On 2017-01-26, at 18:13, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Thu 2017-01-26 13:36:09 -0500, Jens Lechtenboerger wrote:
>> That’s customized in mml-secure-key-preferences. So, the usual
>> customize interface is available. And there is some code to detect
>> and remove unusable customizations.
>
>
Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
> On Thu 2017-01-26 14:34:22 -0500, Daiki Ueno wrote:
>> Jens Lechtenboerger writes:
>>> The mml code is based on EasyPG by Daiki Ueno (cc’ed). EasyPG makes
>>> use of sub-keys and their IDs for encryption
On Thu 2017-01-26 14:34:22 -0500, Daiki Ueno wrote:
> Jens Lechtenboerger writes:
>> The mml code is based on EasyPG by Daiki Ueno (cc’ed). EasyPG makes
>> use of sub-keys and their IDs for encryption commands, instead of
>> relying on GnuPG’s selections.
>
> It was
On Wed 2017-01-25 15:09:47 -0500, Jens Lechtenboerger wrote:
> mml2015-always-trust is replaced by mml-secure-openpgp-always-trust
> nowadays. I certainly wouldn’t object if the default value was
> changed, but lots of long-term users might be surprised.
hm, i just noticed that
On Thu 2017-01-26 13:36:09 -0500, Jens Lechtenboerger wrote:
> On 2017-01-25, at 15:30, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>> On Wed 2017-01-25 15:09:47 -0500, Jens Lechtenboerger wrote:
>>> mml2015-always-trust is replaced by mml-secure-openpgp-always-trust
>>> nowadays. I certainly wouldn’t object if
Jens Lechtenboerger writes:
>> Modern versions of GnuPG automatically select the key which GnuPG knows
>> to have the best validity among all matches for the selector, thanks to
>> work put in by Justus Winter (cc'ed), so letting GnuPG make the decision
>> would
On 2017-01-25, at 15:30, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> On Wed 2017-01-25 15:09:47 -0500, Jens Lechtenboerger wrote:
>> mml2015-always-trust is replaced by mml-secure-openpgp-always-trust
>> nowadays. I certainly wouldn’t object if the default value was
>> changed, but lots of long-term users
On Wed 2017-01-25 15:09:47 -0500, Jens Lechtenboerger wrote:
> On 2017-01-25, at 18:19, Lars Ingebrigtsen wrote:
>
>> Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
>>
>>> So in the scenario above, Bob's cert is still overall valid (because it
>>> has a valid certification over the correct
Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
> So in the scenario above, Bob's cert is still overall valid (because it
> has a valid certification over the correct UserID+key from Alice), even
> though the ca...@example.org UserID is invalid.
>
> I don't know mml-mode or elisp well enough
On 2017-01-25, at 18:19, Lars Ingebrigtsen wrote:
> Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
>
>> So in the scenario above, Bob's cert is still overall valid (because it
>> has a valid certification over the correct UserID+key from Alice), even
>> though the ca...@example.org UserID
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