Package: mailman
Version: 2.1.13-2
Severity: wishlist
Tags: sid
* Add forum archiver patch that allow multiple archivers * Session : -
Modify SecurityManager.py to make it extendable - Add
OldSecurityManager.py as the default security manager * MailList.py :
modified - Search extend.py first in /var/lib/lists - Make it
possible to extend SecurityManager.py * Add dist-packages (python library
directory) to ./misc/paths.py.in
-- System Information:
Debian Release: squeeze/sid
APT prefers oldstable
APT policy: (500, 'oldstable'), (500, 'unstable'), (500, 'testing'), (500,
'stable'), (1, 'experimental')
Architecture: i386 (i686)
Kernel: Linux 2.6.32-trunk-686 (SMP w/2 CPU cores)
Locale: LANG=fr_FR.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=fr_FR.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/bash
Versions of packages mailman depends on:
ii adduser 3.112 add and remove users and groups
ii apache2 2.2.15-2 Apache HTTP Server metapackage
ii apache2-mpm-prefork [httpd] 2.2.15-2 Apache HTTP Server - traditional n
ii cron 3.0pl1-107 process scheduling daemon
ii debconf [debconf-2.0] 1.5.30 Debian configuration management sy
ii exim4 4.71-3 metapackage to ease Exim MTA (v4)
ii exim4-daemon-light [mail-tran 4.71-3 lightweight Exim MTA (v4) daemon
ii libc6 2.10.2-6 Embedded GNU C Library: Shared lib
ii logrotate 3.7.8-5 Log rotation utility
ii lsb-base 3.2-23 Linux Standard Base 3.2 init scrip
ii pwgen 2.06-1+b1 Automatic Password generation
ii python 2.5.4-9 An interactive high-level object-o
ii python-support 1.0.7 automated rebuilding support for P
ii ucf 3.0025 Update Configuration File: preserv
mailman recommends no packages.
Versions of packages mailman suggests:
pn listadmin <none> (no description available)
ii lynx 2.8.8dev.2-1 Text-mode WWW Browser (transitiona
ii spamassassin 3.3.1-1 Perl-based spam filter using text
Index: mailman-2.1.13/Mailman/MailList.py
===================================================================
--- mailman-2.1.13.orig/Mailman/MailList.py 2009-12-22 19:00:43.000000000 +0100
+++ mailman-2.1.13/Mailman/MailList.py 2010-03-29 11:29:07.712414092 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+
# Copyright (C) 1998-2008 by the Free Software Foundation, Inc.
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
from Mailman.HTMLFormatter import HTMLFormatter
from Mailman.ListAdmin import ListAdmin
from Mailman.SecurityManager import SecurityManager
+from Mailman.OldSecurityManager import OldSecurityManager
from Mailman.TopicMgr import TopicMgr
from Mailman import Pending
@@ -85,7 +87,7 @@
# Use mixins here just to avoid having any one chunk be too large.
class MailList(HTMLFormatter, Deliverer, ListAdmin,
- Archiver, Digester, SecurityManager, Bouncer, GatewayManager,
+ Archiver, Digester, Bouncer, GatewayManager,
Autoresponder, TopicMgr, Pending.Pending):
#
@@ -103,14 +105,20 @@
self.InitTempVars(name)
# Default membership adaptor class
self._memberadaptor = OldStyleMemberships(self)
+ # Default security manager class
+ self._securitymanager = OldSecurityManager(self)
# This extension mechanism allows list-specific overrides of any
# method (well, except __init__(), InitTempVars(), and InitVars()
# I think). Note that fullpath() will return None when we're creating
# the list, which will only happen when name is None.
if name is None:
return
- filename = os.path.join(self.fullpath(), 'extend.py')
- dict = {}
+ defaultfile = os.path.join(self.fullpath(), 'extend.py')
+ if os.path.exists(defaultfile):
+ filename = defaultfile
+ else:
+ filename = os.path.join(self.fullpath().strip(self.internal_name()), 'extend.py')
+ dict = {}
try:
execfile(filename, dict)
except IOError, e:
@@ -120,9 +128,13 @@
else:
syslog('error', 'IOError reading list extension: %s', e)
else:
- func = dict.get('extend')
+ func = dict.get('extendMemberAdaptor')
if func:
func(self)
+ func = dict.get('extendSecurityManager')
+ if func:
+ func(self)
+
if lock:
# This will load the database.
self.Lock()
