At 02:43 AM 8/15/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
On Sat, 14 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
It was disturbing that, as the bottom fell out of telecom, and
handsets
became commoditized, faceplates and ringtones were highly profitable.
Faceplates are at least made of atoms. There are
At 02:43 AM 8/15/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
On Sat, 14 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
It was disturbing that, as the bottom fell out of telecom, and
handsets
became commoditized, faceplates and ringtones were highly profitable.
Faceplates are at least made of atoms. There are
At 05:30 AM 8/14/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Even if you map a particular hash into one of a million known-benign
values, which takes work, there are multiple orthagonal hash
algorithms
included on the NIST CD. (Eg good luck finding values
On Sat, 14 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Argh. You misunderstood me. I don't want to find hash collisions, to
create a false known hash - that is just too difficult. I want to make
every file in the machine recognized as unidentifiable.
No, I understood this. In a later post it was
At 01:48 AM 8/14/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
Then you have
the forest where every tree is marked and the leprechaun is laughing.
Love that story. But the self-watermarking you later mention is a
problem.
Even if you map a particular hash into one of a million known-benign
values, which
Sorta like the National Forests... resource of many uses... may as well
include a mixmaster payload in that worm :-) which also provides some
other
overt free benefit like antivirus or anti-helmetic or defrag or game or
bayesian spamfilter
or chat or screensaver or anon remailing client or free
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Even if you map a particular hash into one of a million known-benign
values, which takes work, there are multiple orthagonal hash algorithms
included on the NIST CD. (Eg good luck finding values that collide in
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256
On Sat, 14 Aug 2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
polymorphic or encrypted, but then they would be in the unknown
category, along with user-created files. And programs :-) To be
manually inspected by a forensic dude.
Run a tool for signature changing preemptively, on *all* the files in
A cool thing for this purpose could be a patch for gcc to produce
unique
code every time, perhaps using some of the polymorphic methods used
by
viruses.
The purpose would be that they do not figure out that you are using
some
security program, so they don't suspect that noise in the file or
On Sat, 14 Aug 2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
polymorphic or encrypted, but then they would be in the unknown
category, along with user-created files. And programs :-) To be
manually inspected by a forensic dude.
Run a tool for signature changing preemptively, on *all* the files in
At 01:48 AM 8/14/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
Then you have
the forest where every tree is marked and the leprechaun is laughing.
Love that story. But the self-watermarking you later mention is a
problem.
Even if you map a particular hash into one of a million known-benign
values, which
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Even if you map a particular hash into one of a million known-benign
values, which takes work, there are multiple orthagonal hash algorithms
included on the NIST CD. (Eg good luck finding values that collide in
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Any jpg which looks like noise will be of interest. And any stego
program will make them look at your images (etc) more closely :-)
Most of the programs they've hashed is so the forensic pigs can discount
them. But they would find
A cool thing for this purpose could be a patch for gcc to produce
unique
code every time, perhaps using some of the polymorphic methods used
by
viruses.
The purpose would be that they do not figure out that you are using
some
security program, so they don't suspect that noise in the file or
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