Weird trolls from gfs pedo
On Saturday, July 13, 2002, at 09:48 AM, gfgs pedo wrote: that every 1 should agree on. would any 1 also like 2 review For starters, why don't you start writing in standard English? Even if English is not your first or second language, using such cutisms as u for you and any 1 for anyone is much more misleading than using the standard, defined words. We mostly get rid of Choate's rants, we get rid of nearly all of mattd spews, but now we have gfs pedo as our new nutcase. Some sort of conservation of strangeness, I guess. Or, in your non-Earth language: u ask more quest shuns than any 1 kneads too..i peep u r a troll. --Tim May
fast, nimble, efficient dept of homeland security is born
2. House panel backs civil service protections in homeland bill By Molly M. Peterson, National Journal News Service During a marathon markup session that dragged into the Thursday night and Friday morning, the House Government Reform Committee voted to ensure civil service protections for federal employees slated to move into the proposed Department of Homeland Security. Committee Chairman Dan Burton, R-Ind., offered an amendment to restore collective bargaining rights, health and retirement benefits and whistleblower protections that the new homeland security secretary would have been allowed to waive under the president's bill (H.R. 5005). Burton's amendment also would modify the bill's procurement provisions and ensure that certain sunshine laws, such as the 1972 Federal Advisory Committee Act would apply to the new department. Full story: http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0702/071202njns1.htm
Re: Virtuallizing Palladium
Albion Zeglin wrote: Similar to DeCSS, only one Palladium chip needs to be reverse engineered and it's key(s) broken to virtualize the machine. If you break one machine's key: a) You won't need to virtualise it b) It won't be getting any new software licensed to it Simulate a Pentium VI in Java and all extant code could be accessed. If you live long enough for it to run, yeah. Similarly, is Microsoft's signing keys were cracked then any code could be signed. Duh. If the software needs a real-time connection to the internet though, then protection could be built into it. Oh yeah? How? Laptop applications would be vulnerable until we have pervasive wireless connection. How many bits do you think MS will use for the keys? Enough. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/ There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit. - Robert Woodruff
Re: Microsoft censors Newsweek - and new version of TCPA FAQ
On Fri, 12 Jul 2002, John Young wrote: The US Dept. of Commerce Technology Administration is inviting the public to make comments for the upcomming Workshop on Digital Entertainment and Rights Management. The workshop will be held on July 17. http://www.ta.doc.gov/comments/comments.htm This morning it works. Post your comments before it breaks again! Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike
RE: Finding encrytion algorithm
hi, I get the idea,thanx. Regards Data. can u pls explain how they have statistical signatures,pls- may be using SPN's, i have tried ANSI X9.17 key generation with GOST-it did have a negligably small skew-it makes me wonder what statistical signature they have.The negligable skew is a weakness but not high enough to compramise the security of the key used from the ANSI x9.17 key gen method. pls explain. thank u veru much. You're on the right track. Take several encryption algorithms of your choice, then use a fixed IV, and the same sets of keys, and encrypt blocks of 0's. For each algorithm, compute several sets of staticstics (a la NIST or DIEHARD). With 100 blocks of 10 Megabytes (100 different keys) you should see some interesting differences. Remember, your question originally was how can you tell which algorithm, not how do you find the key. Let us know what you find out :-) --yes :) Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike __ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Autos - Get free new car price quotes http://autos.yahoo.com
Atmospheric noise fair coin flipping
hi, Does a fair coin exist in real world? Like as according to Allan Turing-an event is defined by set of certain parameters governing the event at that instant. by redoing the same experiment-do we always have the same set of parameters that previously defined the coin. it is said that atmospheric noise is random but how can we say for sure. what if the parameters giverning atmospheric noise vary frm time 2 time. may be at a later stage an additional parameter may govern atmospheric noise or may be a parameter may be removed,we cant say that for sure. like the earth moon attract each other,no 1 knows why,it is a physical observation based on it we make a matahmetical model,what if one day-2 bodies with mass start repelling each other? then an extra parameter would govern it we will have 2 change the mathametical mode considering this additional parameter. so can we say atmospheric noise is random or a coin