@@ -136,14 +148,18 @@
# order.
try:
return getattr(self._memberadaptor, name)
+ getattr(self._securitymanager, name)
except AttributeError:
- for guicomponent in self._gui:
- try:
- return getattr(guicomponent, name)
- except AttributeError:
- pass
- else:
- raise AttributeError, name
+ try:
+ return getattr(self._securitymanager, name)
+ except AttributeError:
+ for guicomponent in self._gui:
+ try:
+ return getattr(guicomponent, name)
+ except AttributeError:
+ pass
+ else:
+ raise AttributeError, name
def __repr__(self):
if self.Locked():
Index: mailman-2.1.13/Mailman/OldSecurityManager.py
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ mailman-2.1.13/Mailman/OldSecurityManager.py 2010-03-29 11:30:00.088409004 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
+# Copyright (C) 1998-2008 by the Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+#
+# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+# as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+# of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+# GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+# USA.
+
+
+"""Handle passwords and sanitize approved messages."""
+
+# There are current 5 roles defined in Mailman, as codified in Defaults.py:
+# user, list-creator, list-moderator, list-admin, site-admin.
+#
+# Here's how we do cookie based authentication.
+#
+# Each role (see above) has an associated password, which is currently the
+# only way to authenticate a role (in the future, we'll authenticate a
+# user and assign users to roles).
+#
+# Each cookie has the following ingredients: the authorization context's
+# secret (i.e. the password, and a timestamp. We generate an SHA1 hex
+# digest of these ingredients, which we call the `mac'. We then marshal
+# up a tuple of the timestamp and the mac, hexlify that and return that as
+# a cookie keyed off the authcontext. Note that authenticating the user
+# also requires the user's email address to be included in the cookie.
+#
+# The verification process is done in CheckCookie() below. It extracts
+# the cookie, unhexlifies and unmarshals the tuple, extracting the
+# timestamp. Using this, and the shared secret, the mac is calculated,
+# and it must match the mac passed in the cookie. If so, they're golden,
+# otherwise, access is denied.
+#
+# It is still possible for an adversary to attempt to brute force crack
+# the password if they obtain the cookie, since they can extract the
+# timestamp and create macs based on password guesses. They never get a
+# cleartext version of the password though, so security rests on the
+# difficulty and expense of retrying the cgi dialog for each attempt. It
+# also relies on the security of SHA1.
+
+import os
+import re
+import time
+import Cookie
+import marshal
+import binascii
+import urllib
+from types import StringType, TupleType
+from urlparse import urlparse
+
+try:
+ import crypt
+except ImportError:
+ crypt = None
+
+from Mailman import mm_cfg
+from Mailman import Utils
+from Mailman import Errors
+from Mailman.Logging.Syslog import syslog
+from Mailman.Utils import md5_new, sha_new
+from Mailman import SecurityManager
+
+try:
+ True, False
+except NameError:
+ True = 1
+ False = 0
+
+
+
+class OldSecurityManager(SecurityManager.SecurityManager):
+ def __init__(self,mlist):
+ self.__mlist = mlist
+ # We used to set self.password here, from a crypted_password argument,
+ # but that's been removed when we generalized the mixin architecture.
+ # self.password is really a SecurityManager attribute, but it's set in
+ # MailList.InitVars().
+ self.mod_password = None
+ # Non configurable
+ self.__mlist.passwords = {}
+
+ def AuthContextInfo(self, authcontext, user=None):
+ # authcontext may be one of AuthUser, AuthListModerator,
+ # AuthListAdmin, AuthSiteAdmin. Not supported is the AuthCreator
+ # context.
+ #
+ # user is ignored unless authcontext is AuthUser
+ #
+ # Return the authcontext's secret and cookie key. If the authcontext
+ # doesn't exist, return the tuple (None, None). If authcontext is
+ # AuthUser, but the user isn't a member of this mailing list, a
+ # NotAMemberError will be raised. If the user's secret is None, raise
+ # a MMBadUserError.
+ key = self.__mlist.internal_name() + '+'
+ if authcontext == mm_cfg.AuthUser:
+ if user is None:
+ # A bad system error
+ raise TypeError, 'No user supplied for AuthUser context'
+ secret = self.__mlist.getMemberPassword(user)
+ userdata = urllib.quote(Utils.ObscureEmail(user), safe='')
+ key += 'user+%s' % userdata
+ elif authcontext == mm_cfg.AuthListModerator:
+ secret = self.mod_password
+ key += 'moderator'
+ elif authcontext == mm_cfg.AuthListAdmin:
+ secret = self.__mlist.password
+ key += 'admin'
+ # BAW: AuthCreator
+ elif authcontext == mm_cfg.AuthSiteAdmin:
+ sitepass = Utils.get_global_password()
+ if mm_cfg.ALLOW_SITE_ADMIN_COOKIES and sitepass:
+ secret = sitepass
+ key = 'site'
+ else:
+ # BAW: this should probably hand out a site password based
+ # cookie, but that makes me a bit nervous, so just treat site
+ # admin as a list admin since there is currently no site
+ # admin-only functionality.
