- Original Message -
From: Shawn K. Quinn [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Dell to Add Security Chip to PCs
Isn't it possible to emulate the TCPA chip in software, using one's own
RSA key, and thus signing whatever you damn well please with it instead
of whatever the chip wants to sign?
On Thu, Feb 03, 2005 at 11:51:57AM -0500, Trei, Peter wrote:
It could easily be leveraged to make motherboards
which will only run 'authorized' OSs, and OSs
which will run only 'authorized' software.
[..]
If you 'take ownership' as you put it, the internal
keys and certs change, and all
Ed Reed wrote:
I'm just curious on this point. I haven't seen much
to indicate that Microsoft and others are ready
for a nymous, tradeable software assets world.
No, and neither are corporate customers, to a large extent.
Right, so my point (I think) was that without some
indication that
On 2005-02-04T14:30:48-0500, Mark Allen Earnest wrote:
The government was not able to get the Clipper chip passed and that was
backed with the horror stories of rampant pedophilia, terrorism, and
organized crime. Do you honestly believe they will be able to destroy
open source, linux,
[from somelist]
Subject: Re: [s-t] The return of Das Blinkenlight
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2005 19:00:49 -0500
In the early 90's I was a product manager for a (now-defunct) company
that made LAN hubs-- this was when a 10Base-T port would cost you a couple
This reminded me of a story from a
Peter Gutmann wrote:
Neither. Currently they've typically been smart-card cores glued to the
MB and accessed via I2C/SMB.
and chips that typically have had eal4+ or eal5+ evaluations. hot topic
in 2000, 2001 ... at the intel developer's forums and rsa conferences
Erwann ABALEA wrote:
I've read your objections. Maybe I wasn't clear. What's wrong in
installing a cryptographic device by default on PC motherboards?
I work for a PKI 'vendor', and for me, software private keys is a
nonsense. How will you convice Mr Smith (or Mme Michu) to buy an
expensive CC
The best that can happen with TCPA is pretty good -
it could stop a lot of viruses and malware, for one
thing.
No, it can't. That's the point; it's not like the code running inside
the sandbox becomes magically exploitproof...it just becomes totally
opaque to any external auditor. A black
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Dan Kaminsky writes:
Uh, you *really* have no idea how much the black hat community is
looking forward to TCPA. For example, Office is going to have core
components running inside a protected environment totally immune to
antivirus.
How? TCPA is only a
At 5:45 PM + 2/4/05, Dave Green wrote:
mmm, petits filous
Everyone else likes to worry about Google's gathering
conflict of interests, but Verisign's S.P.E.C.T.R.E.-level
skills still take some beating. This week, orbiting crypto
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