Bug#1017425: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Avoid LFENCE in FILL_RETURN_BUFFER on CPUs that lack it
Hi Martin, On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 03:18:51PM +0300, Martin-??ric Racine wrote: > On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 3:00 PM Peter Zijlstra wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 02:42:04PM +0300, Martin-??ric Racine wrote: > > > On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 3:15 PM Peter Zijlstra > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 01:38:27PM +0200, Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > > > > > > > So that puts the whole __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER inside an alternative, and > > > > > we can't have nested alternatives. That's unfortunate. > > > > > > > > Well, both alternatives end with the LFENCE instruction, so I could pull > > > > it out and do two consequtive ALTs, but unrolling the loop for i386 is > > > > a better solution in that the sequence, while larger, removes the need > > > > for the LFENCE. > > > > > > Have we reached a definitive conclusion on to how to fix this? > > > > https://git.kernel.org/tip/332924973725e8cdcc783c175f68cf7e162cb9e5 > > Thanks. > > Ben: When can we expect an updated kernel to security-updates at Debian? When the update is ready to go. Likely the update for the next point release for bullseye will contain the fix for this issue. Regards, Salvatore
Bug#1017425: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Avoid LFENCE in FILL_RETURN_BUFFER on CPUs that lack it
On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 3:00 PM Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 02:42:04PM +0300, Martin-Éric Racine wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 3:15 PM Peter Zijlstra wrote: > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 01:38:27PM +0200, Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > > > > > So that puts the whole __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER inside an alternative, and > > > > we can't have nested alternatives. That's unfortunate. > > > > > > Well, both alternatives end with the LFENCE instruction, so I could pull > > > it out and do two consequtive ALTs, but unrolling the loop for i386 is > > > a better solution in that the sequence, while larger, removes the need > > > for the LFENCE. > > > > Have we reached a definitive conclusion on to how to fix this? > > https://git.kernel.org/tip/332924973725e8cdcc783c175f68cf7e162cb9e5 Thanks. Ben: When can we expect an updated kernel to security-updates at Debian? Martin-Éric
Bug#1017425: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Avoid LFENCE in FILL_RETURN_BUFFER on CPUs that lack it
On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 02:42:04PM +0300, Martin-Éric Racine wrote: > Greetings, > > On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 3:15 PM Peter Zijlstra wrote: > > > > On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 01:38:27PM +0200, Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > > > So that puts the whole __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER inside an alternative, and > > > we can't have nested alternatives. That's unfortunate. > > > > Well, both alternatives end with the LFENCE instruction, so I could pull > > it out and do two consequtive ALTs, but unrolling the loop for i386 is > > a better solution in that the sequence, while larger, removes the need > > for the LFENCE. > > Have we reached a definitive conclusion on to how to fix this? https://git.kernel.org/tip/332924973725e8cdcc783c175f68cf7e162cb9e5
Bug#1017425: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Avoid LFENCE in FILL_RETURN_BUFFER on CPUs that lack it
Greetings, On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 3:15 PM Peter Zijlstra wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 01:38:27PM +0200, Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > So that puts the whole __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER inside an alternative, and > > we can't have nested alternatives. That's unfortunate. > > Well, both alternatives end with the LFENCE instruction, so I could pull > it out and do two consequtive ALTs, but unrolling the loop for i386 is > a better solution in that the sequence, while larger, removes the need > for the LFENCE. Have we reached a definitive conclusion on to how to fix this? Martin-Éric
Bug#1017425: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Avoid LFENCE in FILL_RETURN_BUFFER on CPUs that lack it
On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 01:38:27PM +0200, Ben Hutchings wrote: > So that puts the whole __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER inside an alternative, and > we can't have nested alternatives. That's unfortunate. Well, both alternatives end with the LFENCE instruction, so I could pull it out and do two consequtive ALTs, but unrolling the loop for i386 is a better solution in that the sequence, while larger, removes the need for the LFENCE.
