Bdale,
what's your stance on this?
Regards,
Joey
Alexandra N. Kossovsky wrote:
Package: sudo-ldap
Version: 1.6.9p17-2+lenny1
Severity: grave
Tags: security patch
Justification: user security hole
Hello.
Following patch fixes memory access after free():
--- parse.c
Michael Kerrisk wrote:
Just for debian's info: you definitely want the man-pages page. The
pthreads pages that I have been recently adding to man-pages are far
better than the ancient glibc pages.
Ack. I've opened Bug#506515 requesting this.
Regards,
Joey
--
No question is too
Philipp Kern wrote:
On Tue, Apr 15, 2008 at 08:39:03AM +0200, Pierre Habouzit wrote:
Dear security team, you broke lighttpd badly with your last upload,
because you use a broken patch to fix the last CVE on it. Please update
the patch, using e.g. the one in the unstable version instead.
Bug confirmed
Recompile sufficient not confirmed
Regards,
Joey
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[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Package: sysklogd
Version: 1.5-1
Severity: critical
Justification: breaks unrelated software
I don't really know if it is new sendmail config, proftpd config or new
sylogd config, but many of my log files have been deactivated and replaced by
others in others
Nikolaus Schulz wrote:
Package: libid3-3.8.3c2a
Version: 3.8.3-6
Severity: grave
Tags: security
Justification: user security hole
Hi,
when tagging file $foo, a temporary copy of the file is created, and for some
reason, libid3 doesn't use mkstemp but just creates $foo.XX
Faidon Liambotis wrote:
Granted, we have a very very bad record as maintainers of supporting
this security-wise but I think we can try to change that. I certainly
will try my best to provide you with patched versions to upload.
I haven't discuss this with the rest of the team yet but I think
Julien Cristau wrote:
tags 427596 + patch
Thanks, fixed in source.
Regards,
Joey
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-- Andrew S. Tanenbaum
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Mike Hommey wrote:
On my OOo build on etch:
/home/rene/Debian/Pakete/openoffice.org/openoffice.org-2.3.0/ooo-build/build/current/extensions/source/plugin/base
dmake: Executing shell macro: $(PKGCONFIG) $(PKGCONFIG_PREFIX) --cflags
$(PKGCONFIG_MODULES)
Package 'Mozilla Plug-In API'
Steve Kemp wrote:
Hiki 0.8.0 - 0.8.6 is affected, it means that stable, testing and unstable
pacakges in Debian are affected. Please update hiki package.
For more detail, see http://hikiwiki.org/en/advisory20070624.html
Joey if you could allocate an ID I'll upload a fixed package.
Bdale Garbee wrote:
Also just talked to James Troup who is in the same room here at Debconf,
and he's running this version of gzip on various buildd systems... so
I'm confused about what might be wrong.
Err, since when are source packages *built* on buildd systems? They
are unpacked - which
Bdale Garbee wrote:
On Mon, 2007-06-18 at 17:47 +0200, Martin Schulze wrote:
Bdale Garbee wrote:
Any idea at where to look?
Not really. I freshened my machine to latest unstable this morning...
maybe an strace would point to something? [shrug]
Does this help?
Look
Bdale Garbee wrote:
tags 429462 +unreproducible +moreinfo
thanks
On Mon, 2007-06-18 at 11:24 +0200, Joey Schulze wrote:
Package: gzip
Version: 1.3.12-2
Severity: grave
I'm sorry to report but the new version of gzip breaks dpkg-source in
sid and thus cannot be used for package
Bdale Garbee wrote:
Any idea at where to look?
Not really. I freshened my machine to latest unstable this morning...
maybe an strace would point to something? [shrug]
Does this help?
finlandia!joey(tty6):/tmp/work dpkg -l gzip
Desired=Unknown/Install/Remove/Purge/Hold
|
Tobias Vogel wrote:
Package: klogd
Version: 1.4.1
Severity: grave
klogd randomly starts using 99 cpu.if work
on the certain vserver is still possible, then
killing the klogd (-9) is the only thing to stop the
process.
