Re:

2005-05-20 Thread Thomas Bushnell BSG
Michael K. Edwards [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 Um, it is true that the rules for interpreting the meaning of licenses
 are more or less the same as the rules for interpreting contracts.  It
 does not follow that licenses are therefore contracts.

 The words license and contract are indeed not synonymous under
 law.  But the law applicable to offers of contract containing grants
 of license is contract law (or the equivalent codes in civil law
 systems).

You're speaking too vaguely.  The law applicable to offers of contract
is of course contract law.  It does not follow that the GPL is thus an
offer of contract.  Indeed, it explicitly disclaims any such intention
itself.  It would be a curious offer of contract indeed that labelled
itself not an offer of contract.

 Huh?  What about the license as just what it purports to be: a
 license?

 You're a little bit late to the party.  Check the debian-legal
 archives for debate and case law out the yin-yang.  There's no such
 thing as a copyright-based license.

I didn't call it a copyright-based license.  I said it's a license.

 There is a thing you are not considering: it is a unilateral grant of
 conditional permission.  This is a perfectly well-traveled area of
 law.

 Also part of contract law; and not applicable to the GPL, which does
 not lack for acceptance or consideration.  Thread at
 http://lists.debian.org/debian-legal/2004/12/msg00209.html .

I don't care what is part of contract law.  I care if the GPL has
the legal status of a contract.  You keep discussing *other* questions
instead of that one.

The GPL is a unilateral grant of permission, a concept which is
independent of contract (whether you lump it together with contracts,
in one thing called contract law is irrelevant to me).  A unilateral
grant of permission lacks the features of contract, but is still a
perfectly real thing.  Estoppel (which you have noted) indeed attaches
upon such grants of permission: having granted me permission to enter
your land, you cannot then sue me for (say) trespass.  

If your grant of permission to enter your land was simply a unilateral
grant, it is not a contract, it is a grant of permission.  It is also
binding on you: having granted me permission, you cannot then sue me
for trespass when I take you up on it.

Now a grant of permission can be revoked, which is a different
question.  If the FSF turned nasty, could they revoke the permission?
The question here is likely one of reliance.  If I have relied on a
future-tense permission (perhaps if you told me you may enter my land
forever) then to the extent of my reliance, you can't sue me for
trespass.  The bindingness of such things is tricky, and nobody knows
how far it goes if the FSF actually attempted to revoke the
permissions given.

Indeed, for this reason the FSF acquires copyright through a contract
with authors such that the authors retain permanently the right to
distribute their work under any terms they like, and in which the FSF
is contractually bound to distribute only under free software
licenses.  In this way, the FSF can assure authors and the world that
its hands are tied and one need not worry about such a revocation of
permission.  (This is relevant, because a legal judgment against the
FSF could result in its assets being transferred to some nasty
person.)

But the point is really almost irrelevant.  If the GPL is actually a
contract and not a grant of permission, then what follows?  If you
have agreed to the contract, it's binding, and that's that.  If you
have not, then there is no arrangement under which you are permitted
to distribute the software, and so you can be sued for copyright
violation by the FSF.  Since this is exactly the state of affairs
which the grant-of-permission argument claims would obtain, what is
the practical difference?

Indeed, reduction to practice is the point.  If the GPL successfully
achieves its ends, then it works.  And it does, in fact, achieve
them.  On numerous occasions the GPL has shown that it is a powerful
instrument for insuring compliance with its provisions as they were
intended, even upon reluctant or recalcitrant redistributors.  

And finally, for Debian's purposes, it's even more irrelevant.  Our
standing policy is that if there is doubt about the force or intention
of a license, we err on the side of simply doing what the licensor
demands.

Thomas



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Re:

2005-05-20 Thread Thomas Bushnell BSG
Michael K. Edwards [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 At this point, there seem to be quite a
 few people who agree that the FSF's stance (copyright-based license)
 and the far-from-novel one that you advance (unilateral license /
 donee beneficiaries) are untenable in the jurisdictions with whose
 law they are to some degree familiar.

You are choosing to post on three different forums.  Having made that
choice, it is your obligation to make your comments relevant to them
all; you cannot post on debian-devel, and then insist that your
interlocutors there read a different list.

Please don't put words into my mouth.  The quotes you give are not my
words; I have not spoken of a unilateral license / donee
beneficiaries, though you words suggest I have.

You have not explained here (on debian-devel, that is) at all why we
should disgregard the actual success of the license in convincing
reluctant people to comply with its provisions.  Indeed, to date there
is nobody who is willing to risk a lawsuit due to noncompliance with
the GPL when the FSF's compliance folks have come after them.  This in
itself suggests very strongly that those who have money to lose on the
question think the GPL is binding

And you haven't answered my question.  Please explain how the
difference in legal theory here affects the bindingness of the GPL on
those who choose to distribute GPLd software.

 And finally, for Debian's purposes, it's even more irrelevant.  Our
 standing policy is that if there is doubt about the force or intention
 of a license, we err on the side of simply doing what the licensor
 demands.

 Which is great, until you find yourself estopped from arguing
 otherwise in a courtroom.  It matters both what you do and why you say
 you do it.

Please be specific.  Where are we hurting ourselves?  (Or, if we are
not, then why is this relevant?)

Thomas
P


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Re:

2005-05-20 Thread Steve Langasek
On Thu, May 19, 2005 at 11:39:21PM -0700, Michael K. Edwards wrote:
 On 5/19/05, Thomas Bushnell BSG [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 [snip arguments that might have been worthy of rebuttal on
 debian-legal five months ago]

 I'm not trying to be snotty about this, but if you want to engage in
 the debate about the proper legal framework in which to understand the
 GPL, I think you would do best to at least dip into recent
 debian-legal archives and also look at some of the precedents cited
 back in December and January.  At this point, there seem to be quite a
 few people who agree that the FSF's stance (copyright-based license)
 and the far-from-novel one that you advance (unilateral license /
 donee beneficiaries) are untenable in the jurisdictions with whose
 law they are to some degree familiar.

So?  Then they should take it up with their local legislative body and/or
the FSF.  Debian doesn't have a duty to account for every individual broken
jurisdiction on the planet.