flipping is random-only because it passes die hard test or other randomness tests-which is an indicator of randomness with the current defenition of parameters in determing randomness? is there truly random or that we can say with certain degre of confidence that they are nearly random as all current evidence poits so. Regards Data. --- Jim Choate [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Perhaps a simpler example. Let's look at a 'fair' coin and what that means in the real world. A normal coin (or any nDx for that matter [1]) for short sequences is random. In other words if you record a game sequence and then replay the game the die sequence won't have any statistical correlation. Knowing what happened last time won't help you this time, the 'window of opportunity' with respect to statistical bias isn't large enough, so the game is 'fair'. But!, if you throw that coin once a second for a billion years you will find that -no- coin is really -fair-. This goes back to k-sequences and Knuth. Go back and then start throwing it again, and if your sequence is long enough you can use this known bias from the first experiment to increase your percentage of 'hits' in the second sequence. In other words you can now prove experimentaly the coin isn't fair and what that bias is. This is related to 'Hypothesis Testing'. It's rather strange, but I happen to be rereading a book, The Mathematical Sciences: A Collection of Essays (LoC# 69-12750) put out by some group called COSRIMS in about 1969. I remember the book because somebody gave it to me (I was about 9 or 10 at the time) to read, and it has an insane bright yellow cover. I recently came across it again in a used bookstore for $10 so I bought it. It's basically a bunch of chapters on various issues of math research with the intent of focusing high school and undergrads to pursue mathematical careers by giving examples of what you might be working on. The chapter Statistical Inference (by J. Kiefer) uses an example of a coin and a 3-run sequence to determine the actual bias of the coin (the example is very simple, the coin is very biased). You should be able to still find the book in public libraries and college libraries. I'm sure more modern texts on hypothesis testing will be just as relevant. The vast majority of RNG's that we use are really PRNG's, we just don't collect enough data on them to be able to demonstrate that. Or the sequence of interest is so short we dont' care. [1] A coin is a 1D2, two coins would be 2D2, for example. Who said wargaming was worthless ;) On Sat, 13 Jul 2002, Mike Rosing wrote: On Sat, 13 Jul 2002, gfgs pedo wrote: can u pls explain how they have statistical signatures,pls- may be using SPN's, i have tried ANSI X9.17 key generation with GOST-it did have a negligably small skew-it makes me wonder what statistical signature they have.The negligable skew is a weakness but not high enough to compramise the security of the key used from the ANSI x9.17 key gen method. pls explain. thank u veru much. You're on the right track. Take several encryption algorithms of your choice, then use a fixed IV, and the same sets of keys, and encrypt blocks of 0's. For each algorithm, compute several sets of staticstics (a la NIST or DIEHARD). With 100 blocks of 10 Megabytes (100 different keys) you should see some interesting differences. Remember, your question originally was how can you tell which algorithm, not how do you find the key. Let us know what you find out :-) Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike -- When I die, I would like to be born again as me. Hugh Hefner [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ssz.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.open-forge.org
Re: Fwd: Re: Quantum Computing Puts Encrypted Messages at Risk (fwd)
Random photons in optical systems are easy to get at hight speed, a flame. BEC's also have the capability to make some significant breaks in the security of optical encryption. For example, one can trap a photon in a BEC, measure it's parameters at one of the BEC-component atoms, then re-emit the photon without changing its state (the trick is we are measuring a part of the photon not the entire photon, and the photon is standing still - frozen in time). -- Forwarded message -- Date: Sun, 14 Jul 2002 15:24:48 +0200 From: Amir Herzberg [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Fwd: Re: Quantum Computing Puts Encrypted Messages at Risk At 20:50 11/07/2002, Ian wrote: When I first read The Code Book (Simon Singh), I drooled endlessly at the idea of Unbreakable Encryption, until I became a little more cynical. I questioned Dr Singh on this when he came and gave a lecture in Cheltenham UK recently, and his best answer was that QKD is so secure because its a different kind of system. Its not like conventional encryption. [synopsis - not direct quotation]. I'm not thorougly convinced. Can anyone (politely) prove this mere outsider wrong? I am also not a physicist. So I share your skepticism about relying for security on physic theories which