I assume that you don't have an idea on what's going on there, right?
Package: open-iscsi
Version: 2.0.730-1
Severity: serious
The installation of open-iscsi leads to:
honey:~# date
Fri May 11 11:58:48 CEST 2007
honey:~# apt-get update
Get:1 http://ftp.de.debian.org etch Release.gpg [378B]
Hit http://ftp.de.debian.org etch Release
merge 409147 409148
thanks
David Broome wrote:
Package: glibc
Version: glibc-2.3.2.ds1-22sarge4
Severity: critical
Hello - tzdata in glibc for stable is based on tzdata2006b (from edits
in 2.3.2.ds1-22sarge1), this does not have the correct PST changes for
this year for 4 Canadian
Please use CVE-2006-5876.
Regards,
Joey
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Josselin Mouette wrote:
Le jeudi 28 décembre 2006 à 17:29 -0800, Thomas Bushnell BSG a écrit :
On Fri, 2006-12-29 at 01:56 +0100, Josselin Mouette wrote:
Now, if you don't provide us with the necessary data, we won't be able
to fix the regression it introduces in gnucash.
There are
Finn-Arne Johansen wrote:
Package: gosa
Version: 2.5.6-2
Severity: critical
Tags: security
Justification: root security hole
The documentation in gosa tells the admin to install gosa.conf under
/etc/gosa/gosa.conf, and to make it readable by the group www-data.
In this configuration
Julien Cristau wrote:
Hi,
do the security@ people have a DSA in preparation for links and/or
elinks for CVE-2006-5925, or should I prepare a patch for the stable
versions too?
As far as I know, no. Please prepare an update.
Regards,
Joey
--
Given enough thrust pigs will fly,
reopen 387089
thanks
I'm sorry to tell you, but this problem is not yet fixed.
Installed version of ca-certificates:
ii ca-certificates 20061027Common CA
Certificates PEM files
There should be a link, but isn't:
finlandia!joey(tty1):/etc/ssl/certs l |grep
Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
let a be an architecture in sarge. Then one of the following holds for
mailman in sarge r3:
- it is affected by a security problem.
- it has a severity critical bug.
Mailman in sid:
- may or may not suffer of a security problem
A security problem in
Steve Langasek wrote:
On Sun, Jul 23, 2006 at 08:51:29PM +0200, Martin Schulze wrote:
Steve Langasek wrote:
On Fri, Jul 07, 2006 at 08:42:59PM +0200, Martin Schulze wrote:
It appears to be a correct fix for the regression that has been reported.
I'd rather make it read
wrote:
On Sat, Aug 19, 2006 at 09:28:46AM +0200, Martin Schulze wrote:
Well, apparently the -3 package that you said you couldn't find was on
security.d.o all along, because this was *not* in the second -3 package
that
I uploaded; but that one was rejected because it was a duplicate
sean finney wrote:
executive summary for security team: not escaping query strings
can possibly result in SQL injection for apps that use pike+postgresql.
i've developed a patch which cleanly applies to both the 7.2 and 7.6
branches that exist in sarge. however, looking more closely at
Alexis Sukrieh wrote:
Moritz Muehlenhoff wrote:
The distribution should be stable-security instead of
testing-proposed-updates. Please also remove all the i18n updates:
Ok, I'll make a new package with the correct distribution.
The i18n updates are automatically made by the build
Stefan Fritsch wrote:
Package: freeciv
Severity: grave
Tags: security
Justification: user security hole
CVE-2006-3913:
Buffer overflow in Freeciv 2.1.0-beta1 and earlier, and SVN 15 Jul
2006 and earlier, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service
(crash) and possibly execute
Thijs Kinkhorst wrote:
CVE-2006-3320: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in command.php
in SiteBar 3.3.8 and earlier allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary
web script or HTML via the command parameter.
I've already fixed this by NMU in unstable. I've also prepared an
updated
Package: asterisk
Version: 1.2.10.dfsg-1
Severity: grave
Tags: security patch
A problem has been discovered in the IAX2 channel driver of Asterisk,
an Open Source Private Branch Exchange and telephony toolkit, which
may allow a remote to cause au crash of the Asterisk server.