The legal questions surrounding Waste are much more likely to center on
whether the people acting at Nullsoft actually had the legal authority to
offer people a license to the code at issue.

-- 
Steve Langasek
postmodern programmer


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Re:

2005-05-20 Thread Michael K. Edwards
On 5/19/05, Thomas Bushnell BSG [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Michael K. Edwards [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 
  At this point, there seem to be quite a
  few people who agree that the FSF's stance (copyright-based license)
  and the far-from-novel one that you advance (unilateral license /
  donee beneficiaries) are untenable in the jurisdictions with whose
  law they are to some degree familiar.
 
 You are choosing to post on three different forums.  Having made that
 choice, it is your obligation to make your comments relevant to them
 all; you cannot post on debian-devel, and then insist that your
 interlocutors there read a different list.

Oh, nuts.  I didn't realize this thread was still copied to hell and
gone.  I'll try to summarize briefly, and would the next person please
cut d-d and waste-public off if appropriate?

 Please don't put words into my mouth.  The quotes you give are not my
 words; I have not spoken of a unilateral license / donee
 beneficiaries, though you words suggest I have.

Sorry about that; I skipped a step or two.  Your unilateral grant of
permission is not in fact a recognized mechanism under law for the
conveyance of a non-exclusive copyright license.  In common law
systems, the mechanism that does exist is called a contract.  :-) 
This horse has been beaten to a pulp on debian-legal, and I think even
my esteemed fencing parter Raul is approaching convinced; if you want
one case law citation on the topic, try Effects Associates v. Cohen
from the Ninth Circuit.  Apparently quite firmly established in
various civil law systems as well.  (IANALIAJ.)

There is such a thing as a unilateral contract, also sometimes called
a defective contract, which can't be held to its full ostensible
extent against the drafter by donee beneficiaries for lack of
evidence of acceptance and/or return consideration.  That doesn't
apply in the case of the GPL; acceptance through conduct is quite
sufficient, and the various obligations accepted by the licensee
(especially the offer of source code) are in fact return
consideration, not a limitation on the scope of license.

Specht v. Netscape is sometimes cited as an obstacle to finding
acceptance of a browse-wrap license.  But it doesn't even contain
the word copyright, and boils down to this analogy (quoted from the
opinion):  From the user's vantage point, SmartDownload could be
analogized to a free neighborhood newspaper, readily obtained from a
sidewalk box or supermarket counter without any exchange with a seller
or vender.  As I wrote in the thread I cited, picking up a free
newspaper doesn't grant you copyright license on its contents.

A better parallel may be found in Jacob Maxwell v. Veeck, in which the
court used evidence of an oral exclusive license agreement to construe
a non-exclusive copyright license and then applied contract law to
establish whether and when it was terminated.  Oral evidence of intent
to offer an exclusive license -- something that by law must be in
writing -- is hardly less valid an offer of contract than a document
whose drafter professes to believe ought to be interpreted under some
other legal theory.  As for consideration, see Fosson v. Palace
Waterland and the cases involving the GPL itself that have been
discussed ad nauseam on d-l.

These and other equines are nearing a blenderized condition on d-l,
whether or not a consensus comes out of it.  I am omitting the rest of
the mountain of case law that has been cited there; persons who wish
pointers to specific topics within that discussion are welcome to ask
there, but let's spare d-d.

 You have not explained here (on debian-devel, that is) at all why we
 should disgregard the actual success of the license in convincing
 reluctant people to comply with its provisions.  Indeed, to date there
 is nobody who is willing to risk a lawsuit due to noncompliance with
 the GPL when the FSF's compliance folks have come after them.  This in
 itself suggests very strongly that those who have money to lose on the
 question think the GPL is binding
 
 And you haven't answered my question.  Please explain how the
 difference in legal theory here affects the bindingness of the GPL on
 those who choose to distribute GPLd software.

There's no question in my mind that the GPL is binding, i. e., a
valid offer of contract that licenses various rights to a given work. 
There are some grounds to worry that Section 6 is hard to implement in
at least some jurisdictions, for reasons having to do with the
doctrine of agency and how strong a form of agreement is needed in
order to construe agency to sub-license; but that's unlikely ever to
be litigated, and if it is we can hope that an appeals court can find
a way around it.

There's also no question that the GPL is enforceable (and has been
successfully enforced by Harald Welte in Deutschland) using a breach
of contract theory against people who don't release source code to
GPL works when they modify and distribute them.  But applying 

License question about regexplorer

2005-05-20 Thread Roberto C. Sanchez
I have been recently checking out packages up for adoption or
already orphaned.  In the process I came across regexplorer [0].
Here are the dependencies of regexplorer and their respective
licenses (as I understand it):

* libc6 (LGPL)
* libgcc1 (GPL w/ exception)
* libqt3c102-mt (QPL/GPL)
* libstdc++5 (GPL)
* libx11-6 (MIT/X)
* libxext6 (MIT/X)

My question is this.  Is Debian accepting QT3 under the GPL or the
QPL?  According the FSF FAQ on licenses [1], the QPL says that
modified sources must be distrubted as patches, and that linking
to GPL code requires a license exception.  However, it gets a bit
more complex.  I know that this has more or less been discussed
before [2], but I think the circumstances have changed.

Specifically:

(1) is the exception for libgcc1 sufficient for regexplorer to link?
(2) is QT3 in Debian via QPL or GPL?
(3) is libstdc++5 actually GPL w/o exception?

It seems that if any of those fails, then regexplorer can't link to
them unless it is relicensed.

Additionally, it seems like QPL licensed code can't be in main (which
may or may not affect QT and any packages that depend on it, depending
on how Debian chooses to make QT available), at least under the version
used by regexplorer [3]  [4]:

QPL:
3. You may make modifications to the Software and distribute your
modifications, in a form that is separate from the Software, such as
patches. The following restrictions apply to modifications:

ME:
Ok.  This is not reall a problem, since we distribute source as a
.orig.tar.gz and a .diff.gz.  This is clearly seperate.