+ secret = self.__mlist.password
+ key += 'admin'
+ else:
+ return None, None
+ return key, secret
+
+ def Authenticate(self, authcontexts, response, user=None):
+ # Given a list of authentication contexts, check to see if the
+ # response matches one of the passwords. authcontexts must be a
+ # sequence, and if it contains the context AuthUser, then the user
+ # argument must not be None.
+ #
+ # Return the authcontext from the argument sequence that matches the
+ # response, or UnAuthorized.
+ if not response:
+ # Don't authenticate null passwords
+ return mm_cfg.UnAuthorized
+ for ac in authcontexts:
+ if ac == mm_cfg.AuthCreator:
+ ok = Utils.check_global_password(response, siteadmin=0)
+ if ok:
+ return mm_cfg.AuthCreator
+ elif ac == mm_cfg.AuthSiteAdmin:
+ ok = Utils.check_global_password(response)
+ if ok:
+ return mm_cfg.AuthSiteAdmin
+ elif ac == mm_cfg.AuthListAdmin:
+ def cryptmatchp(response, secret):
+ try:
+ salt = secret[:2]
+ if crypt and crypt.crypt(response, salt) == secret:
+ return True
+ return False
+ except TypeError:
+ # BAW: Hard to say why we can get a TypeError here.
+ # SF bug report #585776 says crypt.crypt() can raise
+ # this if salt contains null bytes, although I don't
+ # know how that can happen (perhaps if a MM2.0 list
+ # with USE_CRYPT = 0 has been updated? Doubtful.
+ return False
+ # The password for the list admin and list moderator are not
+ # kept as plain text, but instead as an sha hexdigest. The
+ # response being passed in is plain text, so we need to
+ # digestify it first. Note however, that for backwards
+ # compatibility reasons, we'll also check the admin response
+ # against the crypted and md5'd passwords, and if they match,
+ # we'll auto-migrate the passwords to sha.
+ key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(ac)
+ if secret is None:
+ continue
+ sharesponse = sha_new(response).hexdigest()
+ upgrade = ok = False
+ if sharesponse == secret:
+ ok = True
+ elif md5_new(response).digest() == secret:
+ ok = upgrade = True
+ elif cryptmatchp(response, secret):
+ ok = upgrade = True
+ if upgrade:
+ save_and_unlock = False
+ if not self.__mlist.Locked():
+ self.__mlist.Lock()
+ save_and_unlock = True
+ try:
+ self._mlist.password = sharesponse
+ if save_and_unlock:
+ self.__mlist.Save()
+ finally:
+ if save_and_unlock:
+ self.Unlock()
+ if ok:
+ return ac
+ elif ac == mm_cfg.AuthListModerator:
+ # The list moderator password must be sha'd
+ key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(ac)
+ if secret and sha_new(response).hexdigest() == secret:
+ return ac
+ elif ac == mm_cfg.AuthUser:
+ if user is not None:
+ try:
+ if self.__mlist.authenticateMember(user, response):
+ return ac
+ except Errors.NotAMemberError:
+ pass
+ else:
+ # What is this context???
+ syslog('error', 'Bad authcontext: %s', ac)
+ raise ValueError, 'Bad authcontext: %s' % ac
+ return mm_cfg.UnAuthorized
+
+ def WebAuthenticate(self, authcontexts, response, user=None):
+ # Given a list of authentication contexts, check to see if the cookie
+ # contains a matching authorization, falling back to checking whether
+ # the response matches one of the passwords. authcontexts must be a
+ # sequence, and if it contains the context AuthUser, then the user
+ # argument should not be None.
+ #
+ # Returns a flag indicating whether authentication succeeded or not.
+ for ac in authcontexts:
+ ok = self.CheckCookie(ac,user)
+ if ok:
+ return True
+ # Check passwords
+ ac = self.Authenticate(authcontexts, response, user)
+ if ac:
+ print self.MakeCookie(ac, user)
+ return True
+ return False
+
+ def MakeCookie(self, authcontext, user=None):
+ key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(authcontext, user)
+ if key is None or secret is None or not isinstance(secret, StringType):
+ raise ValueError
+ # Timestamp
+ issued = int(time.time())
+ # Get a digest of the secret, plus other information.
+ mac = sha_new(secret + `issued`).hexdigest()
+ # Create the cookie object.