The patch used for
Mark Purcell wrote:
On Thursday 27 July 2006 07:34, Martin Schulze wrote:
The patch used for security is attached.
Thanks Joey,
In asterisk 1.2.10 half of that patch is already applied upstream.
I have applied the other half and am in the process of uploading.
Great!
Regards
Steve Langasek wrote:
On Fri, Jul 07, 2006 at 08:42:59PM +0200, Martin Schulze wrote:
Steve Langasek wrote:
As mentioned earlier this month, a regression was found in the freetype
2.1.7-2.5 package uploaded for DSA-1095 which caused applications to crash
with division-by-zero errors
Christian Perrier wrote:
As a consequence, I hereby ask the security team to DROP the processing
of the 4.0.3-31sarge6 version you have.
As you wish, packages deleted.
Regards,
Joey
--
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Please always Cc
Hi!
Steve Langasek wrote:
As mentioned earlier this month, a regression was found in the freetype
2.1.7-2.5 package uploaded for DSA-1095 which caused applications to crash
with division-by-zero errors. I've prepared a maintainer upload to fix
this regression using the patch from bug
Steve Langasek wrote:
On Mon, Jun 26, 2006 at 08:36:07AM +0100, Steve Kemp wrote:
On Sun, Jun 25, 2006 at 03:09:51PM -0700, Steve Langasek wrote:
As mentioned earlier this month, a regression was found in the freetype
2.1.7-2.5 package uploaded for DSA-1095 which caused applications to
Here are packages that I would upload if you don't object.
http://people.debian.org/~joey/NMU/thuban/
Regards,
Joey
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Anon Sricharoenchai wrote:
Package: mimms
Version: 0.0.9-1
Severity: grave
Justification: user security hole
Tags: security patch
According to the patch attached in this report, it has many possible buffer
overflows.
For example,
- memcpy(buf, data, length) without bounding the limit of
FYI
Regards,
Joey
- Forwarded message from Steven M. Christey [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
==
Name: CVE-2006-3081
Status: Candidate
URL: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-3081
Reference: BUGTRAQ:20060614 MySQL DoS
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+xine-ui (0.99.3-1sarge1) stable-security; urgency=high
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload by the Security Team
+ * Corrected call to report() and printf() to fix format string
+vulnerabilities [src/xitk/main.c, src/xitk/xine-toolkit/xitk.c,
+CVE-2006-2230]
+
+ -- Martin Schulze [EMAIL
Martin Pitt wrote:
Hi Joey,
Martin Schulze [2006-05-28 19:37 +0200]:
[1] http://people.debian.org/~mpitt/psql-sarge/
[2]
http://people.debian.org/~mpitt/psql-sarge/postgresql_7.4.7-6sarge2.debdiff
Thanks a lot. However, could you redo the (source) package without
the arch
Martin Pitt wrote:
Hi security team,
I backported the relevant changes from 7.4.13 and put the sarge
security update to [1]. This time, just putting 7.4.13 into
sarge-security would even have been safer IMHO, and that's what users
would want anyway, but we already had this discussion
Martin Pitt wrote:
Hi Florian, hi security team, hi everyone else,
just for the record, sid has updated packages already.
I'm 70% into completing the security update for sarge. However, due to
the nature of the vulns, the patches are enormous, and thus require
meticulous porting and
-14woody1) oldstable-security; urgency=high
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload by the Security Team
+ * Fully implemented non-world-writeable directories [libdi_d/config.sh
+alias xmcdconfig, CVE-2006-2542]
+
+ -- Martin Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thu, 25 May 2006 20:32:48 +0200
+
xmcd (2.6-14) unstable
Alec Berryman wrote:
Package: freeradius
Followup-For: Bug #359042
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Attached dpatch is reformatted from revision 1.11 of
src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_mschapv2/rlm_eap_mschapv2.c.
The fix applies and compiles, but I have not done
Christian Hammers wrote:
Attached you will find a diff that can be used to make a DSA for the
recent Quagga security bug.