QPL:
a. Modifications must not alter or remove any copyright notices in
the Software.

ME:
No problem here either.

QPL:
b. When modifications to the Software are released under this
license, a non-exclusive royalty-free right is granted to the initial
developer of the Software to distribute your modification in future
versions of the Software provided such versions remain available under
these terms in addition to any other license(s) of the initial developer.

ME:
Does this mean that the Debian-specific packaging must be QPL licensed?
It is a patch modification to the source.  I presume that non-exclusive
means Debian can continue to distribute the modifications themselves
under other terms, e.g., the GPL.  But, I think this implies the
modifications must at least be dual/licensed.

QPL:
4. You may distribute machine-executable forms of the Software or
machine-executable forms of modified versions of the Software, provided
that you meet these restrictions:

ME:
Ok.  At least there is a chance to distribute the modified binaries.

QPL:
a. You must include this license document in the distribution.

ME:
No sweat.

QPL:
b. You must ensure that all recipients of the machine-executable
forms are also able to receive the complete machine-readable source code
to the distributed Software, including all modifications, without any
charge beyond the costs of data transfer, and place prominent notices in
the distribution explaining this.

ME:
Does this even comply with DFSG?  This would imply that if make a CD
which includes regexplorer (which is in main), then I can't charge
money for it above the cost of duplication.

QPL:
c. You must ensure that all modifications included in the
machine-executable forms are available under the terms of this license.

ME:
Not sure how that affects Debian's distribution of the package.

Sorry if this has already been discussed, but I am trying to wrap my
head around this.  Also, please CC me on all replies, as I am not
subcribed to -legal.

-Roberto

[0] http://pacakges.debian.org/regexplorer
[1] http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/index_html#GPLIncompatibleLicenses
[2] http://lists.debian.org/debian-legal/2000/01/msg00203.html
[3]
http://cvs.sourceforge.net/viewcvs.py/*checkout*/regexplorer/regexplorer/QPL.html?rev=1.1.1.1
[4]
http://packages.debian.org/changelogs/pool/main/r/regexplorer/regexplorer_0.1.6-12/regexplorer.copyright

-- 
Roberto C. Sanchez
http://familiasanchez.net/~sanchezr


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Re:

2005-05-20 Thread Thomas Bushnell BSG
Michael K. Edwards [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 Sorry about that; I skipped a step or two.  Your unilateral grant of
 permission is not in fact a recognized mechanism under law for the
 conveyance of a non-exclusive copyright license.  

I'm sorry, can you point me to the statute here?  The US statute
simply prohibits copying without permission.  It says nothing about
how permission is granted.  Can you point me to a court case which
said that grant of permission is not contractual, and therefore no
permission has been granted?

We aren't concerned with a browsewrap or shrinkwrap license; all the
cases you point to are about that.  Those are about licenses which
attempt to take away rights that a person would have had if they had
never agreed to the license.  Since the GPL only gives you new rights,
never taking away any, it's not clear how objections to those kinds of
licenses would matter.

 There's also no question that the GPL is enforceable (and has been
 successfully enforced by Harald Welte in Deutschland) using a breach
 of contract theory against people who don't release source code to
 GPL works when they modify and distribute them.  But applying contract
 law standards of construction against the offeror, notice and cure of
 breach, grounds for preliminary injunction, and all that -- together
 with a correct reading of phrases like derivative work under
 copyright law and mere aggregation -- results in a GPL whose
 utility as a club against the Wicked Linker is greatly weakened and
 possibly (IANALIAJ) zero.  Which is, in my personal view, as it should
 be.

I see, so this is what you're claiming.  Since the proponents of the
unilateral-grant-of-permission theory completely agree that contract
law is the normal rule for the interpretation of such documents, there
isn't any debate there.  If you only reason for invoking contract law
is to say the license must be interpreted in accord with the
standards of contract construction, there is already broad agreement
about that point.

 There's a world of difference between we can't link Quagga against an
 OpenSSL-enabled NetSNMP because it's illegal; whoops, we already did
 so (and a thousand similar things), which means we have to beg the FSF
 to un-automatically-terminate all of our GPL rights and as a matter
 of courtesy to the FSF, we usually make a reasonable effort to obtain
 OpenSSL 'exemption riders' where their FAQ recommends them,
 irrespective of whether the assertions in their FAQ and related
 statements are legally valid.

Yes, and we can simply make neither statement, but ask for the rider,
make no statements to the FSF about whether our past actions were
right or wrong, and if the rider is not granted, stop distributing
(which we would do anyway).

So this is a tempest in a silly teapot.  I'm happy to leave the thread
here, since the upshot is a no-relevance-to-important-issues.

Thomas


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Re: [WASTE-dev-public] Do not package WASTE! UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE [Was: Re: Questions about waste licence and code.]

2005-05-20 Thread Bernhard R. Link
* Arnoud Engelfriet [EMAIL PROTECTED] [050519 19:52]:
 Moral rights only allow you to act against mutilation of
 the work and lack of proper attribution. And you have the right
 to decide on _first_ publication. But once you publish, the
 work is on the market and your rights are exhausted. I don't see
 a basis for doing a recall.

INAL, but German law also has some revocation paragraphs:

The German copyright laws, called something line author rights law 
Urheberrechtsgesetz (e.g. http://www.netlaw.de/gesetze/urhg.htm)
has paragraphs about revocation:

§41 Rückrufsrecht wegen Nichtausübung
which could be translated to revocation right because of non-use,
which is quite uninteresting. It mainly allows to terminate rights
when you give exclusive rights and the person makes no use of it.

§42 Rückrufsrecht wegen gewandelter Überzeugung 
This could be translated as revocation right because of changed
opinion/belief.
For free software it is not very applicaple in my eyes, as the
law mandates in that case:
- the author has to compensate adaquately
- the revocation is not active before compensation is payed.
- the licensee has three months to name the amount of compensation
- if the work is to be used again, the former licensee has to 
  be offered equivalent rights under fair conditions.

