Re: Blind signatures with DSA/ECDSA?

2004-04-23 Thread privacy.at Anonymous Remailer
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Often people ask about blind DSA signatures. There are many known variants on DSA signatures which allow for blinding, but blinding plain DSA signatures is not discussed much. Clearly, blinding DSA signatures is possible, through general purpose

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Thoenen, Peter Mr CN Sprint SFOR
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Tyler Durden wrote: | However, I'd bet there are short-term applications for crypto that | really matter and yet have no real relationship to $$$ (for instance, | what if there was widespread communications and crypto in Nazi | Germany...would the

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Tyler Durden
I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't help. Well, what if there were 3 passwords: 1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will actually be smart enough to look beyond this...that's

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Fri, Apr 23, 2004 at 10:43:14AM -0400, Trei, Peter wrote: Step zero is to pull the power, so any shutdown code does not run. Pulling the power is the exact wrong thing to do if it's a CFS requiring a passphrase at startup. Does anyone know what the default procedure is when hardware is

RE: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Trei, Peter
Tyler Durden wrote: I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't help. Well, what if there were 3 passwords: 1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will actually be smart

RE: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Steve Schear
At 07:43 AM 4/23/2004, Trei, Peter wrote: If you're dealing with a state-level attacker, any scheme involving explosives or incendiaries would get the attackee in as much or more trouble than the original data would. This is a hard problem. I suspect any solution will involve tamper-resistant

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Marcel Popescu
From: Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED] 3) One for plausible real data, BUT when this one's used, it also destroys the real data as it opens the plausible real data. For Windows, look up Strong Disk Pro, they're quite paranoid - it can be used like this. Mark

Postfix 2.1 Released (fwd from brian-slashdotnews@hyperreal.org)

2004-04-23 Thread Eugen Leitl
mumbleTLS/mumble - Forwarded message from [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: 23 Apr 2004 16:26:02 - To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Postfix 2.1 Released User-Agent: SlashdotNewsScooper/0.0.3 Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/04/23/1356214 Posted by: michael,

RE: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Thomas Shaddack
Right, there are at least two workable solutions- Hard drives with user alterable firmware. I surprised that none of the major drive manufacturers seems to have thought about offering a version of their controllers, for substantially more money, that offers this. A retrofit device that

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread John Kelsey
From: Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Apr 23, 2004 10:09 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push .. Well, what if there were 3 passwords: 1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will actually be smart enough to look

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Major Variola (ret)
At 11:33 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: This will produce a loud bang, obviously. Thermite is a good choice to turn your fileserver into lava, but that thing better be outside, or mounted in chamotte- or asbestos-lined metal closet. Will produce smoke, and take some time, too. Thanks, I

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Major Variola (ret)
At 08:51 PM 4/23/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote: On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, John Kelsey wrote: The obvious problem with multiple levels of passwords and data is: When does the guy with the rubber hose stop beating passwords out of you? This serves a purpose as well. Why would you ever cooperate if

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Major Variola (ret)
t 10:09 AM 4/23/04 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't help. Well, what if there were 3 passwords: 1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Major Variola (ret)
At 09:23 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote: Innocents could be a good cannon fodder that can bring a lot of backslash and alienation aganst the goons, stripping them from public support. Yes, this has been discussed before, in addition to using it retributionally --finger some deserving

Smartcard patents

2004-04-23 Thread Steve Schear
http://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000121.html Cryptography Research, the California company that announced the discovery of differential power analysis around late 1997, have picked up a swag of patents

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Thomas Shaddack
On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, John Kelsey wrote: The obvious problem with multiple levels of passwords and data is: When does the guy with the rubber hose stop beating passwords out of you? After he gets one? Yeah, that's plausible, if he's convinced there's only one. But once he's seen a second

Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

2004-04-23 Thread Thomas Shaddack
On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: filesystems (etc) with layers of deniable stego. Are there any decent implementations for Linux/BSD/NT? I haven't looked recently. One property that such a FS or app should have is that it is useful for something *else* besides stego duress