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On 23 May 2002 at 21:58, Adam Back wrote:
> This won't achieve the desired effect because it will just
> destroy the S/MIME trust mechanism. S/MIME is based on the
> assumption that all CAs are trustworthy. Anyone can forge any
> identity for clients with that key installed. S/MIME isn't
On Thu, 23 May 2002, Adam Back wrote:
> On Thu, May 23, 2002 at 03:05:49PM -0400, Adam Shostack wrote:
> > So what if we create the Cypherpunks Root CA, which (either) signs
> > what you submit to it via a web page, or publish the secret key?
>
> This won't achieve the desired effect because it w
Self-signed and CA x.509 certificates cannot be used in Outlook
even when they are added to the Trusted Root CA's.
Apparently Outlook is able to distinguish between these and
CA-issued x.509 certificates.
--- "Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I can't speak for mail-only clients, but
> Adam Back[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>
> On Thu, May 23, 2002 at 03:05:49PM -0400, Adam Shostack wrote:
> > So what if we create the Cypherpunks Root CA, which (either) signs
> > what you submit to it via a web page, or publish the secret key?
>
[...]
> > We then get the Cypherpunks Root
On Thu, May 23, 2002 at 03:05:49PM -0400, Adam Shostack wrote:
> So what if we create the Cypherpunks Root CA, which (either) signs
> what you submit to it via a web page, or publish the secret key?
This won't achieve the desired effect because it will just destroy the
S/MIME trust mechanism. S/
On Thu, May 23, 2002 at 07:10:01PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
| Certificate authorities also can forge certificates and issue
| certificates in fake names if asked by government agencies. S/MIME is
| too much under central control by design to be a sensible choice for
| general individual use.
So w
