Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-11 Thread Simon Josefsson
Sam Morris s...@robots.org.uk writes: Maybe in a few years, NSS will have disabled the use of MD5 and the ancient MD2 algorithm. I wonder how many other insecure algorithms are still lurking in NSS, OpenSSL, GNU TLS, Java, etc... In GnuTLS, we decided in 2005 that certificate signatures

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-02 Thread Aiko Barz
On Thu, Jan 01, 2009 at 12:45:22PM -0500, Micah Anderson wrote: On Wed, 31 Dec 2008, Micah Anderson wrote: Does anyone have a legitimate reason to trust any particular Certificate Authority? Yves-Alexis Perez cor...@debian.org writes: I may be

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-01 Thread Peter Palfrader
On Thu, 01 Jan 2009, Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn wrote: Still, the original question was (sort of) whether MD5 signed certificates like this one: Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 1 (0x1) Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-01 Thread Sam Morris
On Wed, 31 Dec 2008 02:39:53 +0100, Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn wrote: http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ Could some skilled person comment on the article? I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package ca-certificates have Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption.

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-01 Thread Russ Allbery
Yves-Alexis Perez cor...@debian.org writes: I may be wrong, but I trust the CAs in ca-certificates. I've followed the add of French Gvt CA Certificates, and the procedure was enough strict to give me this trust impression. I would hope that other CA are checked to be trustworthy enough

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-01 Thread Sam Morris
On Wed, 31 Dec 2008 02:39:53 +0100, Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn wrote: http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ Could some skilled person comment on the article? I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package ca-certificates have Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption.

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-01 Thread Michael Marsh
On Thu, Jan 1, 2009 at 9:56 AM, Sam Morris s...@robots.org.uk wrote: Maybe in a few years, NSS will have disabled the use of MD5 and the ancient MD2 algorithm. I wonder how many other insecure algorithms are still lurking in NSS, OpenSSL, GNU TLS, Java, etc... Having programmed with OpenSSL a

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-01 Thread Micah Anderson
On Wed, 31 Dec 2008, Micah Anderson wrote: Does anyone have a legitimate reason to trust any particular Certificate Authority? Yves-Alexis Perez cor...@debian.org writes: I may be wrong, but I trust the CAs in ca-certificates. I've followed the add

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-01 Thread Bernd Eckenfels
In article 0901011447100.8...@somehost you wrote: Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption ^ should be distributed at all. Yes, because it is the self signature, but since we distribute the CA certificate it is not checked but trusted. The

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2009-01-01 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn wrote: http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ Could some skilled person comment on the article? I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package ca-certificates have Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption. Reason to worry? Hi, (I'm one of

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2008-12-31 Thread bgrpt3
On Mittwoch, 31. Dezember 2008, Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn wrote: http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ Could some skilled person comment on the article? I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package ca-certificates have Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption. Reason to

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2008-12-31 Thread Florian Weimer
* Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn: I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package ca-certificates have Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption. Reason to worry? These are self-signatures and typically not checked anyway. When these CA certificates are used to issue other

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2008-12-31 Thread Micah Anderson
* bgr...@toplitzer.net bgr...@toplitzer.net [2008-12-31 05:47-0500]: On Mittwoch, 31. Dezember 2008, Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn wrote: http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ Could some skilled person comment on the article? I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2008-12-31 Thread Michael Stone
On Wed, Dec 31, 2008 at 02:15:18PM -0500, Micah Anderson wrote: Does anyone have a legitimate reason to trust any particular Certificate Authority? Of course--some charge *lots* of money, and we all know that expensive bits are better than cheap bits. Mike Stone -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email

Re: Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2008-12-31 Thread Nikolai Lusan
On Wed, 2008-12-31 at 14:15 -0500, Micah Anderson wrote: Does anyone have a legitimate reason to trust any particular Certificate Authority? The trust comes with knowing the procedures a CA uses to verify the particulars of the people asking (or indeed paying) them to sign certificates. The

Certification Authorities are recommended to stop using MD5 altogether

2008-12-30 Thread Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn
http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ Could some skilled person comment on the article? I noticed around 20 certificates distributed with the package ca-certificates have Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption. Reason to worry? Cheers, -- Cristian -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to