+ c = Cookie.SimpleCookie()
+ c[key] = binascii.hexlify(marshal.dumps((issued, mac)))
+ # The path to all Mailman stuff, minus the scheme and host,
+ # i.e. usually the string `/mailman'
+ path = urlparse(self.__mlist.web_page_url)[2]
+ c[key]['path'] = path
+ # We use session cookies, so don't set `expires' or `max-age' keys.
+ # Set the RFC 2109 required header.
+ c[key]['version'] = 1
+ return c
+
+ def ZapCookie(self, authcontext, user=None):
+ # We can throw away the secret.
+ key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(authcontext, user)
+ # Logout of the session by zapping the cookie. For safety both set
+ # max-age=0 (as per RFC2109) and set the cookie data to the empty
+ # string.
+ c = Cookie.SimpleCookie()
+ c[key] = ''
+ # The path to all Mailman stuff, minus the scheme and host,
+ # i.e. usually the string `/mailman'
+ path = urlparse(self.__mlist.web_page_url)[2]
+ c[key]['path'] = path
+ c[key]['max-age'] = 0
+ # Don't set expires=0 here otherwise it'll force a persistent cookie
+ c[key]['version'] = 1
+ return c
+
+ def CheckCookie(self, authcontext, user=None):
+ # Two results can occur: we return 1 meaning the cookie authentication
+ # succeeded for the authorization context, we return 0 meaning the
+ # authentication failed.
+ #
+ # Dig out the cookie data, which better be passed on this cgi
+ # environment variable. If there's no cookie data, we reject the
+ # authentication.
+ cookiedata = os.environ.get('HTTP_COOKIE')
+ if not cookiedata:
+ return False
+ # We can't use the Cookie module here because it isn't liberal in what
+ # it accepts. Feed it a MM2.0 cookie along with a MM2.1 cookie and
+ # you get a CookieError. :(. All we care about is accessing the
+ # cookie data via getitem, so we'll use our own parser, which returns
+ # a dictionary.
+ c = parsecookie(cookiedata)
+ # If the user was not supplied, but the authcontext is AuthUser, we
+ # can try to glean the user address from the cookie key. There may be
+ # more than one matching key (if the user has multiple accounts
+ # subscribed to this list), but any are okay.
+ if authcontext == mm_cfg.AuthUser:
+ if user:
+ usernames = [user]
+ else:
+ usernames = []
+ prefix = self.__mlist.internal_name() + '+user+'
+ for k in c.keys():
+ if k.startswith(prefix):
+ usernames.append(k[len(prefix):])
+ # If any check out, we're golden. Note: `@'s are no longer legal
+ # values in cookie keys.
+ for user in [Utils.UnobscureEmail(urllib.unquote(u))
+ for u in usernames]:
+ ok = self.__checkone(c, authcontext, user)
+ if ok:
+ return True
+ return False
+ else:
+ return self.__checkone(c, authcontext, user)
+
+ def __checkone(self, c, authcontext, user):
+ # Do the guts of the cookie check, for one authcontext/user
+ # combination.
+ try:
+ key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(authcontext, user)
+ except Errors.NotAMemberError:
+ return False
+ if not c.has_key(key) or not isinstance(secret, StringType):
+ return False
+ # Undo the encoding we performed in MakeCookie() above. BAW: I
+ # believe this is safe from exploit because marshal can't be forced to
+ # load recursive data structures, and it can't be forced to execute
+ # any unexpected code. The worst that can happen is that either the
+ # client will have provided us bogus data, in which case we'll get one
+ # of the caught exceptions, or marshal format will have changed, in
+ # which case, the cookie decoding will fail. In either case, we'll
+ # simply request reauthorization, resulting in a new cookie being
+ # returned to the client.
+ try:
+ data = marshal.loads(binascii.unhexlify(c[key]))
+ issued, received_mac = data
+ except (EOFError, ValueError, TypeError, KeyError):
+ return False
+ # Make sure the issued timestamp makes sense
+ now = time.time()
+ if now < issued:
+ return False
+ # Calculate what the mac ought to be based on the cookie's timestamp
+ # and the shared secret.
+ mac = sha_new(secret + `issued`).hexdigest()
+ if mac <> received_mac:
+ return False
+ # Authenticated!
+ return True
+
+
+
+splitter = re.compile(';\s*')
+
+def parsecookie(s):
+ c = {}
+ for line in s.splitlines():
+ for p in splitter.split(line):
+ try:
+ k, v = p.split('=', 1)
+ except ValueError:
+ pass
+ else:
+ c[k] = v
+ return c
Index: mailman-2.1.13/Mailman/SecurityManager.py
===================================================================
--- mailman-2.1.13.orig/Mailman/SecurityManager.py 2009-12-22 19:00:43.000000000 +0100
+++ mailman-2.1.13/Mailman/SecurityManager.py 2010-03-29 11:29:07.716415355 +0200
@@ -15,348 +15,52 @@
# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
# USA.
+"""This is an interface to list-specific security information.
