Peter Trei writes:
My mind has been boggled, my flabbers have been ghasted.
In the name of protecting their business model, the MPAA
proposes that every analog/digital (A/D) converter - one of
the most basic of chips - be required to check for US
government mandated copyright flags. Quite
I concur. The problem is that the most prevalent e-mail
program (Outlook) requires no user intervention as a default
when signing and/or encrypting a message with S/MIME. One can
override the default to High Security (requiring password)
only while the X.509 certificate is being installed.
I
David Hopwood writes:
Forward-secure public-key encryption has been discussed here, on
sci.crypt, and elsewhere. To recap - the goal is that an adversary who
breaks into your computer today can't read messages sent/received
yesterday. In the interactive case, you use ephermal Diffie-Hellman.
At 06:20 AM 5/30/2002 +0200, Nomen Nescio wrote:
Peter Trei writes:
My mind has been boggled, my flabbers have been ghasted.
In the name of protecting their business model, the MPAA
proposes that every analog/digital (A/D) converter - one of
the most basic of chips - be required to
SSL for commerce is readily in place without batting an eyelid these days.
Costs are still way too high. This won't change until
browsers are shipped that treat self-signed certs as being
valid. Unfortunately, browser manufacturers believe in
cert-ware for a variety of non-security reasons.
Why would I be interested in fool[ing] [you]. All I asked was for some
help with sources. If you cannot be of help, at least don't be a
hindrance. Besides, don't claim to speak for others. If envy is what
drives you, then I suggest that you work on that.
hr
On Wed, 29 May 2002, Morlock Elloi
Mike Rosing [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Having it be transparent where the user doesn't need to know
anything about how it works does not have to destroy the
effectiveness of digital signatures or crypto. When people sign a
document they don't know all the ramifications because few bother to
Hector Rosario wrote:
Why would I be interested in fool[ing] [you]. All I asked was for some
^ ^^
^
help with sources. If you cannot be of help, at least don't be a
^ ^ ^
Hector Rosario wrote:
Why would I be interested in fool[ing] [you]. All I asked was for some
help with sources. If you cannot be of help, at least don't be a
hindrance. Besides, don't claim to speak for others. If envy is what
drives you, then I suggest that you work on that.
hr
On Wed,
At 11:19 AM -0400 5/29/02, Hector Rosario wrote:
I am writing my dissertation on steganography. Basically I'm writing a
technical monograph that would be of use to undergraduate instructors.
What do you think are the best sources on steganography on
the Web? What about books other than Johnson,
On Thu, 30 May 2002, Anonymous wrote:
David Hopwood writes:
Did I miss a separate message in which David Hopwood followed up to my
post? Cypherpunks is more reliable for me than it used to be, but it's not
always all there.
math is really advanced and not many implementors or users are
I AM OSAMA
Good one !!! lol
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On
Behalf Of Hector Rosario
Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2002 8:42 AM
To: Morlock Elloi
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: sources on steganography
Why would I be interested in fool[ing]
Ian Grigg wrote:
[...]
SSL for commerce is readily in place without batting an eyelid these days.
Costs are still way too high. This won't change until
browsers are shipped that treat self-signed certs as being
valid. Unfortunately, browser manufacturers believe in
cert-ware for a
At 01:52 PM 5/30/2002 -0400, Steve Furlong wrote:
Summary: Recent laws have attempted to make electronic contracting
binding, but they have not addressed some of the fundamental principles
of contract law. These fundamental principles are often stretched or
broken in electronic contracting.
Mike Rosing wrote:
On Thu, 30 May 2002, cypherpunk_reader wrote:
If the end user insists on e-signing a document without having read it it is
there perogative,
but I think there should be a better system in place to insure that they
either read it or that
they did not read it but
Why would I be interested in fool[ing] [you]. All I asked was for some
help with sources. If you cannot be of help, at least don't be a
I think that perception and sense of humour are sort of required for crypto work.
=
end
(of original message)
Y-a*h*o-o (yes, they scan for this) spam
Hi
However, I'd be interested to know just how many users out there
would enter their card details on an unprotected site, despite the
unclosed padlocks and the alert boxes.
( 02.05.30 08:34 -0400 ) Ian Grigg:
Huge numbers of them. You won't see it in security
lists, but most of your
On Thu, 30 May 2002, Ian Grigg wrote:
[...]
And, in practice this is how it goes. No thief ever bothers
to do an MITM, even over *un*encrypted traffic. They simply
hack into the machines and steal it all. That's why there
has never been a case of CCs sniffed over the net and being
used to
Get ready for the shit storm.
I'm making a list, checking it twice, gonna found who's tree gets watered tonight...
F.B.I. Given Broad Authority to Monitor the Public
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Attorney General John Ashcroft on Thursday gave the FBI broad new
authority to
Jesus christ Hector! What the fuck are you planning to be when you grow
up? A funeral director or something? Grow a sense of humor for
chrissakes. Or get lost, whichever is easier.
yeah, I top posted. And my sig is at the bottom. Sue me.
On Thu, 30 May 2002, Hector Rosario wrote:
Peter Wayner has a few books that deal with this and related topics.
Search for them on Amazon or wherever.
At 11:19 AM 05/29/2002 -0400, you wrote:
I am writing my dissertation on steganography. Basically I'm writing a
technical monograph that would be of use to undergraduate instructors.
What
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