Author: aurel32
Date: 2010-01-16 15:26:47 +0000 (Sat, 16 Jan 2010)
New Revision: 4087

Added:
   
glibc-package/branches/glibc-branch-etch/debian/patches/any/submitted-nis-shadow.diff
Modified:
   glibc-package/branches/glibc-branch-etch/debian/changelog
   glibc-package/branches/glibc-branch-etch/debian/patches/series
Log:
  * Fix NIS shadow entries leakage to non-priviledge users when nscd is
    in use.
    Fixes: CVE-2010-0015.



Modified: glibc-package/branches/glibc-branch-etch/debian/changelog
===================================================================
--- glibc-package/branches/glibc-branch-etch/debian/changelog   2010-01-16 
14:54:09 UTC (rev 4086)
+++ glibc-package/branches/glibc-branch-etch/debian/changelog   2010-01-16 
15:26:47 UTC (rev 4087)
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+glibc (2.3.6.ds1-13etch10) stable; urgency=low
+
+  * Fix NIS shadow entries leakage to non-priviledge users when nscd is
+    in use.
+    Fixes: CVE-2010-0015.
+
+ -- Aurelien Jarno <aure...@debian.org>  Sat, 16 Jan 2010 16:26:38 +0100
+
 glibc (2.3.6.ds1-13etch9) stable; urgency=low
 
