Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

On Thu, 2005-10-27 at 20:18 -0700, cyphrpunk wrote: > This is off-topic. Let's not degenerate into random Microsoft bashing. > Keep the focus on anonymity. That's what the cypherpunks list is > about. Sorry, but I have to disagree. I highly doubt that Microsoft is interested in helping users of th

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

At 8:41 PM -0700 10/27/05, cyphrpunk wrote: >Where else are you going to talk about >this shit? Talk about it here, of course. Just don't expect anyone to listen to you when you play list-mommie. Cheers, RAH -- - R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

>From: Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Sent: Oct 27, 2005 3:22 AM >To: "Shawn K. Quinn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used .. >It's never about merit, and not e

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

> The cypherpunks list is about anything we want it to be. At this stage in > the lifecycle (post-nuclear-armageddon-weeds-in-the-rubble), it's more > about the crazy bastards who are still here than it is about just about > anything else. Fine, I want it to be about crypto and anonymity. You can

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

At 12:23 PM -0700 10/27/05, Major Variola (ret) wrote: >Why don't you send her comma-delimited text, Excel can import it? But, but... You can't put Visual *BASIC* in comma delimited text... ;-) Cheers, RAH Yet another virus vector. Bah! :-) -- - R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bea

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

At 8:18 PM -0700 10/27/05, cyphrpunk wrote: >Keep the focus on anonymity. That's what the cypherpunks list is >about. Please. The cypherpunks list is about anything we want it to be. At this stage in the lifecycle (post-nuclear-armageddon-weeds-in-the-rubble), it's more about the crazy bastards w

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

On Thu, 2005-10-27 at 23:28 -0400, R.A. Hettinga wrote: > RAH > Who thinks anything Microsoft makes these days is, by definition, a > security risk. Indeed, the amount of trust I'm willing to place in a piece of software is quite related to how much of its source code is available for review. Surp

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

On 10/26/05, Shawn K. Quinn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote: > > Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and > > thus are subject to what economists call "network externalities". The > > best example I can think of is Microsoft

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

On Thu, Oct 27, 2005 at 11:28:42PM -0400, R.A. Hettinga wrote: > The cypherpunks list is about anything we want it to be. At this stage in > the lifecycle (post-nuclear-armageddon-weeds-in-the-rubble), it's more > about the crazy bastards who are still here than it is about just about > anything e

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

At 08:41 PM 10/26/05 -0500, Shawn K. Quinn wrote: >On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote: >> Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and >> thus are subject to what economists call "network externalities". The >> best example I can think of is Microsoft Office fi

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

On Wed, Oct 26, 2005 at 08:41:48PM -0500, Shawn K. Quinn wrote: > 1) You have told your HR person what a bad idea it is to introduce a > dependency on a proprietary file format, right? Telling is useless. Are you in a sufficient position of power to make them stop using it? I doubt it, because th

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote: > Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and > thus are subject to what economists call "network externalities". The > best example I can think of is Microsoft Office file formats. I don't > buy MS Office because it's the

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

Travis H. wrote: > Part of the problem is using a packet-switched network; if we had > circuit-based, then thwarting traffic analysis is easy; you just fill > the link with random garbage when not transmitting packets. I > considered doing this with SLIP back before broadband (back when my > frien

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

Hello, At 25/10/05 07:18, cyphrpunk wrote: > http://www.hbarel.com/Blog/entry0006.html > > I believe that for anonymity and pseudonymity technologies to survive > they have to be applied to applications that require them by design, > rather than to mass-market applications that can also do (

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

On 2005-10-26T08:21:08+0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote: > cyphrpunk wrote: > > The main threat to > > this illegal but widely practiced activity is legal action by > > copyright holders against individual traders. The only effective > > protection against these threats is the barrier that could be prov

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

On Wed, 26 Oct 2005, JЖrn Schmidt wrote: > --- "Travis H." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > [snip] > > Another issue involves the ease of use when switching between a > > [slower] anonymous service and a fast non-anonymous service. I > > have a tool called metaprox on my website (see URL in sig) th

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

--- "Travis H." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: [snip] > Another issue involves the ease of use when switching between a > [slower] anonymous service and a fast non-anonymous service. I have > a > tool called metaprox on my website (see URL in sig) that allows you > to > choose what proxies you use on

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

Part of the problem is using a packet-switched network; if we had circuit-based, then thwarting traffic analysis is easy; you just fill the link with random garbage when not transmitting packets. I considered doing this with SLIP back before broadband (back when my friend was my ISP). There are t

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

cyphrpunk wrote: The main threat to this illegal but widely practiced activity is legal action by copyright holders against individual traders. The only effective protection against these threats is the barrier that could be provided by anonymity. An effective, anonymous file sharing network woul

Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used

> http://www.hbarel.com/Blog/entry0006.html > > I believe that for anonymity and pseudonymity technologies to survive > they have to be applied to applications that require them by design, > rather than to mass-market applications that can also do (cheaper) > without. If anonymity mechanisms a