-"""Handle passwords and sanitize approved messages."""
+This class should not be instantiated directly, but instead, it should be
+subclassed for specific adaptation to session manager. The default
+MM2.0.x style adaptor is in OldSecurityManager.py. Through the extendSM.py
+mechanism, you can instantiate different session approval. For instance
+accept another cookie than the one created by mailman (in the case of
+mailman integration in another web pplication).
+"""
-# There are current 5 roles defined in Mailman, as codified in Defaults.py:
-# user, list-creator, list-moderator, list-admin, site-admin.
-#
-# Here's how we do cookie based authentication.
-#
-# Each role (see above) has an associated password, which is currently the
-# only way to authenticate a role (in the future, we'll authenticate a
-# user and assign users to roles).
-#
-# Each cookie has the following ingredients: the authorization context's
-# secret (i.e. the password, and a timestamp. We generate an SHA1 hex
-# digest of these ingredients, which we call the `mac'. We then marshal
-# up a tuple of the timestamp and the mac, hexlify that and return that as
-# a cookie keyed off the authcontext. Note that authenticating the user
-# also requires the user's email address to be included in the cookie.
-#
-# The verification process is done in CheckCookie() below. It extracts
-# the cookie, unhexlifies and unmarshals the tuple, extracting the
-# timestamp. Using this, and the shared secret, the mac is calculated,
-# and it must match the mac passed in the cookie. If so, they're golden,
-# otherwise, access is denied.
-#
-# It is still possible for an adversary to attempt to brute force crack
-# the password if they obtain the cookie, since they can extract the
-# timestamp and create macs based on password guesses. They never get a
-# cleartext version of the password though, so security rests on the
-# difficulty and expense of retrying the cgi dialog for each attempt. It
-# also relies on the security of SHA1.
-
-import os
-import re
-import time
-import Cookie
-import marshal
-import binascii
-import urllib
-from types import StringType, TupleType
-from urlparse import urlparse
-
-try:
- import crypt
-except ImportError:
- crypt = None
-
-from Mailman import mm_cfg
-from Mailman import Utils
-from Mailman import Errors
-from Mailman.Logging.Syslog import syslog
-from Mailman.Utils import md5_new, sha_new
-
-try:
- True, False
-except NameError:
- True = 1
- False = 0
-
class SecurityManager:
def InitVars(self):
- # We used to set self.password here, from a crypted_password argument,
- # but that's been removed when we generalized the mixin architecture.
- # self.password is really a SecurityManager attribute, but it's set in
- # MailList.InitVars().
- self.mod_password = None
- # Non configurable
- self.passwords = {}
+ """Initialize the list password"""
+ raise NotImplementedError
def AuthContextInfo(self, authcontext, user=None):
- # authcontext may be one of AuthUser, AuthListModerator,
- # AuthListAdmin, AuthSiteAdmin. Not supported is the AuthCreator
- # context.
- #
- # user is ignored unless authcontext is AuthUser
- #
- # Return the authcontext's secret and cookie key. If the authcontext
- # doesn't exist, return the tuple (None, None). If authcontext is
- # AuthUser, but the user isn't a member of this mailing list, a
- # NotAMemberError will be raised. If the user's secret is None, raise
- # a MMBadUserError.
- key = self.internal_name() + '+'
- if authcontext == mm_cfg.AuthUser:
- if user is None:
- # A bad system error
- raise TypeError, 'No user supplied for AuthUser context'
- secret = self.getMemberPassword(user)
- userdata = urllib.quote(Utils.ObscureEmail(user), safe='')
- key += 'user+%s' % userdata
- elif authcontext == mm_cfg.AuthListModerator:
- secret = self.mod_password
- key += 'moderator'
- elif authcontext == mm_cfg.AuthListAdmin:
- secret = self.password
- key += 'admin'
- # BAW: AuthCreator
- elif authcontext == mm_cfg.AuthSiteAdmin:
- sitepass = Utils.get_global_password()
- if mm_cfg.ALLOW_SITE_ADMIN_COOKIES and sitepass:
- secret = sitepass
- key = 'site'
- else:
- # BAW: this should probably hand out a site password based
- # cookie, but that makes me a bit nervous, so just treat site
- # admin as a list admin since there is currently no site
- # admin-only functionality.
