There are two variants of Brands schemes: over RSA or DH. The DH
variant can be used with the EC. People don't do RSA over EC because
the security argument doesn't work (ie I believe you can do it
technically, but the performance / key size / security arguments no
longer work).
So for that
On Wed, Oct 29, 2003 at 01:50:37PM -0500, Sunder wrote:
The push to do that should be aimed at the MTA authors and package
organizers. If you can get it turned on by default, you're half way
there. Last time I tried to fuck with this on qmail, I had to patch qmail
to support it. Not
The push to do that should be aimed at the MTA authors and package
organizers. If you can get it turned on by default, you're half way
there. Last time I tried to fuck with this on qmail, I had to patch qmail
to support it. Not something I'd like to do again - hopefully it's
changed a bit.
In particular a claim was made that recent technology has come to
light that allows factoring of 1024 bit RSA keys at $1B (US)/day. The
basic gist was that
Adi Shamir's TWINKLE, I guess.
I think that's the source as well - when the most recent of the
TWINKLE and TWIRL papers came out, Lucky
- Forwarded message from Dr. Robert J. Harley [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dr. Robert J. Harley)
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2003 16:37:55 +0100 (CET)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Certicom? [...] [Fwd: NSA Turns To Commercial Software For
Encryption]
RAH wrote:
White smoke from the chimney of the L of C...
As of now, it is now explicitly legal to decrypt the blacklists of
NetNanny - style applications.
As of now, it is now explicitly legal to RevEng abandonware dongles.
Also legal to break copy-restriction schemes on abandonware.
The most surprising
HI,
TD wrote-
that, increased use of
crypto implies increased cost of monitoring.
If a larger population starts using cryptography, we
can compare it to U.S mail. The govt. any way can't go
through all the snail mails due to its sheer volume.
They rely on other methods to detect and nullify
On Wed, Oct 29, 2003 at 11:28:08AM -0500, Sunder wrote:
The biggest hurdle and the thing that will have the most effect is to have
every MTA out there turn on Start TLS. It won't provide a big enhancement
For the record: it's unreasonably difficult (for a pedestrian
sysadmin such as me) to set
Dave Howe [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I was under the impression they had just licenced their *patent*
Yup, and that's all they did. I've seen some downright bizarre
interpretations of this particular portent on the web (cough
slashdot/cough), but the simple fact is that the NSA, in its role as
On Tue, 28 Oct 2003 05:08:28 -0600 (CST), Jim Choate said:
In particular a claim was made that recent technology has come to light that
allows factoring of 1024 bit RSA keys at $1B (US)/day. The basic gist was that
Adi Shamir's TWINKLE, I guess.
time of approx. a year. That 2048 keys were by
--
On 28 Oct 2003 at 13:49, Adam Back wrote:
So for that reason I think Chaum's scheme practically would
not be viable over EC. (Or you could do it but you'd be
better off performance, security and key/messag size doing
Chaum over normal RSA).
Simple Chaumian blinding works fine on EC.
Tim May wrote...
But silliness about if everybody used encryption, then... is just that,
silliness.
You seem to miss my point here (and in general), and since this is probably
the closest area in which we agree, I'd suggest it's worthwhile examining
this.
Let's first of all agree that the
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