Bug#971515: Request for security team input on kubernetes TC bug

2020-11-17 Thread Moritz Mühlenhoff
On Sun, Nov 08, 2020 at 10:49:31PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote: > * Moritz Mühlenhoff: > > > * Follow a scheme similar to Firefox ESR where in case of a security > > the update either happens to the latest minor release of > > the current branch or if that has stop

Bug#971515: Request for security team input on kubernetes TC bug

2020-11-17 Thread Moritz Mühlenhoff
Catching up on this... > > This leaves Debian with two options: > > * Keep it out of a stable release and accept that it's good enough > > if people just install whatever deb they currently find in testing/sid > > (works out well enough for most given that blob nature of Go!) > > IMHO this

Bug#971515: Request for security team input on kubernetes TC bug

2020-10-27 Thread Moritz Mühlenhoff
On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 08:22:11AM -0700, Sean Whitton wrote: > Hello security team, > > The TC are being asked about src:kubernetes, and it would be good to > hear from you about whether and how security support is a relevant > consideration in determining whether the level of vendoring in that >

Bug#947847: please install systemd-sysusers using update-alternatives

2020-01-29 Thread Moritz Mühlenhoff
Simon McVittie wrote: > I think we have a fairly good picture of the costs that would be > incurred from using alternatives: Plus in the case of opentmpfiles; a pile of security issues: systemd-tmpfiles addresses a number of complex races using low level primitives like openat() et al. or O_PATH,

Bug#802159: New OpenSSL upstream version

2015-12-06 Thread Moritz Mühlenhoff
Hi, Personally I'm in favour of following the openssl point updates and I'd like to add an additional data point to the discussion: CVE-2015-3196 was already fixed as a plain bugfix in an earlier point release, but the security impact was only noticed later on, so following the point updates would

Bug#727708: systemd (security) bugs (was: init system question)

2013-11-30 Thread Moritz Mühlenhoff
On Thu, Nov 28, 2013 at 08:07:16PM -0600, Steve Langasek wrote: > All distributions "care" about not having security issues in their code, but > that's not the same thing as actually doing the work to audit the code. In > practice this only happens when dedicated resources are turned on the code >