- secret = self.password
- key += 'admin'
- else:
- return None, None
- return key, secret
+ """Return the authcontext's secret and cookie key"""
+ raise NotImplementedError
def Authenticate(self, authcontexts, response, user=None):
- # Given a list of authentication contexts, check to see if the
- # response matches one of the passwords. authcontexts must be a
- # sequence, and if it contains the context AuthUser, then the user
- # argument must not be None.
- #
- # Return the authcontext from the argument sequence that matches the
- # response, or UnAuthorized.
- if not response:
- # Don't authenticate null passwords
- return mm_cfg.UnAuthorized
- for ac in authcontexts:
- if ac == mm_cfg.AuthCreator:
- ok = Utils.check_global_password(response, siteadmin=0)
- if ok:
- return mm_cfg.AuthCreator
- elif ac == mm_cfg.AuthSiteAdmin:
- ok = Utils.check_global_password(response)
- if ok:
- return mm_cfg.AuthSiteAdmin
- elif ac == mm_cfg.AuthListAdmin:
- def cryptmatchp(response, secret):
- try:
- salt = secret[:2]
- if crypt and crypt.crypt(response, salt) == secret:
- return True
- return False
- except TypeError:
- # BAW: Hard to say why we can get a TypeError here.
- # SF bug report #585776 says crypt.crypt() can raise
- # this if salt contains null bytes, although I don't
- # know how that can happen (perhaps if a MM2.0 list
- # with USE_CRYPT = 0 has been updated? Doubtful.
- return False
- # The password for the list admin and list moderator are not
- # kept as plain text, but instead as an sha hexdigest. The
- # response being passed in is plain text, so we need to
- # digestify it first. Note however, that for backwards
- # compatibility reasons, we'll also check the admin response
- # against the crypted and md5'd passwords, and if they match,
- # we'll auto-migrate the passwords to sha.
- key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(ac)
- if secret is None:
- continue
- sharesponse = sha_new(response).hexdigest()
- upgrade = ok = False
- if sharesponse == secret:
- ok = True
- elif md5_new(response).digest() == secret:
- ok = upgrade = True
- elif cryptmatchp(response, secret):
- ok = upgrade = True
- if upgrade:
- save_and_unlock = False
- if not self.Locked():
- self.Lock()
- save_and_unlock = True
- try:
- self.password = sharesponse
- if save_and_unlock:
- self.Save()
- finally:
- if save_and_unlock:
- self.Unlock()
- if ok:
- return ac
- elif ac == mm_cfg.AuthListModerator:
- # The list moderator password must be sha'd
- key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(ac)
- if secret and sha_new(response).hexdigest() == secret:
- return ac
- elif ac == mm_cfg.AuthUser:
- if user is not None:
- try:
- if self.authenticateMember(user, response):
- return ac
- except Errors.NotAMemberError:
- pass
- else:
- # What is this context???
- syslog('error', 'Bad authcontext: %s', ac)
- raise ValueError, 'Bad authcontext: %s' % ac
- return mm_cfg.UnAuthorized
+ """Given a list of authentication contexts, check to see if the
+ response matches one of the passwords."""
+ raise NotImplementedError
def WebAuthenticate(self, authcontexts, response, user=None):
- # Given a list of authentication contexts, check to see if the cookie
- # contains a matching authorization, falling back to checking whether
- # the response matches one of the passwords. authcontexts must be a
- # sequence, and if it contains the context AuthUser, then the user
- # argument should not be None.
- #
- # Returns a flag indicating whether authentication succeeded or not.
- for ac in authcontexts:
- ok = self.CheckCookie(ac, user)
- if ok:
- return True
- # Check passwords
- ac = self.Authenticate(authcontexts, response, user)
- if ac:
- print self.MakeCookie(ac, user)
- return True
- return False
+ """Given a list of authentication contexts, check to see if the cookie
+ contains a matching authorization, falling back to checking whether
+ the response matches one of the passwords"""
+ raise NotImplementedError
def MakeCookie(self, authcontext, user=None):
- key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(authcontext, user)
- if key is None or secret is None or not isinstance(secret, StringType):
- raise ValueError
- # Timestamp
- issued = int(time.time())
- # Get a digest of the secret, plus other information.
- mac = sha_new(secret + `issued`).hexdigest()
- # Create the cookie object.
- c = Cookie.SimpleCookie()
- c[key] = binascii.hexlify(marshal.dumps((issued, mac)))
- # The path to all Mailman stuff, minus the scheme and host,
- # i.e. usually the string `/mailman'
- path = urlparse(self.web_page_url)[2]
- c[key]['path'] = path
- # We use session cookies, so don't set `expires' or `max-age' keys.