   * Backport from unstable: patches/localedata/cy_EL_euro.diff,

Added: 
glibc-package/branches/glibc-branch-etch/debian/patches/any/submitted-nis-shadow.diff
===================================================================
--- 
glibc-package/branches/glibc-branch-etch/debian/patches/any/submitted-nis-shadow.diff
                               (rev 0)
+++ 
glibc-package/branches/glibc-branch-etch/debian/patches/any/submitted-nis-shadow.diff
       2010-01-16 15:26:47 UTC (rev 4087)
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+2010-01-06  Christoph Pleger <christoph.ple...@cs.tu-dortmund.de>
+           Aurelien Jarno  <aurel...@aurel32.net>
+
+       * nis/nss_nis/nis-pwd.c (internal_nis_getpwent_r): When adjunct
+       style secret password is returned, mangle 'x' instead of the
+       encrypted password.
+       (_nss_nis_getpwnam_r): Likewise.
+       (_nss_nis_getpwuid_r): Likewise.
+       * nis/nss_nis/nis-spwd.c (internal_nis_getspent_r): When shadow.byname
+       does not exist, look in passwd.adjunct.byname and adapt the result.
+       (_nss_nis_getspnam_r): Likewise.
+
+
+--- a/nis/nss_nis/nis-pwd.c
++++ b/nis/nss_nis/nis-pwd.c
+@@ -82,9 +82,8 @@
+   do
+     {
+       enum nss_status retval;
+-      char *result, *outkey, *result2, *p;
+-      int len, keylen, len2;
+-      size_t namelen;
++      char *result, *outkey, *p;
++      int len, keylen;
+ 
+       if (new_start)
+         retval = yperr2nss (yp_first (domain, "passwd.byname",
+@@ -105,44 +104,33 @@
+        recognized by a password starting with "##".  */
+       p = strchr (result, ':');
+       if (p != NULL   /* This better should be true in all cases.  */
+-        && p[1] == '#' && p[2] == '#'
+-        && (namelen = p - result,
+-            yp_match (domain, "passwd.adjunct.byname", result, namelen,
+-                      &result2, &len2)) == YPERR_SUCCESS)
++        && p[1] == '#' && p[2] == '#')
+       {
+-        /* We found a passwd.adjunct entry.  Merge encrypted
+-           password therein into original result.  */
+-        char *encrypted = strchr (result2, ':');
+-        char *endp;
+-        size_t restlen;
++        size_t namelen, restlen;
+ 
+-        if (encrypted == NULL
+-            || (endp = strchr (++encrypted, ':')) == NULL
+-            || (p = strchr (p + 1, ':')) == NULL)
++        namelen = p - result;
++        if ((p = strchr (p + 1, ':')) == NULL)
+           {
+             /* Invalid format of the entry.  This never should happen
+                unless the data from which the NIS table is generated is
+                wrong.  We simply ignore it.  */
+-            free (result2);
+             goto non_adjunct;
+           }
+ 
++        /* We found an adjunct style secret password.  Replace
++           it by 'x' into the result.  */
+         restlen = len - (p - result);
+-        if ((size_t) (namelen + (endp - encrypted) + restlen + 2) > buflen)
++        if ((size_t) (namelen + restlen + 3) > buflen)
+           {
+-            free (result2);
+             free (result);
+             *errnop = ERANGE;
+             return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
+           }
+ 
+-        __mempcpy (__mempcpy (__mempcpy (__mempcpy (buffer, result, namelen),
+-                                         ":", 1),
+-                              encrypted, endp - encrypted),
++        __mempcpy (__mempcpy (__mempcpy (buffer, result, namelen),
++                              ":x", 2),
+                    p, restlen + 1);
+         p = buffer;
+-
+-        free (result2);
+       }
+       else
+       {
+@@ -201,8 +189,8 @@
+ {
+   struct parser_data *data = (void *) buffer;
+   enum nss_status retval;
+-  char *domain, *result, *result2, *p;
+-  int len, len2, parse_res;
++  char *domain, *result, *p;
++  int len, parse_res;
+   size_t namelen;
+ 
+   if (name == NULL)
+@@ -230,43 +218,32 @@
+      by a password starting with "##".  */
+   p = strchr (result, ':');
+   if (p != NULL       /* This better should be true in all cases.  */
+-      && p[1] == '#' && p[2] == '#'
+-      && yp_match (domain, "passwd.adjunct.byname", name, namelen,
+-                 &result2, &len2) == YPERR_SUCCESS)
++      && p[1] == '#' && p[2] == '#')
+     {
+-      /* We found a passwd.adjunct entry.  Merge encrypted password
+-       therein into original result.  */
+-      char *encrypted = strchr (result2, ':');
+-      char *endp;
+       size_t restlen;
+-
+-      if (encrypted == NULL
+-        || (endp = strchr (++encrypted, ':')) == NULL
+-        || (p = strchr (p + 1, ':')) == NULL)
++      
++      if ((p = strchr (p + 1, ':')) == NULL)
+       {
+         /* Invalid format of the entry.  This never should happen
+            unless the data from which the NIS table is generated is
+            wrong.  We simply ignore it.  */
+-        free (result2);
+         goto non_adjunct;
+       }
+ 
++      /* We found an adjunct style secret password.  Replace
++         it by 'x' into the result.  */
+       restlen = len - (p - result);
+-      if ((size_t) (namelen + (endp - encrypted) + restlen + 2) > buflen)
++      if ((size_t) (namelen + restlen + 3) > buflen)
+       {
+-        free (result2);
+         free (result);
+         *errnop = ERANGE;
+         return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
+       }
+ 
+-      __mempcpy (__mempcpy (__mempcpy (__mempcpy (buffer, name, namelen),
+-                                     ":", 1),
+-                          encrypted, endp - encrypted),
++      __mempcpy (__mempcpy (__mempcpy (buffer, name, namelen),
++                          ":x", 2),
+                p, restlen + 1);
+       p = buffer;
+-
+-      free (result2);
+     }
+   else
+     {
+@@ -304,10 +281,9 @@
+ {
+   struct parser_data *data = (void *) buffer;
+   enum nss_status retval;
+-  char *domain, *result, *p, *result2;
+-  int len, nlen, parse_res, len2;
++  char *domain, *result, *p;
++  int len, nlen, parse_res;
+   char buf[32];
+-  size_t namelen;
+ 
+   if (yp_get_default_domain (&domain))
+     return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
+@@ -328,44 +304,32 @@
+      by a password starting with "##".  */
+   p = strchr (result, ':');
+   if (p != NULL       /* This better should be true in all cases.  */