Bug#1017425: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Avoid LFENCE in FILL_RETURN_BUFFER on CPUs that lack it
On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 10:47:21AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 02:33:08AM +0200, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > From: Ben Hutchings
> >
> > The mitigation for PBRSB includes adding LFENCE instructions to the
> > RSB filling sequence. However, RSB filling is done on some older CPUs
> > that don't support the LFENCE instruction.
> >
>
> Wait; what? There are chips that enable the RSB mitigations and DONT
> have LFENCE ?!?
So I gave in and clicked on the horrible bugzilla thing. Apparently this
is P3/Athlon64 era crud.
Anyway, the added LFENCE isn't because of retbleed; it is because you
can steer the jnz and terminate the loop early and then not actually
complete the RSB stuffing.
New insights etc.. So it's a geniune fix for the existing rsb stuffing.
I'm not entirly sure what to do here. On the one hand, it's 32bit, so
who gives a crap, otoh we shouldn't break these ancient chips either I
suppose.
How's something like so then? It goes on top of my other patch cleaning
up this RSB mess:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Yv9m%2FhuNJLuyviIn%40worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net
---
Subject: x86/nospec: Fix i386 RSB stuffing
Turns out that i386 doesn't unconditionally have LFENCE, as such the
loop in __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER isn't actually speculation safe on such
chips.
Fixes: ba6e31af2be9 ("x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel)
---
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
* the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation
* trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
*/
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr) \
mov $(nr/2), reg; \
771: \
@@ -60,6 +61,17 @@
jnz 771b; \
/* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \
lfence;
+#else
+/*
+ * i386 doesn't unconditionally have LFENCE, as such it can't
+ * do a loop.
+ */
+#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr) \
+ .rept nr; \
+ __FILL_RETURN_SLOT; \
+ .endr; \
+ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, %_ASM_SP;
+#endif
/*
* Stuff a single RSB slot.
Bug#1017425: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Avoid LFENCE in FILL_RETURN_BUFFER on CPUs that lack it
On Fri, 2022-08-19 at 13:01 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 10:47:21AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 02:33:08AM +0200, Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > From: Ben Hutchings > > > > > > The mitigation for PBRSB includes adding LFENCE instructions to the > > > RSB filling sequence. However, RSB filling is done on some older CPUs > > > that don't support the LFENCE instruction. > > > > > > > Wait; what? There are chips that enable the RSB mitigations and DONT > > have LFENCE ?!? > > So I gave in and clicked on the horrible bugzilla thing. Apparently this > is P3/Athlon64 era crud. > > Anyway, the added LFENCE isn't because of retbleed; it is because you > can steer the jnz and terminate the loop early and then not actually > complete the RSB stuffing. I know, I corrected that further down. > New insights etc.. So it's a geniune fix for the existing rsb stuffing. > > I'm not entirly sure what to do here. On the one hand, it's 32bit, so > who gives a crap, otoh we shouldn't break these ancient chips either I > suppose. > > How's something like so then? It goes on top of my other patch cleaning > up this RSB mess: > > > https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Yv9m%2FhuNJLuyviIn%40worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net [...] That should be: https://lore.kernel.org/all/yv9m%2fhunjluyv...@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net/ (the redirector unescapes the URL-escaped /). So that puts the whole __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER inside an alternative, and we can't have nested alternatives. That's unfortunate. Ben. -- Ben Hutchings Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved it correct, not tried it. - Donald Knuth signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part
Bug#1017425: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Avoid LFENCE in FILL_RETURN_BUFFER on CPUs that lack it
On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 2:01 PM Peter Zijlstra wrote: > I'm not entirly sure what to do here. On the one hand, it's 32bit, so > who gives a crap, otoh we shouldn't break these ancient chips either I > suppose. This is something that I've repeatedly had to bring up, whenever something breaks because someone meant well by enabling more security bells and whistles: x86-32 is by definition legacy hardware. Enabling more bells and whistles essentially kills support for all but the very latest variants of the x86-32 family. This is the wrong approach. The right approach is to accept that building for x86-32 inherently means building for older and thus less secure architectures. Martin-Éric
Bug#1017425: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Avoid LFENCE in FILL_RETURN_BUFFER on CPUs that lack it