Thanks a lot for preparing the update.
Please also mention CVE-2006-2223 CVE-2006-2224 in the unstable changelog
when you're doing the next upload anyway.
Regards,
-2006-2247]
+
+ -- Martin Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED] Fri, 12 May 2006 08:10:15 +0200
+
webcalendar (0.9.45-4sarge3) stable-security; urgency=high
* Fixed multiple security vulnerabilities
only in patch2:
unchanged:
--- webcalendar-0.9.45.orig/includes/user.php
+++ webcalendar-0.9.45/includes
,
+debian/patches/9_CVE-2006-2162.dpatch]
+
+ -- Martin Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thu, 11 May 2006 17:34:58 +0200
+
nagios (2:1.3-cvs.20050402-2.sarge.1) unstable; urgency=high
* Sean Finney:
only in patch2:
unchanged:
--- nagios-1.3-cvs.20050402.orig/debian/patches/9_CVE-2006-2162.dpatch
Elrond wrote:
On Sun, May 07, 2006 at 09:16:35AM +0200, Martin Schulze wrote:
[...]
If an update enters stable-security and the version in testing ist the
same as in stable, then the new version propagates into testing. If,
additionally, the version in unstable is the same, this very
Mario 'BitKoenig' Holbe wrote:
Elrond wrote:
I _might_ be able to test, wether the package still works
Please let us know.
Tests are done. Everything seems to work well.
Update prepared.
Go on :)
Please make sure you did also add 50_client-c_bufferoverflow_fix to
Elrond wrote:
Nearly all the relevant information, that is currently
available regarding this issue, is in the bug logs.
(see: http://bugs.debian.org/365680)
Are you going to update the package in sid as well?
Or should the package propagate via stable-security?
Regards,
Joey
--
Elrond wrote:
Nearly all the relevant information, that is currently
available regarding this issue, is in the bug logs.
(see: http://bugs.debian.org/365680)
Very Short summary:
* bufferoverflow in C code
* remotely exploitable
* CVE has been requested by micah
* Untested patch exists
Stefan Fritsch wrote:
Package: libxine1
Version: 1.1.1-1
Severity: grave
Tags: security
Justification: user security hole
According to CVE-2006-1664, there is a buffer overflow in
xine_list_delete_current in libxine 1.14 and earlier, as distributed
in xine-lib 1.1.1 and earlier,
Mark Purcell wrote:
Bug #315532 has been rasied as grave security related bug against
asterisk-1.0.7, which is included in the released sarge.
It refers to a potential overflow in the Asterisk Manager Interface, which is
not enabled by default in the Debian asterisk package. In addition
paul cannon wrote:
It seems rather like manpages-dev /should/ be the one to own these, and
a bug should be filed on modutils to get these manpages out of there.
In a former time it was the job of manpages/manpages-dev to document
the interface to the kernel and libc, i.e. system calls etc.
Steinar H. Gunderson wrote:
On Mon, Mar 13, 2006 at 12:25:13AM +0100, Martin Schulze wrote:
An algorithm weakness has been discovered in Apache2::Request, the
generic request library for Apache2 which can be exploited remotely
and cause a denial of service via CPU consumption.
Looks like
Damyan Ivanov wrote:
Here's a patch that fixes the crash. The fix is
rather ugly IMHO, but this is what upstream proposed.
The patch looks good. I've requested a CVE name as well,
will upload fixed packages for sarge tonight.
Regards,
Joey
--
Of course, I didn't mean that, which is
Damyan Ivanov wrote:
Here's a patch that fixes the crash. The fix is
rather ugly IMHO, but this is what upstream proposed.
Please apply it to stable version of firebird2.
Unstable package is due for upload.
More information (discovery, reproduction) on
http://bugs.debian.org/358580
Vincent Lefevre wrote:
Package: mutt
Version: 1.5.11+cvs20060126-2
Severity: grave
Tags: security
Justification: user security hole
Mutt doesn't filter control characters, in particular the ^J and ^M,
from headers, which can lead to unwanted behavior; in particular when
replying, the
Proposed updates for woody and sarge are here:
http://klecker.debian.org/~joey/security/sudo/
I'd be glad if you could test them.
