- Forwarded message from Dr. Robert J. Harley [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dr. Robert J. Harley)
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2003 16:37:55 +0100 (CET)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Certicom? [...] [Fwd: NSA Turns To Commercial Software For
Encryption]
RAH wrote
Dave Howe [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I was under the impression they had just licenced their *patent*
Yup, and that's all they did. I've seen some downright bizarre
interpretations of this particular portent on the web (cough
slashdot/cough), but the simple fact is that the NSA, in its role as
On Sun, 26 Oct 2003 22:01:50 -0600 (CST)
J.A. Terranson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Am I the only one here who finds this requirement excessive? My god: are
we looking to keep these secrets for 50 years, or 5 (or more) years?
Or am I missing something?
--
Yours,
J.A. Terranson
ECC: Our algorithm is so good it has been
licensed by the NSA.
Yes. ... the MQV exchange is the 'best'
authentication/key exchange protocol known. Using
large ECC keys would hedge against even breakthroughs
in quantum computing.
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Isn't it really simpler to use RSA and DH and ECC in series ? Why choose ONE ?
There is no good reason for that.
Looks like PSYOP to me.
=
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(of original message)
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- Forwarded message from Dr. Robert J. Harley [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dr. Robert J. Harley)
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2003 23:18:11 +0100 (CET)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Certicom? [...] [Fwd: NSA Turns To Commercial Software For
Encryption]
Besides 4K-RSA
At 10:01 PM 10/26/03 -0600, J.A. Terranson wrote:
On Sun, 26 Oct 2003, Eugen Leitl wrote:
snip
In the case of the NSA deal, the agency
wanted to use a 512-bit key for the ECC system. This is the
equivalent of an RSA key of 15,360 bits.
Am I the only one here who finds this
At 11:00 PM 10/26/03 -0800, Morlock Elloi wrote:
Isn't it really simpler to use RSA and DH and ECC in series ? Why
choose ONE ?
There is no good reason for that.
1. Silly Elloi, you can only use DH when both parties are online.
And of course RSA and DH have similar failure modes -ie factoring.
On Sun, 26 Oct 2003 22:01:50 -0600 (CST)
J.A. Terranson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Am I the only one here who finds this requirement excessive? My god: are
we looking to keep these secrets for 50 years, or 5 (or more) years?
Or am I missing something?
--
Yours,
J.A. Terranson
Isn't it really simpler to use RSA and DH and ECC in series ? Why choose ONE ?
There is no good reason for that.
Looks like PSYOP to me.
=
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Eugen Leitl wrote:
[1]Roland Piquepaille writes According to eWEEK, the National
Security Agency (NSA) has [2]picked a commercial solution for its
encryption technology needs, instead on relying on its own
proprietary code.
I was under the impression they had just licenced their
On Sun, 26 Oct 2003, Eugen Leitl wrote:
snip
In the case of the NSA deal, the agency
wanted to use a 512-bit key for the ECC system. This is the
equivalent of an RSA key of 15,360 bits.
Am I the only one here who finds this requirement excessive? My god: are
we looking to keep these
On Sunday, October 26, 2003, at 07:37 PM, Neil Johnson wrote:
I dunno know. It comes down to which of the following slogans you
believe.
ECC: Our algorithm is so good it has been licensed by the NSA.
or
RSA: Our algorithm is so good that the NSA tried to prevent it's
publication,
had it
Eric Cordian wrote:
Nonetheless, it's an indication that they don't think RSA has much of
a future.
Not really - they could simply be covering all bases (supporting RSA, DH
and EC, knowing if DH is broken then almost certainly so is RSA (and vice
versa) leaving only EC to fill the gap)
The
At 11:00 PM 10/26/03 -0800, Morlock Elloi wrote:
Isn't it really simpler to use RSA and DH and ECC in series ? Why
choose ONE ?
There is no good reason for that.
1. Silly Elloi, you can only use DH when both parties are online.
And of course RSA and DH have similar failure modes -ie factoring.
At 10:01 PM 10/26/03 -0600, J.A. Terranson wrote:
On Sun, 26 Oct 2003, Eugen Leitl wrote:
snip
In the case of the NSA deal, the agency
wanted to use a 512-bit key for the ECC system. This is the
equivalent of an RSA key of 15,360 bits.
Am I the only one here who finds this
David Howe writes:
I doubt the NSA need, trust or want anyone else's actual software for EC
Nonetheless, it's an indication that they don't think RSA has much of a
future. So now they have a public key cryptosystem with smaller key
lengths, and a more obtuse one-way function that can't be
I dunno know. It comes down to which of the following slogans you believe.
ECC: Our algorithm is so good it has been licensed by the NSA.
or
RSA: Our algorithm is so good that the NSA tried to prevent it's publication,
had it classified as a munition and export controlled, tried to get the
On Sun, 26 Oct 2003, Eugen Leitl wrote:
snip
In the case of the NSA deal, the agency
wanted to use a 512-bit key for the ECC system. This is the
equivalent of an RSA key of 15,360 bits.
Am I the only one here who finds this requirement excessive? My god: are
we looking to keep these
On Sunday, October 26, 2003, at 07:37 PM, Neil Johnson wrote:
I dunno know. It comes down to which of the following slogans you
believe.
ECC: Our algorithm is so good it has been licensed by the NSA.
or
RSA: Our algorithm is so good that the NSA tried to prevent it's
publication,
had it
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