- # Set the RFC 2109 required header.
- c[key]['version'] = 1
- return c
+ raise NotImplementedError
def ZapCookie(self, authcontext, user=None):
- # We can throw away the secret.
- key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(authcontext, user)
- # Logout of the session by zapping the cookie. For safety both set
- # max-age=0 (as per RFC2109) and set the cookie data to the empty
- # string.
- c = Cookie.SimpleCookie()
- c[key] = ''
- # The path to all Mailman stuff, minus the scheme and host,
- # i.e. usually the string `/mailman'
- path = urlparse(self.web_page_url)[2]
- c[key]['path'] = path
- c[key]['max-age'] = 0
- # Don't set expires=0 here otherwise it'll force a persistent cookie
- c[key]['version'] = 1
- return c
+ raise NotImplementedError
def CheckCookie(self, authcontext, user=None):
- # Two results can occur: we return 1 meaning the cookie authentication
- # succeeded for the authorization context, we return 0 meaning the
- # authentication failed.
- #
- # Dig out the cookie data, which better be passed on this cgi
- # environment variable. If there's no cookie data, we reject the
- # authentication.
- cookiedata = os.environ.get('HTTP_COOKIE')
- if not cookiedata:
- return False
- # We can't use the Cookie module here because it isn't liberal in what
- # it accepts. Feed it a MM2.0 cookie along with a MM2.1 cookie and
- # you get a CookieError. :(. All we care about is accessing the
- # cookie data via getitem, so we'll use our own parser, which returns
- # a dictionary.
- c = parsecookie(cookiedata)
- # If the user was not supplied, but the authcontext is AuthUser, we
- # can try to glean the user address from the cookie key. There may be
- # more than one matching key (if the user has multiple accounts
- # subscribed to this list), but any are okay.
- if authcontext == mm_cfg.AuthUser:
- if user:
- usernames = [user]
- else:
- usernames = []
- prefix = self.internal_name() + '+user+'
- for k in c.keys():
- if k.startswith(prefix):
- usernames.append(k[len(prefix):])
- # If any check out, we're golden. Note: `@'s are no longer legal
- # values in cookie keys.
- for user in [Utils.UnobscureEmail(urllib.unquote(u))
- for u in usernames]:
- ok = self.__checkone(c, authcontext, user)
- if ok:
- return True
- return False
- else:
- return self.__checkone(c, authcontext, user)
+ """Two results can occur: we return 1 meaning the cookie authentication
+ succeeded for the authorization context, we return 0 meaning the
+ authentication failed."""
+ raise NotImplementedError
def __checkone(self, c, authcontext, user):
- # Do the guts of the cookie check, for one authcontext/user
- # combination.
- try:
- key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(authcontext, user)
- except Errors.NotAMemberError:
- return False
- if not c.has_key(key) or not isinstance(secret, StringType):
- return False
- # Undo the encoding we performed in MakeCookie() above. BAW: I
- # believe this is safe from exploit because marshal can't be forced to
- # load recursive data structures, and it can't be forced to execute
- # any unexpected code. The worst that can happen is that either the
- # client will have provided us bogus data, in which case we'll get one
- # of the caught exceptions, or marshal format will have changed, in
- # which case, the cookie decoding will fail. In either case, we'll
- # simply request reauthorization, resulting in a new cookie being
- # returned to the client.
- try:
- data = marshal.loads(binascii.unhexlify(c[key]))
- issued, received_mac = data
- except (EOFError, ValueError, TypeError, KeyError):
- return False
- # Make sure the issued timestamp makes sense
- now = time.time()
- if now < issued:
- return False
- # Calculate what the mac ought to be based on the cookie's timestamp
- # and the shared secret.
- mac = sha_new(secret + `issued`).hexdigest()
- if mac <> received_mac:
- return False
- # Authenticated!
- return True
-
-
-
-splitter = re.compile(';\s*')
+ raise NotImplementedError
def parsecookie(s):
- c = {}
- for line in s.splitlines():
- for p in splitter.split(line):
- try:
- k, v = p.split('=', 1)
- except ValueError:
- pass
- else:
- c[k] = v
- return c
+ raise NotImplementedError
Index: mailman-2.1.13/misc/paths.py.in
===================================================================
--- mailman-2.1.13.orig/misc/paths.py.in 2010-03-29 11:28:30.776910462 +0200
+++ mailman-2.1.13/misc/paths.py.in 2010-03-29 11:29:07.716415355 +0200
@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@
'site-packages')
sys.path.append(sitedir)
+# Include Python's dist-packages directory.
