at Thursday, November 21, 2002 2:26 PM, Sarad AV <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> was seen to say: > 'A' uses a very strong crytographic algorithm which > would be forced out by rubber horse cryptanalysis > Now if Aice could give another key k` such that the > cipher text (c) decrypts to another dummy plain > text(D) > the secret police gets to read > the dummy plain text(D) using the surrendered key k` > without compramising the real plain text(P). Depends on what (c) looks like and how it is obtained. if it is a random jumble of characters (like a scramdisk) then you might get away with claiming a key 'k is the otp key for it (and of course given (c) and the required plaintext, 'k is trivial to construct)
if (c) is self-evidently in the format of a known encryption package (pgp, smime, lots of others) then your attackers are not going to believe they are really OTP encrypted if the message is intercepted, not sniffed (ie, you never receive a copy yourself) then you cannot construct 'k