On Fri, 2022-08-19 at 10:47 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 02:33:08AM +0200, Ben Hutchings wrote: > > From: Ben Hutchings > > > > The mitigation for PBRSB includes adding LFENCE instructions to the > > RSB filling sequence. However, RSB filling is done on some older CPUs > > that don't support the LFENCE instruction. > > > > Wait; what? There are chips that enable the RSB mitigations and DONT > have LFENCE ?!? Yes, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW is enabled if any other Spectre v2 mitigation is enabled. And all Intel family 6 (except some early Atoms) and AMD family 5+ get Spectre v2 mitigation by default. Ben. -- Ben Hutchings Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved it correct, not tried it. - Donald Knuth signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part
Bug#1017425: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Avoid LFENCE in FILL_RETURN_BUFFER on CPUs that lack it
On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 02:33:08AM +0200, Ben Hutchings wrote: > From: Ben Hutchings > > The mitigation for PBRSB includes adding LFENCE instructions to the > RSB filling sequence. However, RSB filling is done on some older CPUs > that don't support the LFENCE instruction. > Wait; what? There are chips that enable the RSB mitigations and DONT have LFENCE ?!?
Bug#1017425: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Avoid LFENCE in FILL_RETURN_BUFFER on CPUs that lack it
From: Ben Hutchings
The mitigation for PBRSB includes adding LFENCE instructions to the
RSB filling sequence. However, RSB filling is done on some older CPUs
that don't support the LFENCE instruction.
Define and use a BARRIER_NOSPEC macro which makes the LFENCE
conditional on X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC, like the barrier_nospec()
macro defined for C code in .
Reported-by: Martin-Éric Racine
References: https://bugs.debian.org/1017425
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
Cc: regressi...@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Daniel Sneddon
Cc: Pawan Gupta
Fixes: 2b1299322016 ("x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections")
Fixes: ba6e31af2be9 ("x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings
---
Re-sending this with properly matched From address and server.
Apologies if you got 2 copies.
Ben.
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 11 +++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index e64fd20778b6..b1029fd88474 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@
#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS32 /* To forcibly overwrite all
entries */
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+/* Prevent speculative execution past this barrier. */
+#define BARRIER_NOSPEC ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC
+
/*
* Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
* the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation
@@ -62,9 +67,7 @@
dec reg;\
jnz 771b; \
/* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \
- lfence;
-
-#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+ BARRIER_NOSPEC;
/*
* This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
@@ -138,7 +141,7 @@
int3
.Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@:
add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP
- lfence
+ BARRIER_NOSPEC
.endm
/*
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
Bug#1017425: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Avoid LFENCE in FILL_RETURN_BUFFER on CPUs that lack it
The mitigation for PBRSB includes adding LFENCE instructions to the
RSB filling sequence. However, RSB filling is done on some older CPUs
that don't support the LFENCE instruction.
Define and use a BARRIER_NOSPEC macro which makes the LFENCE
conditional on X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC, like the barrier_nospec()
macro defined for C code in .
Reported-by: Martin-Éric Racine
References: https://bugs.debian.org/1017425
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
Cc: regressi...@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Daniel Sneddon
Cc: Pawan Gupta
Fixes: 2b1299322016 ("x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections")
Fixes: ba6e31af2be9 ("x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 11 +++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index e64fd20778b6..b1029fd88474 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@
#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS32 /* To forcibly overwrite all
entries */
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+/* Prevent speculative execution past this barrier. */
+#define BARRIER_NOSPEC ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC
+
/*
* Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
* the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation
@@ -62,9 +67,7 @@
dec reg;\
jnz 771b; \
/* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \
- lfence;
-
-#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+ BARRIER_NOSPEC;
/*
* This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
@@ -138,7 +141,7 @@
int3
.Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@:
add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP
- lfence
+ BARRIER_NOSPEC
.endm
/*
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