Regards,
Joey
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Noah Meyerhans wrote:
On Tue, Jan 31, 2006 at 08:41:35AM -0800, Ryan Murray wrote:
gcc -O2 -Wall -D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
-D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -DSYSV -fomit-frame-pointer -fno-strength-reduce
-DFSSTND -c ksym_mod.c
In file included from
Jason Dorje Short wrote:
Package: freeciv-server
Version: 2.0.7-2
Severity: important
Jordi -
There is a security hole in Freeciv 2.0 allowing a remote user to trigger a
server crash (it is unlikely anything more than a crashed civserver would
result from the hole). This patch (which
Thomas Wana wrote:
Hi,
Geoff Crompton wrote:
This bug has been closed for unstable (see bug 350964) with the 4.6
upload, but will it be fixed for sarge?
Joey: I sent you a patch for that, but it seems you didn't
include this in scponly-4.0sarge1. We also had no discussion
about wether
Torsten Werner wrote:
Moritz Muehlenhoff wrote:
What's the status of an update for stable?
I have provide a fix over 2 months ago but I did not hear anything from
the security team.
Hmm. I only find my complaints but no response from you.
However, the packages on master are better now.
Please read the advisory again:
http://www.debian.org/security/2006/dsa-946
It says:
Additional variables are only passed through when set as env_check
in /etc/sudoers, which might be required for some scripts to
continue to work.
Use
Defaultsenv_check = HOME
in /etc/sudoers
Moritz Muehlenhoff wrote:
Dear security team,
so far there hasn't been a security update for the latest evolution
vulnerabilities. (CVE-2005-2549/CVE-2005-2550)
I've attached patches for Woody and Sarge. The Sarge fixes are
straightforward,
but some comments on Woody, relative to the patch
Niko Tyni wrote:
Hi security team,
I'm very sorry that you have to hear from me again :(
There's a regression in the patch for DSA-960-1, for both woody and sarge.
When $HOME is not set, Mail::Audit is now creating logfiles in cwd and
dying if it's not writable. This happens even if
Daniel Kobras wrote:
On Fri, Jan 27, 2006 at 10:59:34PM +0100, Martin Schulze wrote:
Daniel Kobras wrote:
Gnah. You are correct. I'm extending the list of forbidden characters
by $().
Upstream has reverted the blacklist and instead went for an improved
version of the symlink
Alexander Wirt wrote:
Hi Michael,
this security bug in xlockmore is still present in all xlockmore versions in
the archive and is open for now 190 days. In the meantime we organized a CVE
number and a patch that fixes that problem. But still no reaction from you. I
know that aren't MIA at
Daniel Kobras wrote:
found 345238 4:5.4.4.5-1woody7
found 345238 6:6.0.6.2-2.5
thanks
On Thu, Jan 05, 2006 at 01:49:11PM +0100, Daniel Kobras wrote:
On Fri, Dec 30, 2005 at 02:19:27PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
With some user interaction, this is exploitable through Gnus and
Daniel Kobras wrote:
Gnah. You are correct. I'm extending the list of forbidden characters
by $().
Upstream has reverted the blacklist and instead went for an improved
version of the symlink fix I added to ImageMagick in unstable. The patch
is more involved, but also more robust and
Stefan Pfetzing wrote:
Package: lsh-server
Version: 2.0.1cdbs-3
Severity: grave
Tags: security
Tags: sarge
Tags: confirmed
Tags: pending
Justification: denial of service
As reported by Niels Möller, the author of lsh-utils, a user is able to
access fd:s used by lsh.
When logging in
Stefan Pfetzing wrote:
Please let us know which version in sid will fix the problem.
I've requested a CVE name and will provide it asap.
lsh-utilis 2.0.1cdbs-4 includes a dpatch file in debian/patches which
fixes the problem.
Please use CVE-2006-0353 for this vulnerability.
