IBM developed a cypher called lucifer. The NSA examined it,
recommended some changes to the algorithm, and the result was DES.
Changes which, we now know, *strengthened* it against differential
cryptanalysis (which they new about in the 70's, and called the
sliding attack, if I remember
On 25 Jun 1997, Mark Eichin wrote:
:
: IBM developed a cypher called lucifer. The NSA examined it,
: recommended some changes to the algorithm, and the result was DES.
:
:Changes which, we now know, *strengthened* it against differential
:cryptanalysis (which they new about in the 70's, and
Mark Eichin wrote:
IBM developed a cypher called lucifer. The NSA examined it,
recommended some changes to the algorithm, and the result was DES.
Changes which, we now know, *strengthened* it against differential
cryptanalysis (which they new about in the 70's, and called the
sliding attack,
On Tue, 24 Jun 1997, Nathan E Norman wrote:
On 25 Jun 1997, Mark Eichin wrote:
:
: IBM developed a cypher called lucifer. The NSA examined it,
: recommended some changes to the algorithm, and the result was DES.
:
:Changes which, we now know, *strengthened* it against differential
knew about another attack), and they reduced the key size to 56 bit so
they could crack it with brute force in massively parallell hardware.
Umm, no, part of the *problem* with lucifer is that the 128 bit key
had symmetries that made it's strength *trivially* less than 64 bit
and as I recall
The problem with SHA-1 is that it is a U.S. Federal Information Processing
Standard, and I don't trust that the U.S. government will not place export
restrictions on it. I'm also wary of U.S. FIPS for the same reason I'm wary
about DES - various spy agencies have to approve the standard, and one
On Mon, 23 Jun 1997, Bruce Perens wrote:
The problem with SHA-1 is that it is a U.S. Federal Information Processing
Standard, and I don't trust that the U.S. government will not place export
restrictions on it. I'm also wary of U.S. FIPS for the same reason I'm wary
about DES - various spy
On Tue, 24 Jun 1997, Shaya Potter wrote:
:On Mon, 23 Jun 1997, Bruce Perens wrote:
:
: The problem with SHA-1 is that it is a U.S. Federal Information Processing
: Standard, and I don't trust that the U.S. government will not place export
: restrictions on it. I'm also wary of U.S. FIPS for the
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