Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

2005-10-27 Thread Ben Laurie
Travis H. wrote: Part of the problem is using a packet-switched network; if we had circuit-based, then thwarting traffic analysis is easy; you just fill the link with random garbage when not transmitting packets. I considered doing this with SLIP back before broadband (back when my friend

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

2005-10-27 Thread Shawn K. Quinn
On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote: Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and thus are subject to what economists call network externalities. The best example I can think of is Microsoft Office file formats. I don't buy MS Office because it's the best

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

2005-10-27 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Wed, Oct 26, 2005 at 08:41:48PM -0500, Shawn K. Quinn wrote: 1) You have told your HR person what a bad idea it is to introduce a dependency on a proprietary file format, right? Telling is useless. Are you in a sufficient position of power to make them stop using it? I doubt it, because

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

2005-10-27 Thread Major Variola (ret)
At 08:41 PM 10/26/05 -0500, Shawn K. Quinn wrote: On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote: Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and thus are subject to what economists call network externalities. The best example I can think of is Microsoft Office file