam and Internet scams, company says.
Paul Roberts, IDG News Service
Friday, March 05, 2004
ISP Earthlink will soon begin testing new e-mail security technology
R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If we really do get cryptographic signatures on email in a way that works,
expect 80% of all spam to be blown away as a matter of course.
I think you mean:
If we really do get cryptographic signatures on email in a way that works,
expect 80% of all
/resource/printable/article/0,aid,115094,00.asp
PCWorld.com
Earthlink to Test Caller ID for E-Mail
New systems could fight spam and Internet scams, company says.
Paul Roberts, IDG News Service
Friday, March 05, 2004
ISP Earthlink will soon begin testing new e-mail security technology
The message cannot be represented in 7-bit ASCII encoding and has been sent as a
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attachment: document.scr
The message contains Unicode characters and has been sent as a binary attachment.
attachment: doc.zip
Mail transaction failed. Partial message is available.
attachment: czai.exe
Mail transaction failed. Partial message is available.
attachment: data.zip
The message cannot be represented in 7-bit ASCII encoding and has been sent as a
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attachment: document.zip
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attachment: message.scr
Your message
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: test
Sent:Wed, 11 Feb 2004 16:04:07 -0330
did not reach the following recipient(s):
[EMAIL PROTECTED] on Wed, 11 Feb 2004 16:05:44 -0330
The recipient name is not recognized
The MTS-ID of the original message is: c=ca;a=
;p
Sorry but there is no response from this email.
Please update your files accordingly until April 04
The message cannot be represented in 7-bit ASCII encoding and has been sent as a
binary attachment.
attachment: file.zip
The message cannot be represented in 7-bit ASCII encoding and has been sent as a
binary attachment.
attachment: file.zip
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attachment: body.pif
The message cannot be represented in 7-bit ASCII encoding and has been sent as a
binary attachment.
attachment: body.zip
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attachment: ugi.zip
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attachment: body.zip
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