On Tue, 8 Jan 2008 11:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
Anyway there 3000 calls to /dev/urandom are far too many for an initial
pool filling. I need to check this.
Found it. The bug was introduced with libgcrypt 1.3.1. Here is a patch:
2008-01-08 Werner Koch [EMAIL PROTECTED]
* random.c (add_randomness): Do not just increment
POOL_FILLED_COUNTER but update it by the actual amount of data.
Index: cipher/random.c
===
--- cipher/random.c (revision 1277)
+++ cipher/random.c (working copy)
@@ -1115,6 +1115,7 @@
add_randomness (const void *buffer, size_t length, enum random_origins origin)
{
const unsigned char *p = buffer;
+ size_t count = 0;
assert (pool_is_locked);
@@ -1123,6 +1124,7 @@
while (length-- )
{
rndpool[pool_writepos++] ^= *p++;
+ count++;
if (pool_writepos = POOLSIZE )
{
/* It is possible that we are invoked before the pool is
@@ -1132,7 +1134,9 @@
separately. See also the remarks about the seed file. */
if (origin = RANDOM_ORIGIN_SLOWPOLL !pool_filled)
{
- if (++pool_filled_counter = POOLSIZE)
+ pool_filled_counter += count;
+ count = 0;
+ if (pool_filled_counter = POOLSIZE)
pool_filled = 1;
}
pool_writepos = 0;
Also commited to SVN. Old and new stats:
$ LD_PRELOAD=/usr/local/lib/libgcrypt.so ./benchmark --verbose random
random 130ms30ms
random usage: poolsize=600 mixed=972 polls=3000/200 added=4200/378400
outmix=200 getlvl1=200/13600 getlvl2=0/0
$ ./benchmark --verbose random
random40ms30ms
random usage: poolsize=600 mixed=377 polls=25/200 added=1225/21400
outmix=200 getlvl1=200/13600 getlvl2=0/0
Shalom-Salam,
Werner
--
Die Gedanken sind frei. Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz.
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