hello,
The security of elliptic curve cryptosystems depend on
the difficulty in solving the elliptic curve discrete
log problem(ECDLP). If any body gets to prove that
P=NP, then all the public key cryptosystemts which
rely on 'hard' problems will be useless for crypto.
Sarath.
--- Sunder
At 03:15 PM 9/6/2004, Hadmut Danisch wrote:
On Mon, Sep 06, 2004 at 11:52:03AM -0600, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
E-mail security company MX Logic Inc. will report this week that 10 percent
of all spam includes such SPF records,
I have mentioned this problem more than a year ago in context of
my RMX
At 11:19 AM 9/8/04 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote:
Hum. I wonder. Do you think these secret regulations are communicated
via
secure channels? What would happen if someone decided to send their own
regulations out to all of the local airline security offices rescinding
any
private regs, particularly if
Well, still ruminating...
The kind of regulations that regulatory bodies have made in the past are in
their nature different from these secret rules I still believe. This is of
course aside from their secret nature.
Previously, if a regulatory body such as the FCC enacted some kind of
policy,
Seth Schoen of the EFF proposed an interesting cryptographic primitive
called a hard to verify signature in his blog at
http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/weblog/nb.cgi/view/vitanuova/2004/09/02 .
The idea is to have a signature which is fast to make but slow to verify,
with the verification speed under
At 11:48 AM 9/8/04 -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
Seth Schoen of the EFF proposed an interesting cryptographic primitive
called a hard to verify signature in his blog at
http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/weblog/nb.cgi/view/vitanuova/2004/09/02 .
The idea is to have a signature which is fast to make but slow
Hi
I proposed a related algorithm based on time-lock puzzles as a step
towards non-parallelizable, fixed-minting-cost stamps in section 6.1
of [1], also Dingledine et al observe the same in [2].
The non-parallelizable minting function is in fact the reverse: sender
encrypts (expensively) and the
From: \Hal Finney\ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sep 8, 2004 2:48 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Seth Schoen's Hard to Verify Signatures
The method Seth describes is to include a random value in the signature
but not to include it in the message. He shows a sample signature
with 3 decimal digits
On Wed, Sep 08, 2004 at 12:44:39PM -0700, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
[...]
In an RSA cryptosystem the public exponent is typically low, often
3 or 65537 (for efficiency reasons only a few bits are set; the other
constraint is that your message, raised to that power, wraps in your
modulus,
