Bug#647545: svnserve: CRAM-MD5 authentication implementation is vulnerable to replay attack

2012-01-16 Thread Jonathan Nieder
Peter Samuelson wrote: Right. Now that apr reads /dev/urandom, there doesn't seem to still be a need for this patch. I suppose I'll remove it in the next upload. Yay. :) Thanks for your attention to detail. -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a

Bug#647545: svnserve: CRAM-MD5 authentication implementation is vulnerable to replay attack

2012-01-15 Thread Jonathan Nieder
Hi again, Jonathan Nieder wrote: In its implementation of CRAM-MD5 authentication, svnserve uses a challenge of nonce . time @ hostname After the fix to bug#285708, the nonce is not actually random, but is just the current time a few moments before the later time component is

Bug#647545: svnserve: CRAM-MD5 authentication implementation is vulnerable to replay attack

2012-01-15 Thread Peter Samuelson
Another detail I missed before: nowadays apr_generate_random_bytes() reads from urandom, not /dev/random, so this would not cause bug#285708 to come back. Right. Now that apr reads /dev/urandom, there doesn't seem to still be a need for this patch. I suppose I'll remove it in the next

Bug#647545: svnserve: CRAM-MD5 authentication implementation is vulnerable to replay attack

2011-11-03 Thread Jonathan Nieder
Package: subversion Version: 1.6.17dfsg-2 Severity: important Tags: security patch Hi, In its implementation of CRAM-MD5 authentication, svnserve uses a challenge of nonce . time @ hostname After the fix to bug#285708, the nonce is not actually random, but is just the current time a