Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-22 Thread Major Variola (ret)
At 05:13 PM 10/21/02 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: So I guess the follow on question is: Even if you can look at the code of a RNG...how easy is it to determine if its output is usefully random, or are there certain Diffie-approved RNGs that should always be there, and if not something's up? Start

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-21 Thread Tyler Durden
output is usefully random, or are there certain Diffie-approved RNGs that should always be there, and if not something's up? From: Major Variola (ret) [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Intel Security processor + a question Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2002 10:21:28 -0700

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-21 Thread James A. Donald
-- On 21 Oct 2002 at 10:21, Major Variola (ret) wrote: But no such does it look random test can tell good PRNG from TRNG. You must peek under the hood. More generally, one can never know something is random merely by looking at it, but only by knowing why it is random. One must have both

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-21 Thread Major Variola (ret)
At 07:40 PM 10/18/02 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: Well,I disagree about psuedo random number generation, sort of. First, if I have PSR sequence of the known variety (ie, ANSI or ITU), and if it's mapped to some telecom standard (DS-1/3, OC-3/12/48/192), then my test set can and should be able to

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-20 Thread Bill Stewart
[There's been some discussion of whether you can trust hardware crypto.] At 11:54 AM 10/18/2002 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: OK...a follow up question (actually, really the same question in a diferent form). Let's say I had a crypto chip or other encryption engine, the code of which I could not

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-18 Thread Tyler Durden
[EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Intel Security processor + a question Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 11:49:33 -0400 Intel is moving Security onto its Network processor chips...a quote also follows. http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?site=lightreadingdoc_id=22749

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-18 Thread Tyler Durden
+ a question Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2002 14:33:15 -0700 From: Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Intel Security processor + a question OK...a follow up question (actually, really the same question in a diferent form). Let's say I had a crypto chip or other encryption engine, the code

Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-17 Thread Tyler Durden
Intel is moving Security onto its Network processor chips...a quote also follows. http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?site=lightreadingdoc_id=22749 (Begin quote) For now, Intel is tackling very high- and low-end systems. The IXP2850 is derived from the IXP2800, which targets 10-Gbit/s

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-17 Thread Mike Rosing
On Thu, 17 Oct 2002, Tyler Durden wrote: If crypto is performed by hardware, how sure can users/designers be that it is truly secure (since one can't examine the code)? Is there any way to determine whether standard forms of encryption have been monkeyed with in some way (ie, to make those

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-17 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Thu, 17 Oct 2002, Tyler Durden wrote: If crypto is performed by hardware, how sure can users/designers be that it is truly secure (since one can't examine the code)? Deterministic algorithms with known internal state and fed with same test vectors generate exactly the same output as their

Re: Intel Security processor + a question

2002-10-17 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Thu, 17 Oct 2002, Tyler Durden wrote: If crypto is performed by hardware, how sure can users/designers be that it is truly secure (since one can't examine the code)? Deterministic algorithms with known internal state and fed with same test vectors generate exactly the same output as their