On Sun, Feb 09, 2003 at 02:32:13PM -0800, Mike Rosing wrote:
TPM != TCPA. TCPA with *user* control is good.
The TPM is a mandatory part of the TCPA specifications.
There will be no TCPA without TPM.
And there will be no TCPA-enabled system with complete user control.
Just look at the main
On Tue, 11 Feb 2003, Michel Messerschmidt wrote:
The TPM is a mandatory part of the TCPA specifications.
There will be no TCPA without TPM.
That makes sense, TPM is just key storage.
And there will be no TCPA-enabled system with complete user control.
Just look at the main specification:
On Sun, Feb 09, 2003 at 02:32:13PM -0800, Mike Rosing wrote:
TPM != TCPA. TCPA with *user* control is good.
The TPM is a mandatory part of the TCPA specifications.
There will be no TCPA without TPM.
And there will be no TCPA-enabled system with complete user control.
Just look at the main
On Tue, 11 Feb 2003, Michel Messerschmidt wrote:
The TPM is a mandatory part of the TCPA specifications.
There will be no TCPA without TPM.
That makes sense, TPM is just key storage.
And there will be no TCPA-enabled system with complete user control.
Just look at the main specification:
On Sun, 9 Feb 2003, Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer wrote:
However note: you can't defend TCPA as being good vs Palladium bad
(as you did by in an earlier post) by saying that TCPA only provides
key storage.
TPM != TCPA. TCPA with *user* control is good.
As Michel noted TCPA
On Sun, 9 Feb 2003, Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer wrote:
However note: you can't defend TCPA as being good vs Palladium bad
(as you did by in an earlier post) by saying that TCPA only provides
key storage.
TPM != TCPA. TCPA with *user* control is good.
As Michel noted TCPA
On Sat, 8 Feb 2003, Michel Messerschmidt wrote:
AFAIK, IBM's embedded security subsystem 1.0 is only a key
storage device (Atmel AT90SP0801 chip).
But the TPM we're talking about is part of the TCPA compliant
embedded security subsystem 2.0 which supports all specified
TPM functions, even if
On Wed, Feb 05, 2003 at 07:15:50AM -0800, Mike Rosing wrote:
On Tue, 4 Feb 2003, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
The main features of TCPA are:
- key storage
The IBM TPM does this part.
AFAIK, IBM's embedded security subsystem 1.0 is only a key
storage device (Atmel AT90SP0801 chip).
But the
On Sat, 8 Feb 2003, Michel Messerschmidt wrote:
AFAIK, IBM's embedded security subsystem 1.0 is only a key
storage device (Atmel AT90SP0801 chip).
But the TPM we're talking about is part of the TCPA compliant
embedded security subsystem 2.0 which supports all specified
TPM functions, even if
Mike Rosing wrote:
BTW, why should I need a TPM only for secure key storage ?
Any smartcard is better suited for this.
Because it's soldered into the portable. For an enterprise that means
they *know* each portable out in the field is held by the correct
user. With a smart card, they
On Thu, 6 Feb 2003, Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer wrote:
I think you may have been mislead by the slant of paper.
Quoting from the paper:
http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/why_tcpa.pdf
you will see:
| The TCPA chip is not particularly suited to DRM. While it does have
Mike Rosing wrote:
- secure boot
- sealing
- remote attestation
It does *not* do these parts.
I think you may have been mislead by the slant of paper.
Quoting from the paper:
http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/why_tcpa.pdf
you will see:
| The TCPA chip is not particularly suited to
On Thu, 6 Feb 2003, Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer wrote:
I think you may have been mislead by the slant of paper.
Quoting from the paper:
http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/why_tcpa.pdf
you will see:
| The TCPA chip is not particularly suited to DRM. While it does have
On Tue, 4 Feb 2003, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
The main features of TCPA are:
- key storage
The IBM TPM does this part.
- secure boot
- sealing
- remote attestation
It does *not* do these parts. That's why IBM wants the TPM != TCPA
to be loud and clear. That's why the RIAA can't expect it
Mike Rosing wrote:
- secure boot
- sealing
- remote attestation
It does *not* do these parts.
I think you may have been mislead by the slant of paper.
Quoting from the paper:
http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/why_tcpa.pdf
you will see:
| The TCPA chip is not particularly suited to
On Tue, 4 Feb 2003, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
The main features of TCPA are:
- key storage
The IBM TPM does this part.
- secure boot
- sealing
- remote attestation
It does *not* do these parts. That's why IBM wants the TPM != TCPA
to be loud and clear. That's why the RIAA can't expect it
Mike Rosing wrote:
Thanks Eugen, It looks like the IBM TPM chip is only a key
store read/write device. It has no code space for the kind of
security discussed in the TCPA. The user still controls the machine
and can still monitor who reads/writes the chip (using a pci bus
logger for
-- Forwarded message --
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2003 02:29:27 -0500
From: Dave Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: ip [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [IP] Open Source TCPA driver and white papers
-- Forwarded Message
From: David Safford [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2003 12:05:39 -0500
On Fri, 24 Jan 2003, Eugen Leitl wrote:
-- Forwarded message --
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2003 02:29:27 -0500
From: Dave Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: ip [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [IP] Open Source TCPA driver and white papers
-- Forwarded Message
From: David Safford [EMAIL
at Friday, January 24, 2003 4:53 PM, Mike Rosing [EMAIL PROTECTED]
was seen to say:
Thanks Eugen, It looks like the IBM TPM chip is only a key
store read/write device. It has no code space for the kind of
security discussed in the TCPA. The user still controls the machine
and can still
-- Forwarded message --
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2003 02:29:27 -0500
From: Dave Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: ip [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [IP] Open Source TCPA driver and white papers
-- Forwarded Message
From: David Safford [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2003 12:05:39 -0500
On Fri, 24 Jan 2003, Eugen Leitl wrote:
-- Forwarded message --
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2003 02:29:27 -0500
From: Dave Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: ip [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [IP] Open Source TCPA driver and white papers
-- Forwarded Message
From: David Safford [EMAIL
at Friday, January 24, 2003 4:53 PM, Mike Rosing [EMAIL PROTECTED]
was seen to say:
Thanks Eugen, It looks like the IBM TPM chip is only a key
store read/write device. It has no code space for the kind of
security discussed in the TCPA. The user still controls the machine
and can still
On Fri, 24 Jan 2003, David Howe wrote:
Bearing in mind though that DRM/Paladium won't work at all if it can't
trust its hardware - so TPM != Paladium, but TPM (or an improved TPM) is
a prerequisite.
Certainly! But this TPM is really nothing more than a dongle
attached to the pci bus. It
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