So this seems to be mainly for things like pictures or other art the
artist wished he never made. Compensating every user, even if only the
costs for downloading are compensated, would be far to expensive.
Also note that as far as I was explained, the author is always the
person who made it. Author's rights are not refereable. The nearest
equivalent of copyright transference are exclusive licenses. And as
these morale rights are considered part of human rights, they are
not transferable and not bounding contracts about their use can be made.

Hochachtungsvoll,
  Bernhard R. Link


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Get latest version, cds and download under $99

2005-05-20 Thread Dicky
OS-Adobe-Macromedia etc All under $15-$99 CDS
http://phnmp.elithdwpb6w3bxw.quotajquot9.com

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Re:

2005-05-20 Thread Michael K. Edwards
On 5/20/05, Thomas Bushnell BSG [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Michael K. Edwards [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 
  Sorry about that; I skipped a step or two.  Your unilateral grant of
  permission is not in fact a recognized mechanism under law for the
  conveyance of a non-exclusive copyright license.
 
 I'm sorry, can you point me to the statute here?  The US statute
 simply prohibits copying without permission.  It says nothing about
 how permission is granted.  Can you point me to a court case which
 said that grant of permission is not contractual, and therefore no
 permission has been granted?

You might read the Jacob Maxwell v. Veeck case, in which the defendant
argued exactly that (because by law an exclusive license must be a
written contract).  The court agreed that federal law didn't permit
the finding of an exclusive license under the circumstances, discussed
exactly what a non-exclusive license is, and proceeded to construe and
interpret one under the applicable state contract law.  Honest to
Murgatroyd, copyright (and patent, etc.) licenses are [terms in]
contracts is a principle that long predates modern copyright statutes
and you're not going to find any counter-examples.

 We aren't concerned with a browsewrap or shrinkwrap license; all the
 cases you point to are about that.  Those are about licenses which
 attempt to take away rights that a person would have had if they had
 never agreed to the license.  Since the GPL only gives you new rights,
 never taking away any, it's not clear how objections to those kinds of
 licenses would matter.

That argument simply doesn't hold water.  Covenants to offer source
code in this and such a way are not scope of license, they're return
consideration.  The GPL is a true offer of bilateral contract.  And
yes, I've read lots of unfounded assertions from the FSF and others on
the subject, and this and other arguments have been made with a
reasonable degree of skill on debian-legal, and I see no reason to
repeat them on d-d.

  There's also no question that the GPL is enforceable (and has been
  successfully enforced by Harald Welte in Deutschland) using a breach
  of contract theory against people who don't release source code to
  GPL works when they modify and distribute them.  But applying contract
  law standards of construction against the offeror, notice and cure of
  breach, grounds for preliminary injunction, and all that -- together
  with a correct reading of phrases like derivative work under
  copyright law and mere aggregation -- results in a GPL whose
  utility as a club against the Wicked Linker is greatly weakened and
  possibly (IANALIAJ) zero.  Which is, in my personal view, as it should
  be.
 
 I see, so this is what you're claiming.  Since the proponents of the
 unilateral-grant-of-permission theory completely agree that contract
 law is the normal rule for the interpretation of such documents, there
 isn't any debate there.  If you only reason for invoking contract law
 is to say the license must be interpreted in accord with the
 standards of contract construction, there is already broad agreement
 about that point.

Not from the copyright-based license crowd, who would have you
believe that contract law standards don't apply and the GPL has a fast
path to preliminary injunction under copyright infringement standards.
 It is, however, a blenderized equine on d-l, so there's no particular
need to continue it here.

  There's a world of difference between we can't link Quagga against an
  OpenSSL-enabled NetSNMP because it's illegal; whoops, we already did
  so (and a thousand similar things), which means we have to beg the FSF
  to un-automatically-terminate all of our GPL rights and as a matter
  of courtesy to the FSF, we usually make a reasonable effort to obtain
  OpenSSL 'exemption riders' where their FAQ recommends them,
  irrespective of whether the assertions in their FAQ and related
  statements are legally valid.
 
 Yes, and we can simply make neither statement, but ask for the rider,
 make no statements to the FSF about whether our past actions were
 right or wrong, and if the rider is not granted, stop distributing
 (which we would do anyway).
 
 So this is a tempest in a silly teapot.  I'm happy to leave the thread
 here, since the upshot is a no-relevance-to-important-issues.

Fair enough; although you may find that not everyone agrees that stop
distributing is the right answer when we are talking dynamic linking
across one or more package boundaries.  Especially when the FSF is not
the sole copyright holder on the GPL'ed upstream, as in the case of
Quagga (now under discussion on d-l).

Cheers,
- Michael



Re:

2005-05-20 Thread Thomas Bushnell BSG
Michael K. Edwards [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

[a lot of repetition that pretty much ignores what I said, and
especially where I said:]

 So this is a tempest in a silly teapot.  I'm happy to leave the thread
 here, since the upshot is a no-relevance-to-important-issues.

So, since you ignored that last sentence, please re-read it.

Thomas


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Re: RES: What makes software copyrightable anyway?

2005-05-20 Thread Raul Miller
On 5/19/05, Adam McKenna [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 On Thu, May 19, 2005 at 07:38:18PM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
  Which can occur if anyone redistributes any of the I_WANT_OPENSSL
  debian packages.
 
 According to you.  If, for the sake of argument, we assume that such
 binaries are undistributable, Debian is still not affected, since we
 aren't contributing to their distribution, only their creation.

In some senses you're right.

The README.Debian clearly documents how to use this in conjunction 
with apt-get -b source -- and this probably does count as contributing
towards their creation.

But is the distinction between contributing to their creation and
contributing towards their distribution a strong distinction?  After
all, we've provided a number of other rather strong contributions
towards distribution in general -- it might be hard to argue that
those contributions are irrelevant here.

On the other hand, if the copyright holder supplied the 
I_WANT_OPENSSL option, then that copyright holder probably 
can't hold us in violation of the license.  Only if code has been 
incorporated from other projects would this seem to be a serious 
problem.  Basically, I think that the violation has to be downstream 
from someone who has significant copyright for it to be a serious
issue.

Thanks,

-- 
Raul



Re: RES: What makes software copyrightable anyway?