+-      && p[1] == '#' && p[2] == '#'
+-      && (namelen = p - result,
+-        yp_match (domain, "passwd.adjunct.byname", result, namelen,
+-                  &result2, &len2)) == YPERR_SUCCESS)
++      && p[1] == '#' && p[2] == '#')
+     {
+-      /* We found a passwd.adjunct entry.  Merge encrypted password
+-       therein into original result.  */
+-      char *encrypted = strchr (result2, ':');
+-      char *endp;
+-      size_t restlen;
++      size_t namelen, restlen;
+ 
+-      if (encrypted == NULL
+-        || (endp = strchr (++encrypted, ':')) == NULL
+-        || (p = strchr (p + 1, ':')) == NULL)
++      namelen = p - result;
++      if ((p = strchr (p + 1, ':')) == NULL)
+       {
+         /* Invalid format of the entry.  This never should happen
+            unless the data from which the NIS table is generated is
+            wrong.  We simply ignore it.  */
+-        free (result2);
+         goto non_adjunct;
+       }
+-
++      /* We found an adjunct style secret password.  Replace
++       it by 'x' into the result.  */
+       restlen = len - (p - result);
+-      if ((size_t) (namelen + (endp - encrypted) + restlen + 2) > buflen)
++      if ((size_t) (namelen + restlen + 3) > buflen)
+       {
+-        free (result2);
+         free (result);
+         *errnop = ERANGE;
+         return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
+       }
+ 
+-      __mempcpy (__mempcpy (__mempcpy (__mempcpy (buffer, result, namelen),
+-                                     ":", 1),
+-                          encrypted, endp - encrypted),
++      __mempcpy (__mempcpy (__mempcpy (buffer, result, namelen),
++                          ":x", 2),
+                p, restlen + 1);
+       p = buffer;
+-
+-      free (result2);
+     }
+   else
+     {
+--- a/nis/nss_nis/nis-spwd.c
++++ b/nis/nss_nis/nis-spwd.c
+@@ -78,25 +78,51 @@
+   /* Get the next entry until we found a correct one. */
+   do
+     {
+-      enum nss_status retval;
+       char *p;
++      int yperr;
++      int adjunct_used = 0;
+ 
+       if (new_start)
+-        retval = yperr2nss (yp_first (domain, "shadow.byname",
+-                                      &outkey, &keylen, &result, &len));
++      {
++          yperr = yp_first (domain, "shadow.byname", &outkey, &keylen, 
&result,
++                          &len);
++
++        if (yperr == YPERR_MAP)
++          {
++            if (result != NULL)
++              free(result);
++
++            yperr = yp_first (domain, "shadow.byname", &outkey, &keylen,
++                              &result, &len);
++            adjunct_used = 1;
++          }
++        }
+       else
+-        retval = yperr2nss ( yp_next (domain, "shadow.byname",
+-                                      oldkey, oldkeylen,
+-                                      &outkey, &keylen, &result, &len));
++      {
++          yperr = yp_next (domain, "shadow.byname", oldkey, oldkeylen, 
&outkey,
++                         &keylen, &result, &len);
+ 
+-      if (retval != NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
++        if (yperr == YPERR_MAP)
++          {
++            if (result != NULL)
++              free(result);
++
++            yperr = yp_next (domain, "shadow.byname", oldkey, oldkeylen,
++                             &outkey, &keylen, &result, &len); 
++            adjunct_used = 1;
++          }
++        }
++
++      if (yperr != YPERR_SUCCESS)
+         {
++        enum nss_status retval = yperr2nss (yperr);
++
+         if (retval == NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN)
+           *errnop = errno;
+           return retval;
+         }
+ 
+-      if ((size_t) (len + 1) > buflen)
++      if ((size_t) (len + (adjunct_used ? 3 : 1)) > buflen)
+         {
+           free (result);
+         *errnop = ERANGE;
+@@ -105,6 +131,9 @@
+ 
+       p = strncpy (buffer, result, len);
+       buffer[len] = '\0';
++      if (adjunct_used)
++      p = strcat (buffer, "::");
++
+       while (isspace (*p))
+         ++p;
+       free (result);
+@@ -147,9 +176,9 @@
+                    char *buffer, size_t buflen, int *errnop)
+ {
+   struct parser_data *data = (void *) buffer;
+-  enum nss_status retval;
+   char *domain, *result, *p;
+-  int len, parse_res;
++  int len, parse_res, yperr;
++  int adjunct_used = 0;
+ 
+   if (name == NULL)
+     {
+@@ -160,17 +189,29 @@
+   if (yp_get_default_domain (&domain))
+     return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
+ 
+-  retval = yperr2nss (yp_match (domain, "shadow.byname", name,
+-                              strlen (name), &result, &len));
++  yperr = yp_match (domain, "shadow.byname", name, strlen (name), &result,
++                  &len);
+ 
+-  if (retval != NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
++  if (yperr == YPERR_MAP)
++    {
++      if (result != NULL)
++      free(result);
++
++      yperr = yp_match (domain, "passwd.adjunct.byname", name, strlen (name),
++                      &result, &len);
++      adjunct_used = 1;
++  }
++
++  if (__builtin_expect (yperr != YPERR_SUCCESS, 0))
+     {
++      enum nss_status retval = yperr2nss (yperr);
++
+       if (retval == NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN)
+       *errnop = errno;
+       return retval;
+     }
+ 
+-  if ((size_t) (len + 1) > buflen)
++  if ((size_t) (len + (adjunct_used ? 3 : 1)) > buflen)
+     {
+       free (result);
+       *errnop = ERANGE;
+@@ -179,6 +220,9 @@
+ 
+   p = strncpy (buffer, result, len);
+   buffer[len] = '\0';
++  if (adjunct_used)
++    p = strcat (buffer, "::");
++
+   while (isspace (*p))
+     ++p;
+   free (result);

Modified: glibc-package/branches/glibc-branch-etch/debian/patches/series
===================================================================
--- glibc-package/branches/glibc-branch-etch/debian/patches/series      
2010-01-16 14:54:09 UTC (rev 4086)
+++ glibc-package/branches/glibc-branch-etch/debian/patches/series      
2010-01-16 15:26:47 UTC (rev 4087)
@@ -201,3 +201,4 @@
 any/cvs-vfprintf-stack-smashing.diff
 any/cvs-getnetgrent_r-memory-leak.diff
 any/cvs-sunrpc_rpc_thread.diff -p0
+any/submitted-nis-shadow.diff -p1


-- 
To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-glibc-requ...@lists.debian.org
with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org

Reply via email to