Regards,
Thijs Kinkhorst wrote:
On Mon, 2005-12-19 at 13:41 +0100, Thijs Kinkhorst wrote:
For stable:
I've extracted the right patch from the unstable version (which has been
present without any bugreports since the end of October), and that is
attached. I've also prepared updated packages here:
Gunnar Wolf wrote:
Martin Schulze dijo [Sat, Jan 14, 2006 at 08:43:57AM +0100]:
Gunnar Wolf wrote:
Hi,
The bug is indeed important, even if it is not easily exploitable, and
the fix is trivial. I am pushing it to the security team so they can
apply it to the version in Sarge
Gunnar Wolf wrote:
Hi,
The bug is indeed important, even if it is not easily exploitable, and
the fix is trivial. I am pushing it to the security team so they can
apply it to the version in Sarge as well.
Please use CVE-2005-4536 for this problem.
Are you in contact with upstream?
Hi Alexis!
Alexis Sukrieh wrote:
* Martin Schulze ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) disait :
Do you happen to know about the package in woody?
Well, I don't know. Where can I grab woody's source packages?
a) what about woody
As soon as I know where to fetch woody's sources, I will tell you.
I
Martin Schulze wrote:
Alexis Sukrieh wrote:
* Martin Schulze ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) disait :
Do you happen to know about the package in woody?
Btw. this issue has been assigned CVE-2005-4534, so please add it to the
changelog if you prepare a fixed package for woody as well.
Regards
/JBIG2Stream.cc, debian/patches/patch-CVE-2005-3191]
+
+ -- Martin Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thu, 15 Dec 2005 17:02:52 +0100
+
+tetex-bin (2.0.2-30sarge3) stable-security; urgency=high
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload by the Security Team
+ * Added more precautionary checks by Martin Pitt
+
+ -- Martin Schulze
Alexis Sukrieh wrote:
Hi,
I'm the maintainer of the backup manager package.
There are currently one security issue in our sarge package (0.5.7-7sarge1).
I made a package with the patch submitted against the bug #329387 which
closes the issue.
Umh... I don't have a CVE name to share
Jeroen van Wolffelaar wrote:
On Tue, Dec 20, 2005 at 06:54:18AM +0100, Martin Schulze wrote:
Thijs Kinkhorst wrote:
On Mon, 2005-12-19 at 06:53 +0100, Martin Schulze wrote:
Thanks. Could somebody explain the issues that were fixed which have no
security relevance? From
You didn't mention CVE-2005-3417. Is the version in sarge not vulnerable
to it? Or did you miss it? Or did you just didn't document this?
Regards,
Joey
--
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Thijs Kinkhorst wrote:
On Mon, 2005-12-19 at 08:49 +0100, Martin Schulze wrote:
You didn't mention CVE-2005-3417. Is the version in sarge not vulnerable
to it? Or did you miss it? Or did you just didn't document this?
This has been fixed but indeed isn't documented in the changelog
Hi Frank!
Frank Küster wrote:
I looked at both, and it seems that Martin's does more. I'm speaking of
the patch attached to
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=342292;msg=136
It introduces limits.h and does the same we did for the xpdf patches at
the beginning of the year,
Martin Pitt wrote:
After discovering that the same flawed multiplication is also present
in upstream's other two patches, I decided to completely rework the
patch.
I attach the debdiff with separated out changelog. Florian, maybe you
can peer-review the patch?
Martin and
; urgency=high
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload by the Security Team
+ * Adjusted the former patch
+ * Applied missing bits found by Ludwig Nussel
+
+ -- Martin Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED] Fri, 9 Dec 2005 11:25:16 +0100
+
+tetex-bin (2.0.2-30sarge1) stable-security; urgency=high
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload
Frank Küster wrote:
Hi Joey,
Martin Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The original patch was not sufficient. I'm attaching the entire and the
incremental patch. Please apply the incremental patch to the version in
sid as well.