2005-05-20 Thread Anthony DeRobertis
Raul Miller wrote:
But we're doing more than distributing the tarball.  The tarballs we're
distributing have been modified so that the user need only type a
couple commands, and (using software we've provided) the 
binaries are reconstituted on their machine.
So what? First off, the GPL gives us permission --- under section 2 --- 
to make and distribute that tarball. The user has permission to run 
those several commands under GPL 0.

The only thing that the user doesn't have permission to do is distribute 
the resulting binary.

The end result is that we have taken steps to make the binaries appear
on the user's machine, so we have some responsibility for that result.
While that may be the end result, we have not distributed that binary, 
which is the only relevant thing the GPL doesn't let us do.

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Re: RES: What makes software copyrightable anyway?

2005-05-20 Thread Michael K. Edwards
On 5/20/05, Raul Miller [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 On 5/20/05, Michael K. Edwards [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  On 5/19/05, Raul Miller [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
   But the ambiguities have to be valid ambiguities.
  
   That's where we seem to differ on this issue.
 
  I think there is little question that the work based on the Program
  definition + erroneous paraphrase in Section 0 is either:  1) a valid
  ambiguity (to be construed against the offeror on the licensee's
  request), or 2) unambiguously readable only as derivative work under
  copyright law, because the paraphrase is so weakly attached as to be
  an implausible candidate for a definition even if the licensee wanted
  it that way.  Perhaps you would now agree to this either/or, without
  any implications for whether my reading of the phrase derivative work
  under copyright law is correct?
 
 I'm going to tackle this in two pieces.  First I'm going to critique
 your presentation, then I'm going to try to tackle the issues I
 think you're raising.  Be warned that I may have misunderstood
 you.

The paragraph I wrote was somewhat cryptic, and I think you did
misunderstand a little.  Once more unto the breach:

Stipulate, for the moment, that either the Program or any derivative
work under copyright law (candidate E) and a work containing the
Program or a portion of it, either verbatim or with modifications
and/or translated into another language (candidate C) are not
obviously equivalent.

Under contract law, it is necessary to construe a single definition
for the clearly delimited phrase work based on the Program -- a
phrase with no a priori legal meaning -- out of the text of section 0
as written, along with any other evidence that may be demonstrated to
reflect a binding intention on the licensee's part.  This construction
must, as a matter of (common law) principle, be done against the
offeror -- i. e., by choosing, from among the plausible readings of
the text, the one least favorable to the offeror's position in the
case at hand.

Personally, I think that candidate C is so weakly attached
grammatically as to be not plausible as a replacement for the
definition given by candidate E.  But suppose one were to call this a
significant ambiguity in the text.

At this point, and only at this point, do we need to bring in the
actual meaning of derivative work under copyright law, as discussed
elsewhere.  As I read it, candidate E is still the correct
construction.  That's because it is less favorable to the offeror, as
it draws narrower bounds on which works based on the Program have to
be offered entirely on GPL terms.  In this construction, the licensee
does need to provide a theory under which the he is granted permission
to create and distribute collections (with or without a selection
criterion that raises them to the level of collective works) that
contain a work based on the Program; this is addressed below.

Is that better?

 Presentation:  Logically, you seem to have assumed that the clause
 in question is erroneous, and you draw conclusions from this
 assumption.  In other words, but your conclusions seem to be
 don't seem to add much to your initial assumption.

I was attempting to use the phrase erroneous paraphrase just as a
name for candidate C above.  As stated more clearly above, the notion
that it is erroneous doesn't enter into the logic until you try to
resolve the ambiguity against the offeror.

 Issues: As near as I can tell, section 0 of the GPL establishes what
 is being licensed by the GPL.  To my knowledge, no works which are
 not explicitly recognized in section 0 are being licensed.  Section 0
 also seems to establish the scope of the license -- which is something
 you've expressed strong interest in.  Other sections which grant
 permissions explicitly do so under the terms of this license which
 includes section 0, or under the terms of section 1 (which refers
 to the Program of section 0), or of section 2 (which must be
 under the terms of section 1).

The question being asked in scope of license analysis is, what
rights reserved to the copyright holder, as defined in 17 USC, are
being made available for exercise by the licensee, whatever the return
consideration may be?  In the case of the GPL, the licensed rights
include copying and distributing the Program itself; modifying,
adapting, translating or otherwise creating a work based on the
Program, and copying and distributing the result; and aggregating a
work based on the Program with other material and copying and
distributing the result.

In another license, the scope might be as narrow as translate
alternate pages into French and German and publish the result on
Post-It (TM) Notes; but as long as you pet a cat on alternate
Tuesdays isn't part of the scope of license even if it's the first
clause in the agreement text.  As long as you [do anything] is
contract law stuff, even if [do anything] logically requires exercise
of the rights under copyright that are being 

Re: RES: What makes software copyrightable anyway?

2005-05-20 Thread Anthony DeRobertis
Raul Miller wrote:
Which can occur if anyone redistributes any of the I_WANT_OPENSSL
debian packages.
No, most likely even that would be fine. Since Debian packages are 
intended to be used with Debian, and Debian ships OpenSSL, third parties 
get to use the GPL's exception for things distributed with the operating 
system. [Debian, of course, can't use this because it doesn't apply if 
the binary is distributed with those things].

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Re: RES: What makes software copyrightable anyway?

2005-05-20 Thread Anthony DeRobertis
Michael K. Edwards wrote:
But note that in principle the
creation of derivative works can be infringement even if they are not
distributed, and I haven't dug through case law to see exactly how far
17 USC 117 can be stretched from run-time use to local builds.
Thankfully, you need not do so; GPL (2) give permission to make 
derivative works. As long as you don't distribute or publish the work 
(which is the case here), you need only (1) make notes on files you 
modified; (2) the thing with spewing the GPL notice for interactive 
programs.

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Keeping debate in its place so we can actually reach resolution [Was: Re: ]

2005-05-20 Thread Don Armstrong
On Fri, 20 May 2005, Michael K. Edwards wrote:
 On 5/19/05, Thomas Bushnell BSG [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  You are choosing to post on three different forums. Having made
  that choice, it is your obligation to make your comments relevant
  to them all; you cannot post on debian-devel, and then insist that
  your interlocutors there read a different list.
 
