A little more about CDROMs

2003-08-23 Thread Thomas Shaddack
http://www.wired.com/news/medtech/0,1286,60138,00.html

Summary: Coating a CD by a reagent, then exposing it to a sample that
changes its color, then counting read errors on the CD.

Maybe could be a nice application for the lowest-level laser signal access
I proposed earlier. (It apparently really could have some unexpected
applications beyond CD copying, Tim.)



Re: paradoxes of randomness

2003-08-23 Thread John Kelsey
At 08:45 AM 8/19/03 -0700, Tim May wrote:
..
(I strongly urge you to actually do this experiment. Really. These are the 
experiments which teach probability theory. No amount of book learning 
substitutes.)
Yep.  I've often thought that one benefit to playing RPGs when I was 
younger was directly observing lots and lots of rolls of various kinds of 
dice.  That gives you an intuition for how unlikely things can happen 
sometimes, for the difference between very unlikely and impossible, etc.

So the coin has been tossed twice in this particular experiment. There is 
now the possibility for equal numbers of heads and tailsbut for the 
second coin toss to give the opposite result of the first toss, every 
time, to balance the outcomes, the coin or the wind currents would have 
to conspire to make the outcome the opposite of what the first toss 
gave. (This is so absurd as to be not worth discussing, except that I know 
of no other way to convince you that your theory that equal numbers of 
heads and tails must be seen cannot be true in any particular experiment. 
The more mathematical way of saying this is that the outcomes are 
independent. The result of one coin toss does not affect the next one, 
which may take place far away, in another room, and so on.)
In fact, I believe this is the trick that makes it very easy to distinguish 
between sequences of coin flips that really happen, and ones that are made 
up by a human.  The human tends to try to make things even out over time.

--Tim May
--John Kelsey, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PGP: FA48 3237 9AD5 30AC EEDD  BBC8 2A80 6948 4CAA F259


RE: JAP back doored

2003-08-23 Thread John Kelsey
At 05:54 AM 8/22/03 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
On Thu, 21 Aug 2003, Vincent Penquerc'h wrote:
 Still useful to protect against third party eavesdroppers, I guess.
Could it be at least somehow useful as a part of some bigger scheme, a
layer of a cake? Can a distributed multilayered proxy be built with some
less-than-trusted components?
For this kind of system, I think it's really hard to get much security from 
the people at the endpoints of the chain of anonymizers.  Specifically, if 
the attacker has control of both the entry and exit anonymizer, or if he 
has control of, say, a target site and the entry anonymizer, he can pretty 
reliably unmask the user's identity with just a few minutes of 
browsing.  Wei Dai discussed this idea several years ago, and I later 
reinvented the same idea.

--John Kelsey, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PGP: FA48 3237 9AD5 30AC EEDD  BBC8 2A80 6948 4CAA F259