On 12/19/2016 06:26 PM, Patrick Schleizer wrote:
What about Debian graphical installer security?
Isn't that in meanwhile the ideal target for exploitation for targeted
attacks? Because it will take a while until the Debian point release
with fixed apt.
And during the gui installer, the output
CVE-2016-9592: RESERVED
--
The output might be a bit terse, but the above ids are known elsewhere,
check the references in the tracker. The second part indicates the status
of that id in the tracker at the moment the script was run.
ansible/stable
--
cairo/stable
--
ceph/stable
--
dcmtk/stable
--
dhcpcd5/stable
--
exim4/stable
--
imagemagick/stable
--
kde-runtime/stable
--
kdesudo/stable
--
libav/stable
--
libcrypto++/stable
--
libgc/stable
--
libgd2/stable
--
libgsf/stable
--
libtomcrypt/stable
--
libtorrent-rasterbar/stable
On Sun, Dec 18, 2016 at 12:35 PM, datanoise wrote:
> There could be https mirrors as well as non-https mirrors.
There is https://cloudfront.debian.net which you could decide to trust.
It doesn't *need* to be a "Debian SSL cert"; since you trust the
mirror anyway is
Peter Lawler:
>
>
> On 18/12/16 22:03, Christoph Moench-Tegeder wrote:
>> second point requires a lot of work
>> to resolve.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Christoph
>>
>
> Monday morning yet-to-be-caffienated thoughts...
>
> I'm going to ignore the 'inconvenience' because I think in this case
> that's a
What about Debian graphical installer security?
Isn't that in meanwhile the ideal target for exploitation for targeted
attacks? Because it will take a while until the Debian point release
with fixed apt.
And during the gui installer, the output of apt-get is not visible. And
stuff during
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