 Oh, nuts. I didn't realize this thread was still copied to hell and
 gone. I'll try to summarize briefly, and would the next person
 please cut d-d and waste-public off if appropriate?

Can we please try to hold most of these discussions primarily in
-legal?

Once we have actually figured out what the primary issue is, and
understood the ramifications of it, only then should we present a
cogent, clear analysis of what the actual issue is to upstream, so
that they can actually deal with it appropriately.

Otherwise, all we're doing is burying upstream (and frankly, -devel)
under a deluge of material that they could care less about, and
hurting our chances of eventually resolving the issue (whatever it is)
appropriately.

[Finally, as a major nitpick: Please, please, please, Set a useful
Topic:. Otherwise it becomes quite impossible to return to these
threads at any point in the future. Topicless threads are almost as
bad as threads with a wrong topic.]


Don Armstrong

-- 
For those who understand, no explanation is necessary.
 For those who do not, none is possible.

http://www.donarmstrong.com  http://rzlab.ucr.edu


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Re: RES: What makes software copyrightable anyway?

2005-05-20 Thread Anthony DeRobertis
Raul Miller wrote:
That works only if they don't distribute libssl with it.
Sure. Same as for Debian. If you distributing software, open source or 
not, you need to read and follow the license.

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Re: RES: What makes software copyrightable anyway?

2005-05-20 Thread Raul Miller
On 5/20/05, Anthony DeRobertis [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 GPL 1, 2, and 3 apply to distributions in object or executable form.
 GPL 1 and 2 apply to distributions in source code form. The GPL has
 *clearly* and *intentionally* placed additional restrictions (given in
 section 3) on binary distribution.

Sure.

But distribution and bits on the wire aren't equivalent.

 That is why whether we distribute in source or object for matters,
 because the FSF made it so when they drafted the GPL. This is not some
 trivial technical workaround trying to exploit a arcane loophole in the
 license; it is a difference that --- judging from the license, the
 preamble, and the position statements on fsf.org --- the FSF considers
 extremely important.
 
 BTW: Most piece of modern, open-source software I've seen comes with a
 few simple commands to build and install a binary; they typically are
 ./configure; make or just make. Are you arguing they are effectively
 distributing a binary, too?

As a general rule, those commands don't go figuring out where to
get the sources and download them for you.  Nor are they specially
documented in the distributor's notes on the package.

Anyways, as long as the I_WANT_OPENSSL is something that's
considered valid all the way upstream for all the GPLed code, I 
don't think this is a problem -- it's just yet another case of someone
not licesning things the way they wanted to license them.

-- 
Raul



Re: RES: What makes software copyrightable anyway?

2005-05-20 Thread Raul Miller
On 5/20/05, Michael K. Edwards [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Stipulate, for the moment, that either the Program or any derivative
 work under copyright law (candidate E) and a work containing the
 Program or a portion of it, either verbatim or with modifications
 and/or translated into another language (candidate C) are not
 obviously equivalent.

Ok.

 Under contract law, it is necessary to construe a single definition
 for the clearly delimited phrase work based on the Program -- a
 phrase with no a priori legal meaning -- out of the text of section 0
 as written, along with any other evidence that may be demonstrated to
 reflect a binding intention on the licensee's part.  This construction
 must, as a matter of (common law) principle, be done against the
 offeror -- i. e., by choosing, from among the plausible readings of
 the text, the one least favorable to the offeror's position in the
 case at hand.

Ok.

 Personally, I think that candidate C is so weakly attached
 grammatically as to be not plausible as a replacement for the
 definition given by candidate E.  But suppose one were to call this a
 significant ambiguity in the text.

Ok.

 At this point, and only at this point, do we need to bring in the
 actual meaning of derivative work under copyright law, as discussed
 elsewhere.  As I read it, candidate E is still the correct
 construction.  That's because it is less favorable to the offeror, as
 it draws narrower bounds on which works based on the Program have to
 be offered entirely on GPL terms.  In this construction, the licensee
 does need to provide a theory under which the he is granted permission
 to create and distribute collections (with or without a selection
 criterion that raises them to the level of collective works) that
 contain a work based on the Program; this is addressed below.
 
 Is that better?

Yes.

I think it's important to note that narrower bounds on the license are
not necessarily less favorable to the offeror.  If you're willing to agree
with me on that point, I'm happy.

  Presentation:  Logically, you seem to have assumed that the clause
  in question is erroneous, and you draw conclusions from this
  assumption.  In other words, but your conclusions seem to be
  don't seem to add much to your initial assumption.
 
 I was attempting to use the phrase erroneous paraphrase just as a
 name for candidate C above.  As stated more clearly above, the notion
 that it is erroneous doesn't enter into the logic until you try to
 resolve the ambiguity against the offeror.

And even there that erroneous character is contextual.

I could imagine (for example in a dual-license contract) that the licensee
might prefer the broader interpretation -- for that case, the narrower
interpretation would be erroneous.

  Issues: As near as I can tell, section 0 of the GPL establishes what
  is being licensed by the GPL.  To my knowledge, no works which are
  not explicitly recognized in section 0 are being licensed.  Section 0
  also seems to establish the scope of the license -- which is something
  you've expressed strong interest in.  Other sections which grant
  permissions explicitly do so under the terms of this license which
  includes section 0, or under the terms of section 1 (which refers
  to the Program of section 0), or of section 2 (which must be
  under the terms of section 1).
 
 The question being asked in scope of license analysis is, what
 rights reserved to the copyright holder, as defined in 17 USC, are
 being made available for exercise by the licensee, whatever the return
 consideration may be?  In the case of the GPL, the licensed rights
 include copying and distributing the Program itself; modifying,
 adapting, translating or otherwise creating a work based on the
 Program, and copying and distributing the result; and aggregating a
 work based on the Program with other material and copying and
 distributing the result.

As near as I can tell, those rights are somewhat limited in the context 
of modification.

