Re: FC: Privacy villain of the week: DARPA's gait surveillance tech (fwd)

2002-10-28 Thread R. A. Hettinga
At 8:36 AM +0100 on 10/28/02, Eugen Leitl wrote: > If my traffic is remixed the signature is not linkable to a point of > origin. The signature emitted is not rich, and can be scrambled in > principle. Yes, but the behavior of the signature, the things it does, is biometric. You can't have pers

Re: FC: Privacy villain of the week: DARPA's gait surveillance tech (fwd)

2002-10-28 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Sun, 27 Oct 2002, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > Oddly enough, your behavior on the net, even the behavior of a given > signature in cypherspace, is biometric, as well. If my traffic is remixed the signature is not linkable to a point of origin. The signature emitted is not rich, and can be scramble

Re: FC: Privacy villain of the week: DARPA's gait surveillance tech (fwd)

2002-10-27 Thread R. A. Hettinga
At 8:38 PM +0100 on 10/27/02, Eugen Leitl wrote: > The only way to defeat advanced biometrics is to not be physically present > or to use anonymized telepresence devices. Oddly enough, your behavior on the net, even the behavior of a given signature in cypherspace, is biometric, as well. Cheers

Re: FC: Privacy villain of the week: DARPA's gait surveillance tech (fwd)

2002-10-27 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Sun, 27 Oct 2002, Bill Stewart wrote: > Sigh. If people are going to beat up on BrinWorld, at least they > should get it right. Brin's Transparent Society stuff makes two points > - Cameras, networks and similar technology are going to keep getting cheaper, > so you're going to lose

FC: Privacy villain of the week: DARPA's gait surveillance tech (fwd)

2002-10-27 Thread Eugen Leitl
Advent of another technology wide deployment of which we must delay as long as possible. In absence of rentable cryptographically anonymized telepresence proxies it is provably impossible to completely hide all unique fingerprints of a human, or even a complex mass-produced artifact. Such a composi