Did you see Martin Pitt's enhanced patch - do both
Loic Minier wrote:
On Mon, Nov 21, 2005, Martin Schulze wrote:
I found the vulnerability matrix by Moritz Muehlenhoff useful:
Woody gtk2 Woody gdk-pixbuf Sarge gtk2 Sarge
gdk-pixbuf
CVE-2005-29751170 2841170 284
CVE-2005
Thijs Kinkhorst wrote:
On Thu, 2005-10-27 at 15:49 +0200, Moritz Muehlenhoff wrote:
All affect Sarge.
I've prepared updated packages for sarge. My updated package for sid is
still pending with my sponsor Luk Claes. The updated packages for sarge
are available here:
Loic Minier wrote:
Sorry for the delay. You can grab the proposed fixes in:
http://people.dooz.org/~lool/debian/gtk-gdk-cves.tgz (87M)
MD5: 56148df50af6e28beaca57e4fa3bf6cc
Thanks a lot! Packages are building already.
I found the vulnerability matrix by Moritz Muehlenhoff
Hi!
Steve Langasek wrote:
I've tracked this bug in centericq down to a failure to deal with short
packets (or packets declaring their own length to be zero). The attached
patch fixes this segfault, by stopping without further processing of the
packet when its length is determined to be zero.
Piotr Roszatycki wrote:
Dnia Wednesday 16 of November 2005 13:17, Martin Schulze napisa?:
Vuln 1:
Full Path Disclosures in the following files:
Vuln 2:
Http Response Splitting in libraries/header_http.inc.php
Do you know if this is the same vulnerability as the first one above
Florian Ragwitz wrote:
On Tue, Nov 15, 2005 at 11:24:32AM +0100, Bastian Blank wrote:
On Tue, Nov 15, 2005 at 01:45:54AM +0100, Florian Ragwitz wrote:
I'm aware of the unportability of parrot and working on it.
Unfortunately I don't have a s390 machine where I can log into
currently.
Jonas Smedegaard wrote:
Jonas Smedegaard wrote:
A package has now been uploaded to
ftp://security.debian.org/pub/SecurityUploadQueue
Hope it is correctly understood that when a firt-timer on
security-debian-org source needs to be incuded.
In general this was correct...
Steve Kemp wrote:
On Wed, Nov 09, 2005 at 04:42:08AM -0800, Charles Stevenson wrote:
Due to a bug in the environment variable substitution code it is
possible to inject environment variables such as LD_PRELOAD and gain a
root shell.
Confirmed.
Joey we'll need an ID for it.
Jonas Smedegaard wrote:
A package has now been uploaded to
ftp://security.debian.org/pub/SecurityUploadQueue
Hope it is correctly understood that when a firt-timer on
security-debian-org source needs to be incuded.
In general this was correct... However, what's this part in the
diff:
only
Steve Kemp wrote:
Due to a bug in the environment variable substitution code it is
possible to inject environment variables such as LD_PRELOAD and gain a
root shell.
Charles Stevenson discovered that osh, the operator's shell for
executing defined programs in a privileged environment, does
Moritz Muehlenhoff wrote:
Martin Schulze wrote:
Due to a bug in the environment variable substitution code it is
possible to inject environment variables such as LD_PRELOAD and gain a
root shell.
Confirmed.
Joey we'll need an ID for it.
Please use CVE-2005-3344
Steve Langasek wrote:
On Tue, Nov 08, 2005 at 10:15:26PM -0500, Charles Fry wrote:
Version 6.4-1.1 of awstats was uploaded to unstable in response to
CVE-2005-1527. However, it was never uploaded to stable-security, even
though version 6.4.1 is the current stable version of awstats.
Moritz Muehlenhoff wrote:
Package: openvpn
Severity: grave
Tags: security
Justification: user security hole
A format string vulnerability has been found in openvpn's option parsing
code, which indirectly may be exploited remotely as well. Please see
Moritz Muehlenhoff wrote:
Thijs Kinkhorst wrote:
Another security problem has been found in mantis. Insufficient
input sanitising of the t_core_path parameter may be exploited to perform
arbitrary file inclusion. Please see
http://secunia.com/secunia_research/2005-46/advisory/ for
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