You seem to be trying to imply that conditions are to be ignored when
construing the scope of the license.  But I don't think that's legally
valid -- I've certainly not seen anything that would support that 
implication.  And, I've seen legal language (for example the concept
of narrow scope) which implies the opposite.

 In another license, the scope might be as narrow as translate
 alternate pages into French and German and publish the result on
 Post-It (TM) Notes; but as long as you pet a cat on alternate
 Tuesdays isn't part of the scope of license even if it's the first
 clause in the agreement text.  As long as you [do anything] is
 contract law stuff, even if [do anything] logically requires exercise
 of the rights under copyright that are being offered to you.

Except... I think you've left out a lot of the narrowness of the GPL.

 I think that there's really no question, no matter which path you take
 to construe aggregation, that it includes both the 

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2005-05-20 Thread Rudolf
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Re: Keeping debate in its place so we can actually reach resolution [Was: Re: ]

2005-05-20 Thread Michael K. Edwards
On 5/20/05, Don Armstrong [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 On Fri, 20 May 2005, Michael K. Edwards wrote:
  On 5/19/05, Thomas Bushnell BSG [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
   You are choosing to post on three different forums. Having made
   that choice, it is your obligation to make your comments relevant
   to them all; you cannot post on debian-devel, and then insist that
   your interlocutors there read a different list.
 
  Oh, nuts. I didn't realize this thread was still copied to hell and
  gone. I'll try to summarize briefly, and would the next person
  please cut d-d and waste-public off if appropriate?
 
 Can we please try to hold most of these discussions primarily in
 -legal?

I agree entirely.  Please review the thread's history:
apparently cross-posted from waste-public to d-d and d-l by one
Mirco Bauer, attracting interest from people who seem not to be
regular d-l readers;
intervention from current d-l participants on the topic of GPL
retraction (certainly relevant to WASTE), followed by a pointed but
polite exchange about patently false (my phrase) assertions in the
FSF FAQ;
thread broken by Thomas Bushnell (trashing Subject; I stupidly
assumed he had also narrowed the cross-posting) in order to dispute
things I had written, in apparent ignorance of recent d-l goings-on;
my attempt to refer Thomas to a specific thread from d-l archives,
rebuffed with the above cross assertion that I owed all participants a
summary;
Thomas's and my subsequent conduct, which you may judge for yourself.

 Once we have actually figured out what the primary issue is, and
 understood the ramifications of it, only then should we present a
 cogent, clear analysis of what the actual issue is to upstream, so
 that they can actually deal with it appropriately.
 
 Otherwise, all we're doing is burying upstream (and frankly, -devel)
 under a deluge of material that they could care less about, and
 hurting our chances of eventually resolving the issue (whatever it is)
 appropriately.

You may note that I've usually been the one to prune branches of
threads that were spamming d-d when I noticed them; I don't believe
I've added d-d to any d-l thread recently, and perhaps not ever.

 [Finally, as a major nitpick: Please, please, please, Set a useful
 Topic:. Otherwise it becomes quite impossible to return to these
 threads at any point in the future. Topicless threads are almost as
 bad as threads with a wrong topic.]

Er, talk to TB, who doesn't seem to read d-l.  ;-)  But I'll try to
fix such things when I notice them.  GMail is the only resource I have
handy that can handle the header-forged spam flood that a d-d
subscription invites, and sometimes I miss things in its interface.

Cheers,
- Michael



Re: Keeping debate in its place so we can actually reach resolution [Was: Re: ]

2005-05-20 Thread Don Armstrong
On Fri, 20 May 2005, Michael K. Edwards wrote:
 On 5/20/05, Don Armstrong [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Can we please try to hold most of these discussions primarily in
  -legal?
 
 I agree entirely. Please review the thread's history

The thread's history just shows where the mistakes were introduced,
but the perpetuation of them is primarily the fault of the author of
every subsequent message.[1]

Everyone who replies to a thread needs to be aware of who they're
sending the message out to, and whether the content of the message
really is going to serve the goal which we (hopefully all) share,
resolving the issue(s) in a manner which allows the software to be
included in Debian in compliance with the DFSG.

  [Please, please, please, Set a useful Topic:.]
 
 Er, talk to TB, who doesn't seem to read d-l.

I'm just talking in general here.[2]


Don Armstrong

1: And I've made more of my fair share of mistakes in perpetuating
pointlessly crossposted threads that just end up confusing hapless
upstreams... *cough* *cough* *mplayer*...

2: The recent influx of thread breaking messages[3] which have made it
almost impossible to follow threads has made me even less tolerant of
messages that break threads and lack subjects... if the discussion is
made that difficult to follow, no one will follow it, and the
participants may as well just be responding privately, because no one
else but the participants in the thread will bother to read it.

3: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0+ (Windows/20050224) and Internet Mail
Service need to be taken out and shot.
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Re: RES: What makes software copyrightable anyway?

2005-05-20 Thread Michael K. Edwards
Another long one, because I'm trying to get to the bottom of this
scope of license business.

On 5/20/05, Raul Miller [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[snip agreement, about which I am very happy]
 I think it's important to note that narrower bounds on the license are
 not necessarily less favorable to the offeror.  If you're willing to agree
 with me on that point, I'm happy.

Sure.  But I'm not talking about narrower bounds on the set of rights
offered with respect to the Program (which is the extant work on which
there exist licensable rights).  I'm talking about narrower bounds on
the definition of work based on the Program, which leaves room to
construe the appropriate permissions for anthologies /
buckets-of-works based on the rest of the contract.

  I was attempting to use the phrase erroneous paraphrase just as a
  name for candidate C above.  As stated more clearly above, the notion
  that it is erroneous doesn't enter into the logic until you try to
  resolve the ambiguity against the offeror.
 
 And even there that erroneous character is contextual.
 
 I could imagine (for example in a dual-license contract) that the licensee
 might prefer the broader interpretation -- for that case, the narrower
 interpretation would be erroneous.

As a paraphrase of candidate E, it's erroneous.  The grammar, as I
read it, doesn't allow it to be anything else.  But a licensee is
certainly welcome to argue for the presence of an ambiguity there if
they have some reason to prefer candidate C.