+distdir = os.path.join(sys.prefix, 'lib', 'python'+sys.version[:3],
+ 'dist-packages')
+sys.path.append(distdir)
+
# In a normal interactive Python environment, the japanese.pth and korean.pth
# files would be imported automatically. But because we inhibit the importing
Index: mailman-2.1.13/Mailman/Archiver/Archiver.py
===================================================================
--- mailman-2.1.13.orig/Mailman/Archiver/Archiver.py 2010-03-29 10:07:10.704421186 +0200
+++ mailman-2.1.13/Mailman/Archiver/Archiver.py 2010-03-29 10:07:10.828413364 +0200
@@ -200,20 +200,25 @@
# Archive to mbox only.
return
txt = str(msg)
- # should we use the internal or external archiver?
+
+ # keep using the internal archiver
+ f = StringIO(txt)
+ import HyperArch
+ h = HyperArch.HyperArchive(self)
+ h.processUnixMailbox(f)
+ h.close()
+ f.close()
+
+ # now, use the external archiver
private_p = self.archive_private
if mm_cfg.PUBLIC_EXTERNAL_ARCHIVER and not private_p:
self.ExternalArchive(mm_cfg.PUBLIC_EXTERNAL_ARCHIVER, txt)
elif mm_cfg.PRIVATE_EXTERNAL_ARCHIVER and private_p:
self.ExternalArchive(mm_cfg.PRIVATE_EXTERNAL_ARCHIVER, txt)
- else:
- # use the internal archiver
- f = StringIO(txt)
- import HyperArch
- h = HyperArch.HyperArchive(self)
- h.processUnixMailbox(f)
- h.close()
- f.close()
+
+ # Mark Sapiro: "The above patch looks fine to me for what you want to do."
+ # http://mail.python.org/pipermail/mailman-users/2008-January/059900.html
+
#
# called from MailList.MailList.Save()
diff -ruN -x 80_coclico.patch -x 81_forum_archiver.patch mailman-2.1.13.orig/debian/changelog mailman-2.1.13//debian/changelog
--- mailman-2.1.13.orig/debian/changelog 2010-04-13 16:22:45.000000000 +0200
+++ mailman-2.1.13//debian/changelog 2010-04-13 16:23:10.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,22 @@
+mailman (1:2.1.13-2coclico4) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * Add python dependancy for postgres and mysql
+
+ -- Christian Bayle <ba...@debian.org> Tue, 30 Mar 2010 11:06:21 +0200
+
+mailman (1:2.1.13-2coclico1) karmic; urgency=low
+
+ * Add forum archiver patch that allow multiple archivers
+ * Session :
+ - Modify SecurityManager.py to make it extendable
+ - Add OldSecurityManager.py as the default security manager
+ * MailList.py : modified
+ - Search extend.py first in /var/lib/lists
+ - Make it possible to extend SecurityManager.py
+ * Add dist-packages (python library directory) to ./misc/paths.py.in
+
+ -- Mélanie Le Bail <melanie.leb...@orange-ftgroup.com> Mon, 29 Mar 2010 11:30:40 +0200
+
mailman (1:2.1.13-2) unstable; urgency=low
* postfix-to-mailman.py: check for list existence before stripping off
diff -ruN -x 80_coclico.patch -x 81_forum_archiver.patch mailman-2.1.13.orig/debian/control mailman-2.1.13//debian/control
--- mailman-2.1.13.orig/debian/control 2010-04-13 16:22:45.000000000 +0200
+++ mailman-2.1.13//debian/control 2010-04-13 16:23:10.000000000 +0200
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
Architecture: any
Pre-Depends: debconf | debconf-2.0
Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, ${python:Depends}, ${misc:Depends},
- logrotate, cron, ucf, pwgen, lsb-base,
+ logrotate, cron, ucf, pwgen, lsb-base, python-psycopg2, python-mysqldb,
exim4 | mail-transport-agent, apache2 | httpd
Suggests: spamassassin, lynx, listadmin
XB-Python-Version: ${python:Versions}
diff -ruN -x 80_coclico.patch -x 81_forum_archiver.patch mailman-2.1.13.orig/debian/patches/series mailman-2.1.13//debian/patches/series
--- mailman-2.1.13.orig/debian/patches/series 2010-04-13 16:22:45.000000000 +0200
+++ mailman-2.1.13//debian/patches/series 2010-04-13 16:23:10.000000000 +0200
@@ -18,3 +18,5 @@
74_admin_non-ascii_emails.patch
79_archiver_slash.patch
99_js_templates.patch
+80_coclico.patch
+81_forum_archiver.patch
