Re: Mitigating Dangers of Compromised Anonymity

2002-09-02 Thread Adam Shostack
On Sat, Aug 31, 2002 at 12:12:16AM -0700, Meyer Wolfsheim wrote: | On Fri, 30 Aug 2002, Adam Shostack wrote: | | > I'd like to suggest that while this may be fun, usability and getting | > millions of users to see that remailers are useful to them is a more | > useful goal. | | I agree, although

Re: Mitigating Dangers of Compromised Anonymity

2002-09-01 Thread Major Variola (ret)
At 01:21 AM 8/31/02 -0700, Morlock Elloi wrote: >Just wondering ... in a life & death situation (say, blackmailing att. >general), what would be the choice of readers of this forum: > > >a) use mixmaster remailer from their home/business/friend. Like that one-degree of separation is comforting...

Re: Mitigating Dangers of Compromised Anonymity

2002-08-31 Thread Morlock Elloi
Just wondering ... in a life & death situation (say, blackmailing att. general), what would be the choice of readers of this forum: a) use mixmaster remailer from their home/business/friend. b) use an internet cafe c) use an open wireless AP b and c assume, of course, one-time use of a throw

Re: Mitigating Dangers of Compromised Anonymity

2002-08-31 Thread Meyer Wolfsheim
On Fri, 30 Aug 2002, Adam Shostack wrote: > I'd like to suggest that while this may be fun, usability and getting > millions of users to see that remailers are useful to them is a more > useful goal. I agree, although I fail to see how working on this would interfere with that goal in any way.

Re: Mitigating Dangers of Compromised Anonymity

2002-08-30 Thread Adam Shostack
I'd like to suggest that while this may be fun, usability and getting millions of users to see that remailers are useful to them is a more useful goal. The anonymity set provided by the current extant systems is too small to protect anyone against anyone who is willing to kill or disapear people

Mitigating Dangers of Compromised Anonymity

2002-08-30 Thread Meyer Wolfsheim
Operating an anonymity service or providing privacy enhancing technologies to the public poses potential risks to the provider if sufficiently motivated entities wish to prevent the availability of such technology. In particular danger are individuals whose meatspace identity and nyms are not pub