  The question being asked in scope of license analysis is, what
  rights reserved to the copyright holder, as defined in 17 USC, are
  being made available for exercise by the licensee, whatever the return
  consideration may be?  In the case of the GPL, the licensed rights
  include copying and distributing the Program itself; modifying,
  adapting, translating or otherwise creating a work based on the
  Program, and copying and distributing the result; and aggregating a
  work based on the Program with other material and copying and
  distributing the result.
 
 As near as I can tell, those rights are somewhat limited in the context
 of modification.
 
 You seem to be trying to imply that conditions are to be ignored when
 construing the scope of the license.  But I don't think that's legally
 valid -- I've certainly not seen anything that would support that
 implication.  And, I've seen legal language (for example the concept
 of narrow scope) which implies the opposite.

It's possible that you're right; however, the only evidence for this
that I have found is internal to the district court's order denying
Sun's copyright infringement claims on remand, and the outcome would
have been the same either way, so it's not much of a precedent.  Long
version below.  Note that the only consequence would be that some
claims might be upgraded from breach of contract to copyright
infringement (and thus an easier standard for preliminary injunction);
all of the rules of construction still apply.

My empirical understanding up until now from reading appellate case
law (IANAL) is that limitations on how, when, where, and by whom
copies (translations, etc.) may be made, and how many and in what form
or medium, are all part of the scope of license.  Ditto the nature and
degree of adaptation, translation, aggregation, etc.  Questions of
form seem to be particularly subject to judicial construction as to
the parties' intent:  see Boosey  Hawkes v. Walt Disney (
http://laws.findlaw.com/2nd/969205v2.html ) and op. cit.

But the appellate record suggests that nothing other than the exercise
of rights reserved to the copyright holder under 17 USC is relevant to
this analysis, and obligations of return performance are to be ignored
-- and the whole you must offer source code on demand bit is
indisputably an obligation of return performance.  Fail to satisfy it,
and you may be in breach of contract, but you can't be successfully
sued for copyright infringement unless the contract is first ruled to
have been properly terminated.

I'm now questioning part of this understanding, based on the Sun v.
Microsoft district court's ruling on remand (
http://java.sun.com/lawsuit/012400motionfeds.html ) with regard to the
scope of license contained in the TLDA.  That opinion uses
California law to justify reviewing the entire TLDA for evidence of
scope of license.  Its ruling against Sun relies on the absence of
language in the TLDA about the license grants being subject to,
conditional on, or limited by compliance with the compatibility
obligations in the disputed section.

The district court's approach to distinguishing between contractual
covenants and restrictions on the license grants does not appear
correct to me, given that all of the appellate judgments I have found
that reference SOS v. Payday seem to implicitly use logic similar to
mine above.  It is worth noting that this is the same district court
that was previously overruled for failing to 

Re: RES: What makes software copyrightable anyway?

2005-05-20 Thread Raul Miller
(Note, I might come back to some of this later -- I need to
think about whether I want to bother raising some issues, among
other things --, but a few of these I have immediate questions or 
comments about.)

On 5/20/05, Michael K. Edwards [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  There is some question about whether Quagga+Net SNMP+libssl
  is uncopyrightable.
 
 No, there isn't.  There's no selection and arrangement creative
 expression there.  It's silly to say that some third party could
 obtain a copyright on combining those things and enforce it on the
 Quagga copyright holders themselves.  Copyright doesn't protect ideas,
 it protects expression; and this is a doctrine of merger instance if
 I ever saw one.

Are you saying I could just as well select, say, libperl, apache, and
mysqld and expect them to be just as satisfactory' when combined with
Quagga?

Or are you saying that since the authors of Quagga already made
that selection that no one else has to?

   1. a.  Official or legal permission to do or own a specified thing.
 
 Feeble.  Get a real dictionary.  

Findlaw's legal dictionary says:

   1 a: a right or permission granted by a competent authority (as of
   a government or a business) to engage in some business or
   occupation, do some act, or engage in some transaction which
   would be unlawful without such right or permission

Better?

 The non-GPL license option to MySQL had no relevance to that case
 whatsoever.  It was not claimed by Progress Software, it is not
 mentioned in the opinion or in Eben Moglen's affidavit, and as far as
 I can tell the judge may not even have known that existed.  Unless you
 have some piece of the court record that I don't yet -- in which case,
 pony up -- this is a lame bit of misdirection.

I'll quote the beginning of point 30 of that affidavit for you:

   MySQL AB engages in ``dual licensing.'' This means that it licenses 
   a version of MySQL to be freely used, copied, modified and 
   distributed by everyone under the GPL, and also makes versions 
   of its program that are distributed to particular customers without 
   the right of free distribution.

I don't have at hand the claims of Progress Software, but Saris
clearly was informed of this issue.

-- 
Raul



Re: RES: What makes software copyrightable anyway?

2005-05-20 Thread Raul Miller
On 5/20/05, Michael K. Edwards [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 As a paraphrase of candidate E, it's erroneous.  The grammar, as I
 read it, doesn't allow it to be anything else.  But a licensee is
 certainly welcome to argue for the presence of an ambiguity there if
 they have some reason to prefer candidate C.

One other observation here:

It's entirely possible that a court would not find this phrasing
ambiguous.

Here's the full text of the definition of derivative work from
17 USC 101:

   A derivative work is a work based upon one or more preexisting 
   works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
   fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
   abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be 
   recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, 
   annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
   represent an original work of authorship, is a derivative work.

I believe that we've established that for a work to be not a derivative
work that it's not sufficient to show that it's a collective work.

And, some of those possibilities -- elaborations, annotations,  adapted,
recast, etc. as well as the bit about based upon one or more preexisting 
works  all seem to point at the idea that if a computer program as a
whole is to be granted special copyright protection beyond that of
its individual components that it is a derivative work of those components.

And I think we can agree that, at least within the U.S., this definition
is a part of copyright law.

[On the flip side, if it can be shown in court that there's some criteria under
which all programs are free of copyright law, that's probably a good thing
for the free software community.]

-- 
Raul