Package: secure-delete
Version: 3.1-5
Severity: minor
Tags: patch

Dear Maintainer,

Patched some typos in '/usr/share/man/man1/sfill.1.gz',
                      '/usr/share/man/man1/srm.1.gz', &
                      '/usr/share/man/man1/sswap.1.gz', 
see attached '.diff' files.

Hope this helps...

-- System Information:
Debian Release: wheezy/sid
  APT prefers unstable
  APT policy: (500, 'unstable'), (1, 'experimental')
Architecture: i386 (i686)

Kernel: Linux 3.2.0-3-686-pae (SMP w/2 CPU cores)
Locale: LANG=C, LC_CTYPE=C (charmap=ANSI_X3.4-1968) (ignored: LC_ALL set to C)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash

Versions of packages secure-delete depends on:
ii  libc6  2.13-34

secure-delete recommends no packages.

secure-delete suggests no packages.

-- no debconf information
--- sswap.1	2010-01-05 10:51:34.000000000 -0500
+++ /tmp/sswap.1	2012-07-04 18:27:20.847925920 -0400
@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@
 .SH DESCRIPTION
 .I sswap
 is designed to delete data which may lie still on your swapspace
-in a secure manner which can not be recovered by thiefs, law enforcement
+in a secure manner which can not be recovered by thieves, law enforcement
 or other threats.
-The wipe algorythm is based on the paper "Secure Deletion of Data from
+The wipe algorithm is based on the paper "Secure Deletion of Data from
 Magnetic and Solid-State Memory" presented at the 6th Usenix Security
 Symposium by Peter Gutmann, one of the leading civilian cryptographers.
 .PP
--- sfill.1	2010-01-05 10:51:34.000000000 -0500
+++ /tmp/sfill.1	2012-07-04 18:25:22.806627266 -0400
@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@
 .SH DESCRIPTION
 .I sfill
 is designed to delete data which lies on available diskspace on mediums
-in a secure manner which can not be recovered by thiefs, law enforcement
+in a secure manner which can not be recovered by thieves, law enforcement
 or other threats.
-The wipe algorythm is based on the paper "Secure Deletion of Data from
+The wipe algorithm is based on the paper "Secure Deletion of Data from
 Magnetic and Solid-State Memory" presented at the 6th Usenix Security
 Symposium by Peter Gutmann, one of the leading civilian cryptographers.
 .PP
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
 .PP
 afterwards as many temporary files as possible are generated to wipe the
 free inode space. After no more temporary files can be created, they are
-removed and sfill is finnished.
+removed and sfill is finished.
 .PP
 
 .SH COMMANDLINE OPTIONS
--- srm.1	2010-01-05 10:51:34.000000000 -0500
+++ /tmp/srm.1	2012-07-04 18:26:41.859496981 -0400
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
 .SH DESCRIPTION
 .I srm 
 is designed to delete data on mediums in a secure manner which can not be
-recovered by thiefs, law enforcement or other threats.
-The wipe algorythm is based on the paper "Secure Deletion of Data from
+recovered by thieves, law enforcement or other threats.
+The wipe algorithm is based on the paper "Secure Deletion of Data from
 Magnetic and Solid-State Memory" presented at the 6th Usenix Security
 Symposium by Peter Gutmann, one of the leading civilian cryptographers.
 .PP
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
 which comes with the
 .I secure_deletion package
 to ensure to wipe also the free diskspace. However, If already a small
-file aquired a block with your precious data, no tool known to me can help
+file acquired a block with your precious data, no tool known to me can help
 you here. For a secure deletion of the swap space
 .I sswap
 is available.

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