On Thu, Oct 27, 2005 at 11:28:42PM -0400, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
The cypherpunks list is about anything we want it to be. At this stage in
the lifecycle (post-nuclear-armageddon-weeds-in-the-rubble), it's more
about the crazy bastards who are still here than it is about just about
anything
On 10/26/05, Shawn K. Quinn [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote:
Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and
thus are subject to what economists call network externalities. The
best example I can think of is Microsoft Office
On Thu, 2005-10-27 at 23:28 -0400, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
RAH
Who thinks anything Microsoft makes these days is, by definition, a
security risk.
Indeed, the amount of trust I'm willing to place in a piece of software
is quite related to how much of its source code is available for review.
At 8:18 PM -0700 10/27/05, cyphrpunk wrote:
Keep the focus on anonymity. That's what the cypherpunks list is
about.
Please.
The cypherpunks list is about anything we want it to be. At this stage in
the lifecycle (post-nuclear-armageddon-weeds-in-the-rubble), it's more
about the crazy bastards
At 12:23 PM -0700 10/27/05, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Why don't you send her comma-delimited text, Excel can import it?
But, but...
You can't put Visual *BASIC* in comma delimited text...
;-)
Cheers,
RAH
Yet another virus vector. Bah! :-)
--
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL
The cypherpunks list is about anything we want it to be. At this stage in
the lifecycle (post-nuclear-armageddon-weeds-in-the-rubble), it's more
about the crazy bastards who are still here than it is about just about
anything else.
Fine, I want it to be about crypto and anonymity. You can
From: Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Oct 27, 2005 3:22 AM
To: Shawn K. Quinn [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used
..
It's never about merit, and not even money, but about predeployed
base and interoperability
At 8:41 PM -0700 10/27/05, cyphrpunk wrote:
Where else are you going to talk about
this shit?
Talk about it here, of course.
Just don't expect anyone to listen to you when you play list-mommie.
Cheers,
RAH
--
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer
On Thu, 2005-10-27 at 20:18 -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
This is off-topic. Let's not degenerate into random Microsoft bashing.
Keep the focus on anonymity. That's what the cypherpunks list is
about.
Sorry, but I have to disagree. I highly doubt that Microsoft is
interested in helping users of
Travis H. wrote:
Part of the problem is using a packet-switched network; if we had
circuit-based, then thwarting traffic analysis is easy; you just fill
the link with random garbage when not transmitting packets. I
considered doing this with SLIP back before broadband (back when my
friend
On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote:
Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and
thus are subject to what economists call network externalities. The
best example I can think of is Microsoft Office file formats. I don't
buy MS Office because it's the best
On Wed, Oct 26, 2005 at 08:41:48PM -0500, Shawn K. Quinn wrote:
1) You have told your HR person what a bad idea it is to introduce a
dependency on a proprietary file format, right?
Telling is useless. Are you in a sufficient position of power to make
them stop using it? I doubt it, because
At 08:41 PM 10/26/05 -0500, Shawn K. Quinn wrote:
On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote:
Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and
thus are subject to what economists call network externalities.
The
best example I can think of is Microsoft Office file
cyphrpunk wrote:
The main threat to
this illegal but widely practiced activity is legal action by
copyright holders against individual traders. The only effective
protection against these threats is the barrier that could be provided
by anonymity. An effective, anonymous file sharing network
Part of the problem is using a packet-switched network; if we had
circuit-based, then thwarting traffic analysis is easy; you just fill
the link with random garbage when not transmitting packets. I
considered doing this with SLIP back before broadband (back when my
friend was my ISP). There are
--- Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[snip]
Another issue involves the ease of use when switching between a
[slower] anonymous service and a fast non-anonymous service. I have
a
tool called metaprox on my website (see URL in sig) that allows you
to
choose what proxies you use on a
On 2005-10-26T08:21:08+0200, Stephan Neuhaus wrote:
cyphrpunk wrote:
The main threat to
this illegal but widely practiced activity is legal action by
copyright holders against individual traders. The only effective
protection against these threats is the barrier that could be provided
On Wed, 26 Oct 2005, JЖrn Schmidt wrote:
--- Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[snip]
Another issue involves the ease of use when switching between a
[slower] anonymous service and a fast non-anonymous service. I
have a tool called metaprox on my website (see URL in sig) that
allows
Hello,
At 25/10/05 07:18, cyphrpunk wrote:
http://www.hbarel.com/Blog/entry0006.html
I believe that for anonymity and pseudonymity technologies to survive
they have to be applied to applications that require them by design,
rather than to mass-market applications that can also do
http://www.hbarel.com/Blog/entry0006.html
I believe that for anonymity and pseudonymity technologies to survive
they have to be applied to applications that require them by design,
rather than to mass-market applications that can also do (cheaper)
without. If anonymity mechanisms are
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