I don't understand, and furthermore which may evolve and refine over time. However, as many people are excited about Quantum crypto, I really would like to put my skepticism aside and understand what is its cryptographic significance, say if we accept the physics as valid (for ever or at least `long enough`). In particular I'm considering whether I should and can cover this area in my book. I must admit I haven't yet studied this area carefully, so my questions may be naive, if so please excuse me (and your answer will be doubly appreciated). Some questions: 1. Quantum key encryption seems to require huge amounts of truly random bits at both sender and receiver. This seems impractical as (almost) truly random bits are hard to produce (especially at high speeds). Is there a fix? 2. After the transmission, the receiver is supposed to tell the sender how it set its polarization; how is this authenticated? If it isn't we are obviously susceptible to man in the middle attack. 3. It seems the quantum link must connect directly from sender to receiver. How can this help provide end to end security on the Internet? Or are we back to private networks? 4. As to quantum computation signalling the end of `crypto as we know it`... Is it fair to say this may end only the mechanisms built on discrete log and/or factoring, but not shared key algorithms like AES and some of the other public key algorithms? Best, Amir Herzberg Amir Herzberg See http://amir.herzberg.name/book.html for draft chapters from `Introduction to Cryptography, Secure Communication and Commerce`, and link to lectures. Comments appreciated. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- When I die, I would like to be born again as me. Hugh Hefner [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ssz.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.open-forge.org
Re: Weird trolls from gfs pedo
On Sun, 14 Jul 2002, Tim May wrote: For starters, why don't you start writing in standard English? Even if English is not your first or second language, using such cutisms as u for you and any 1 for anyone is much more misleading than using the standard, defined words. Get up on the wrong side of bed today Tim? Must have smacked your nose pretty good to get that bent out of shape for something that trivial. We mostly get rid of Choate's rants, we get rid of nearly all of mattd spews, but now we have gfs pedo as our new nutcase. Some sort of conservation of strangeness, I guess. give the kid a break. He's trying to learn something, and you're being unpleasant about it may simply make him try to piss you off. I know that's what my kids to for me :-) Or, in your non-Earth language: u ask more quest shuns than any 1 kneads too..i peep u r a troll. Not quite as good a third grader, but not bad Tim. If you actually were a soccer mom you might have a better attitude about teaching nettequite. But you just drive like one. Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike
Re: Virtuallizing Palladium
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] was seen to declaim: Albion Zeglin wrote: Similar to DeCSS, only one Palladium chip needs to be reverse engineered and it's key(s) broken to virtualize the machine. If you break one machine's key: a) You won't need to virtualise it b) It won't be getting any new software licensed to it I would think it would be more likely to match the mod chips that address this very issue in the Gaming world - a replacement chip that tells the OS yeah, everythings ok even when it isn't :)
Re: Which universe are we in? (tossing tennis balls into spinning props)
On Mon, 15 Jul 2002, Major Variola (ret) wrote: The uncertainty principle says that there is a limit on the information about position and change in position that you can collect. It does not rule out internal states. Yes it does, it says that any time you measure a system it WILL be in an unknown state after the measurement. No if's, no but's. It effects photons (which I challenge you to demonstrate has 'charge') as well as electrons and protons. It's universal. It's about measuring, not about what is being measured. The 2nd also comes into play because any mechanism you use to 'manipulate' that internal state must also effect that state in a negative way. You're screwed two ways from Sunday. -- When I die, I would like to be born again as me. Hugh Hefner [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ssz.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.open-forge.org
state dept melting down, trying to intimidate reporters
When Mowbray began to get the feeling that he couldn't leave even if he wanted to, he asked, Am I being detained? When a diplomatic security official told him no, Mowbray announced that he was leaving. At which point, the guard stepped in front of Mowbray and said, Now, you're being detained. He was physically kept from leaving the building, and repeatedly pushed to reveal his source, until, for whatever reason, he was allowed to go. http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20020715-115302-3818r