Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-11 Thread Colin Watson
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 01:27:54PM -0500, G. Branden Robinson wrote: > At 2024-04-11T15:37:46+0100, Colin Watson wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 10:26:55AM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > > > Or, because some upstream maintainers have learned through, long, > > > bitter experience that newer

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-11 Thread G. Branden Robinson
At 2024-04-11T15:37:46+0100, Colin Watson wrote: > On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 10:26:55AM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > > Or, because some upstream maintainers have learned through, long, > > bitter experience that newer versions of autoconf tools may result > > in the generated configure script to be

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-11 Thread Theodore Ts'o
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 03:37:46PM +0100, Colin Watson wrote: > > When was the last time this actually happened to you? I certainly > remember it being a problem in the early 2.5x days, but it's been well > over a decade since this actually bit me. I'd have to go through git archives, but I

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-11 Thread Colin Watson
On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 10:26:55AM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > On Sat, Apr 06, 2024 at 04:30:44PM +0100, Simon McVittie wrote: > > But, it is conventional for Autotools projects to ship the generated > > ./configure script *as well* (for example this is what `make dist` > > outputs), to allow

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-11 Thread Theodore Ts'o
On Sat, Apr 06, 2024 at 04:30:44PM +0100, Simon McVittie wrote: > > But, it is conventional for Autotools projects to ship the generated > ./configure script *as well* (for example this is what `make dist` > outputs), to allow the project to be compiled on systems that do not > have the complete

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-07 Thread Sean Whitton
Hello, On Sat 06 Apr 2024 at 02:24pm +02, Guillem Jover wrote: > Hi! > > On Sat, 2024-04-06 at 19:13:22 +0800, Sean Whitton wrote: >> On Fri 05 Apr 2024 at 01:31am +03, Adrian Bunk wrote: >> > Right now the preferred form of source in Debian is an upstream-signed >> > release tarball, NOT

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-07 Thread Sean Whitton
Hello, On Sat 06 Apr 2024 at 02:42pm +03, Adrian Bunk wrote: > On Sat, Apr 06, 2024 at 07:13:22PM +0800, Sean Whitton wrote: >> Hello, >> >> On Fri 05 Apr 2024 at 01:31am +03, Adrian Bunk wrote: >> >> > >> > Right now the preferred form of source in Debian is an upstream-signed >> > release

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-06 Thread Jeremy Stanley
On 2024-04-06 16:30:44 +0100 (+0100), Simon McVittie wrote: [...] > Indeed, if upstream does ship generated files in addition to the actual > source code, we have traditionally said that Debian package maintainers > "should, except where impossible for legal reasons, preserve the entire > building

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-06 Thread Simon McVittie
On Sat, 06 Apr 2024 at 15:54:51 +0200, kpcyrd wrote: > On 4/6/24 1:42 PM, Adrian Bunk wrote: > > You cannot simply proclaim that some git tree is the preferred form of > > modification without shipping said git tree in our ftp archive. > > > > If your claim was true, then Debian and downstreams

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-06 Thread Adrian Bunk
On Sat, Apr 06, 2024 at 03:54:51PM +0200, kpcyrd wrote: >... > autotools pre-processed source code is clearly not "the preferred form of > the work for making modifications", which is specifically what I'm saying > Debian shouldn't consider a "source code input" either, to eliminate this > vector

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-06 Thread kpcyrd
On 4/6/24 1:42 PM, Adrian Bunk wrote: You cannot simply proclaim that some git tree is the preferred form of modification without shipping said git tree in our ftp archive. If your claim was true, then Debian and downstreams would be violating licences like the GPL by not providing the

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-06 Thread Guillem Jover
Hi! On Sat, 2024-04-06 at 19:13:22 +0800, Sean Whitton wrote: > On Fri 05 Apr 2024 at 01:31am +03, Adrian Bunk wrote: > > Right now the preferred form of source in Debian is an upstream-signed > > release tarball, NOT anything from git. > > The preferred form of modification is not simply up for

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-06 Thread Adrian Bunk
On Sat, Apr 06, 2024 at 07:13:22PM +0800, Sean Whitton wrote: > Hello, > > On Fri 05 Apr 2024 at 01:31am +03, Adrian Bunk wrote: > > > > > Right now the preferred form of source in Debian is an upstream-signed > > release tarball, NOT anything from git. > > The preferred form of modification is

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-06 Thread Sean Whitton
Hello, On Fri 05 Apr 2024 at 01:31am +03, Adrian Bunk wrote: > > Right now the preferred form of source in Debian is an upstream-signed > release tarball, NOT anything from git. The preferred form of modification is not simply up for proclamation. Our practices, which are focused around git,

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-04 Thread Adrian Bunk
On Fri, Apr 05, 2024 at 01:30:51AM +0200, kpcyrd wrote: > On 4/5/24 12:31 AM, Adrian Bunk wrote: > > Hashes of "git archive" tarballs are anyway not stable, > > so whatever a maintainer generates is not worse than what is on Github. > > > > Any proper tooling would have to verify that the

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-04 Thread kpcyrd
On 4/5/24 12:31 AM, Adrian Bunk wrote: Hashes of "git archive" tarballs are anyway not stable, so whatever a maintainer generates is not worse than what is on Github. Any proper tooling would have to verify that the contents is equal. ... Being able to disregard the compression layer is still

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-04 Thread James McCoy
On Fri, Apr 05, 2024 at 01:31:25AM +0300, Adrian Bunk wrote: > On Thu, Apr 04, 2024 at 09:39:51PM +0200, kpcyrd wrote: > >... > > I've checked both, upstreams github release page and their website[1], but > > couldn't find any mention of .tar.xz, so I think my claim of Debian doing > > the

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-04 Thread Adrian Bunk
On Thu, Apr 04, 2024 at 09:39:51PM +0200, kpcyrd wrote: >... > I've checked both, upstreams github release page and their website[1], but > couldn't find any mention of .tar.xz, so I think my claim of Debian doing > the compression is fair. > > [1]: https://www.vim.org/download.php >... Perhaps

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-04 Thread Jeremy Stanley
On 2024-04-04 21:39:51 +0200 (+0200), kpcyrd wrote: [...] > I don't know if Debian has this kind of provenance information available, to > my knowledge, Debian operates on "our maintainers upload .tar.xz files into > our archive and we take them for face value". Which does make sense, >

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-04 Thread kpcyrd
On 4/3/24 4:21 AM, Adrian Bunk wrote: On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 02:31:11AM +0200, kpcyrd wrote: ... I figured out a somewhat straight-forward way to check if a given `git archive` output is cryptographically claimed to be the source input of a given binary package in either Arch Linux or Debian

Re: New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-02 Thread Adrian Bunk
On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 02:31:11AM +0200, kpcyrd wrote: >... > I figured out a somewhat straight-forward way to check if a given `git > archive` output is cryptographically claimed to be the source input of a > given binary package in either Arch Linux or Debian (or both). For Debian the proper

New supply-chain security tool: backseat-signed

2024-04-02 Thread kpcyrd
Hello, I'm going to keep this short, I've been writing a lot of text recently (which is quite exhausting, on top of my dayjob and all the code I wrote today afterwards. Apologies if you're still waiting for a reply in one of the other threads). I figured out a somewhat straight-forward way