Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote:
>> The last, I think, is the right answer. On the whole, when my laptop
>> is stolen I don't want anybody to get *anything* useful off of that
>> drive. If they can't get anything useful, then in particular they
>> cannot get my crypto keys and I'm done.
> Law enforcem
[Dave: since Bill forwarded his reply to eros-arch, I'm copying you and
cypherpunks on the reply.]
Background: Dave suggested language-level support for storage that must
be zeroed when freed. Bill Frantz forwarded this to me in the context of
paging-related optimizations and a possible exposure a
On Sunday, November 10, 2002, at 07:33 PM, Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote:
4. Encrypt all *used* storage as it goes to disk, whereupon you don't
need to worry about explicitly zeroing the deleted storage.
This can be a problem when you are somehow forced to decrypt your
storage contents to allow for
