Ian Grigg wrote:
..
I wouldn't think that the encryption need be opportunistic; in the BGP
backbone world, as you noted, peers are known a-priori, and should
have certs that could be signed by well-known, trusted CAs.
Let's see if I can make these assumptions clearer, because
I still perceive
At 10:28 PM 9/16/04 +0200, Hadmut Danisch wrote:
Because PKC works for this AliceBob communication scheme. If you
connect to a web server, then what you want to know, or what
authentication means is: Are you really www.somedomain.com?
That's the AliceBob model. SSL is good for that.
What makes
Ian Grigg wrote:
Bill Stewart wrote:
Also, the author's document discusses protecting BGP to prevent
some of the recent denial-of-service attacks,
and asks for confirmation about the assertion in a message
on the IPSEC mailing list suggesting
E.g., it is not feasible for BGP routers to be
Joe Touch wrote:
Ian Grigg wrote:
On the backbone, between BGP peers, one would have thought
that there are relatively few attackers, as the staff are
highly trusted and the wires are hard to access - hence no
active attacks going on and only some passive eavesdropping
attacks. Also, anyone
On Thu, 16 Sep 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
At 02:17 PM 9/16/04 -0700, Joe Touch wrote:
Except that certs need to be signed by authorities that are trusted.
Name one.
You don't have to sign the certs. Use self-signed ones, then publish a GPG
signature of your certificate in a known
Ken Brown wrote...
Prostitution industry?
Well, Industry from what I understand is probably too strong a term. These
seem to be individual females. And no, they ain't wearin' high heels and hot
pants, so what we're talking about is very, very discrete, and sometimes for
goods and services as
Bill Stewart wrote:
At 02:17 PM 9/16/2004, Joe Touch wrote:
Ian Grigg wrote:
On the backbone, between BGP peers, one would have thought
that there are relatively few attackers, as the staff are
highly trusted and the wires are hard to access - hence no
active attacks going on and only some
At 02:17 PM 9/16/04 -0700, Joe Touch wrote:
Except that certs need to be signed by authorities that are trusted.
Name one.
On 2004-09-16T20:11:56-0700, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
At 02:17 PM 9/16/04 -0700, Joe Touch wrote:
Except that certs need to be signed by authorities that are trusted.
Name one.
Oh, come on. Nothing can be absolutely trusted. How much security is
enough?
Aren't the DOD CAs trusted
At 02:17 PM 9/16/2004, Joe Touch wrote:
Ian Grigg wrote:
On the backbone, between BGP peers, one would have thought
that there are relatively few attackers, as the staff are
highly trusted and the wires are hard to access - hence no
active attacks going on and only some passive eavesdropping
Tyler Durden wrote:
Who, the Iranians? Which ones are fanatics?
I'll grant there are some fanatics left in Iran, but Iran seems
increasingly dominated by fairly sleezy clergy/judges. Like any
government, theirs is deteriorating into a mere racket. And if you ask
me, fanaticism never lasts very
Ken Brown wrote...
Apparently the best thing about is the lack of American tourists - just
like Cuba ;-)
What! I'm deeply offended by that remark...I demand you with
Aw fuckit. It's true. In fact, when I'm in a restaurant outside the US, I
have witnessed that the food quality is inversely
On Fri, 17 Sep 2004, Tyler Durden wrung hi hands and exclaimed:
Hey Hey Hey!
I'm not the original quoter there...watch it!
-TD
To which [EMAIL PROTECTED] took not and made a closer examination of his
previous posting, thus:
From: J.A. Terranson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Tyler Durden [EMAIL
Hey Hey Hey!
I'm not the original quoter there...watch it!
-TD
From: J.A. Terranson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Tyler Durden [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Geopolitical Darwin Awards
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2004 15:48:01 -0500 (CDT)
On Thu, 16 Sep 2004, Tyler Durden
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