Re: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit
Title: Message Do you use scripts to set up your accounts? Saves us a ton of time when restoring or migrating accounts. When we had a similar problem mid-April that also required a server rebuild, running the scripts allowed us to recreate all of the websites on that server in a few minutes. There were a few tweaks needed from permissions that had been changed but not documented, and Frontpage Server Extensions never seems to work right without installing first 2000, then upgrading to 2002 and restarting IIS, but otherwise it went smooth. Most of our recovery time was spent on a couple of websites that have a lot of custom services. Other than that it was just the base server rebuild and some drive shuffling to get backed up data local to the server. Darin. - Original Message - From: John Tolmachoff (Lists) To: Declude.Virus@declude.com Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 8:42 PM Subject: RE: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit Putting in 2 new drives was the easy part. Recreating 43 websites in IIS because the backup drive on the backup server departed for parts unknown the week before and proceeded with the tape drive (Onstream) finally giving out a month ago leaving my backup solution in shambles is what has been fun. Fortunately, both the actual website data drives and their separate backups on zip disks are fine. When it rains it pours. I must be in Southern California. Needless to say, I am revamping my backup and disaster recovery solutions. John T eServices For You -Original Message-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Colbeck, AndrewSent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 2:42 PMTo: Declude.Virus@declude.comSubject: RE: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit Ok, John, get back to fixing that mirrored drive set. Andrew 8)
RE: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit
Since I am pressed for time and am presently unable to completely digest what the vulnerability is and how to stop it, how can we configure our Declude installs to protect/find/stop these messages? John T eServices For You -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Andy Schmidt Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 11:30 AM To: Declude.Virus@declude.com Subject: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit Hi, Enclosed a notice for the MS05-16 Exploit. For the record: I'm actually in favor of using STRICT interpretation of vulnerabilities - no matter how seldom one might actually occur. Whether a violation of standards is due to an actual virus - or just a poor mass-mailer application, I gladly use the reason of vulnerability of a potential virus to reject these messages early. As far as some features suggested here: - I do agree that it might be helpful for some people not to scan for viruses, if a vulnerability is found (to conserve CPU). - I do agree that there is little reason (other than statistics) to run the second scanner after the first scanner already found a virus. - I do agree that it is desirable for some people, if there was an option that would delete vulnerabilities rather than isolate them in the Virus folder. - I do NOT agree that Declude should NOT detect certain vulerabilities, just because they only occur very rarely. Best Regards Andy Schmidt Phone: +1 201 934-3414 x20 (Business) Fax:+1 201 934-9206 -Original Message- From: Nick FitzGerald [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, May 29, 2005 9:31 AM To: Bugtraq@securityfocus.com Subject: Spam exploiting MS05-016 Yesterday at least two of my spam-traps received the following message (I've elided the MIME boundary values just in case...): Subject: We make a business offer to you MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary=[...] [...] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=Windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Hello! It is not spam, so don't delete this message. We have a business offer to you. Read our offer. You can increase the business in 1,5 times. We hope you do not miss this information. Best regards, Keith [...] Content-type: application/octet-stream; name=agreement.zip Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=agreement.zip encoded ZIP file data There are a few trivial differences between the messages to the different addresses I checked, so don't anyone try to turn the above into a totally literal filtering rule... Anyway, the agreement.zip attachment held only one file, apparently called agreement.txt, but on closer inspection it turned out the file was called agreement.txt where the apparent trailing space was actually a 0xFF character. This pseudo-TXT file was, in fact, an OLE2 format file (originally a Word document file) with the OLE2 Root Entry CLSID set to that of the Microsoft HTML Application Host (MSHTA). This was all done as per the description in the iDEFENSE advisory announcing this vulnerability: http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=231type=vulns This pseudo-TXT file is an example of what is produced by the PoC generator posted to Bugtraq. Oddly, that message is not archived in SecurityFocus' own mailing list archives, but its PoC code is listed with the vulnerability's BID entry: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13132/info/ That PoC may be identified from the comment at the top of its code: MS05-016 POC Made By ZwelL [EMAIL PROTECTED] 2005.4.13 Anyway, the agreement.txt file contained a script to write a text file with commands and responses for use with the Windows ftp client via its -s option and further commands to run ftp with those scripted commands and then to run the executable that ftp script would cause to be downloaded from a Russian web site. At the time of writing, that site is still up and the executable that is downloaded (a backdoor) is the same one that was there when the spam was first seen. If you haven't installed the MS05-016 Windows Shell patch yet: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms05-016.mspx or at least taken reasonable precautions to defang possible exploitation of this vulnerability (particularly through MSHTA), it would be advisable to do so now. When initially discovered, only two of more than 20 tested virus scanning engines detected the exploit in agreement.txt . Since alerting the antivirus developer community of the field discovery of this exploit, a couple more big name scanners have added a degree of detection for this exploit, and I expect that number to grow as the new week dawns and new updates are pushed to customers. -- Nick FitzGerald Computer Virus
Re: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit
This is the one that Andy pointed out: Microsoft Windows Shell Remote Code Execution Vulnerability http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13132/discussion/ Microsoft Windows is prone to a vulnerability that may allow remote attackers to execute code through the Windows Shell. The cause of the vulnerability is related to how the operating system handles unregistered file types. The specific issue is that files with an unknown extension may be opened with the application specified in the embedded CLSID. The victim of the attack would be required to open a malicious file, possibly hosted on a Web site or sent through email. Social engineering would generally be required to entice the victim into opening the file. I can't say whether or not it is a broad enough threat to be exploited in a mass-mailing virus. Declude defaults to BANCSLID ON which may or may not protect from such an attack. Some CSLID calls are entire valid and normal for Outlook/Office generated E-mails, and I'm not totally sure what Declude considers to be good to ban with this switch. Andrew previously indicated that he had never seen it triggered. Anyway, these things pop up about once a month and most are never exploited in E-mail viruses, so there is probably no reason to not treat all of them the same. I see no reason why virus scanners wouldn't detect the infected attachments once they were updated with definitions for known threats. Matt John Tolmachoff (Lists) wrote: Since I am pressed for time and am presently unable to completely digest what the vulnerability is and how to stop it, how can we configure our Declude installs to protect/find/stop these messages? John T eServices For You -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Andy Schmidt Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 11:30 AM To: Declude.Virus@declude.com Subject: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit Hi, Enclosed a notice for the MS05-16 Exploit. For the record: I'm actually in favor of using STRICT interpretation of vulnerabilities - no matter how seldom one might actually occur. Whether a violation of standards is due to an actual virus - or just a poor mass-mailer application, I gladly use the reason of "vulnerability" of a potential virus to reject these messages early. As far as some features suggested here: - I do agree that it might be helpful for some people not to scan for viruses, if a vulnerability is found (to conserve CPU). - I do agree that there is little reason (other than statistics) to run the second scanner after the first scanner already found a virus. - I do agree that it is desirable for some people, if there was an option that would delete vulnerabilities rather than "isolate" them in the Virus folder. - I do NOT agree that Declude should NOT detect certain vulerabilities, just because they only occur very rarely. Best Regards Andy Schmidt Phone: +1 201 934-3414 x20 (Business) Fax:+1 201 934-9206 -Original Message- From: Nick FitzGerald [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Sunday, May 29, 2005 9:31 AM To: Bugtraq@securityfocus.com Subject: Spam exploiting MS05-016 Yesterday at least two of my spam-traps received the following message (I've elided the MIME boundary values just in case...): Subject: We make a business offer to you MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="[...]" [...] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Hello! It is not spam, so don't delete this message. We have a business offer to you. Read our offer. You can increase the business in 1,5 times. We hope you do not miss this information. Best regards, Keith [...] Content-type: application/octet-stream; name="agreement.zip" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="agreement.zip" encoded ZIP file data There are a few trivial differences between the messages to the different addresses I checked, so don't anyone try to turn the above into a totally literal filtering rule... Anyway, the "agreement.zip" attachment held only one file, apparently called "agreement.txt", but on closer inspection it turned out the file was called "agreement.txt " where the apparent trailing space was actually a 0xFF character. This "pseudo-TXT" file was, in fact, an OLE2 format file (originally a Word document file) with the OLE2 Root Entry CLSID set to that of the Microsoft HTML Application Host (MSHTA). This was all done as per the description in the iDEFENSE advisory announcing this vulnerability: http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=231type=vulns This "pseudo-TXT" file is an example of what is produced by the PoC generator posted to Bugtraq. Oddly, that message is not archived
RE: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit
Good point. What version of Declude introduced the 'BANCSLID ON' feature? -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Matt Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 2:21 PM To: Declude.Virus@declude.com Subject: Re: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit This is the one that Andy pointed out: Microsoft Windows Shell Remote Code Execution Vulnerability http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13132/discussion/ Microsoft Windows is prone to a vulnerability that may allow remote attackers to execute code through the Windows Shell. The cause of the vulnerability is related to how the operating system handles unregistered file types. The specific issue is that files with an unknown extension may be opened with the application specified in the embedded CLSID. The victim of the attack would be required to open a malicious file, possibly hosted on a Web site or sent through email. Social engineering would generally be required to entice the victim into opening the file. I can't say whether or not it is a broad enough threat to be exploited in a mass-mailing virus. Declude defaults to BANCSLID ON which may or may not protect from such an attack. Some CSLID calls are entire valid and normal for Outlook/Office generated E-mails, and I'm not totally sure what Declude considers to be good to ban with this switch. Andrew previously indicated that he had never seen it triggered. Anyway, these things pop up about once a month and most are never exploited in E-mail viruses, so there is probably no reason to not treat all of them the same. I see no reason why virus scanners wouldn't detect the infected attachments once they were updated with definitions for known threats. Matt John Tolmachoff (Lists) wrote: Since I am pressed for time and am presently unable to completely digest what the vulnerability is and how to stop it, how can we configure our Declude installs to protect/find/stop these messages? John T eServices For You -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Andy Schmidt Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 11:30 AM To: Declude.Virus@declude.com Subject: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit Hi, Enclosed a notice for the MS05-16 Exploit. For the record: I'm actually in favor of using STRICT interpretation of vulnerabilities - no matter how seldom one might actually occur. Whether a violation of standards is due to an actual virus - or just a poor mass-mailer application, I gladly use the reason of vulnerability of a potential virus to reject these messages early. As far as some features suggested here: - I do agree that it might be helpful for some people not to scan for viruses, if a vulnerability is found (to conserve CPU). - I do agree that there is little reason (other than statistics) to run the second scanner after the first scanner already found a virus. - I do agree that it is desirable for some people, if there was an option that would delete vulnerabilities rather than isolate them in the Virus folder. - I do NOT agree that Declude should NOT detect certain vulerabilities, just because they only occur very rarely. Best Regards Andy Schmidt Phone: +1 201 934-3414 x20 (Business) Fax:+1 201 934-9206 -Original Message- From: Nick FitzGerald [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, May 29, 2005 9:31 AM To: Bugtraq@securityfocus.com Subject: Spam exploiting MS05-016 Yesterday at least two of my spam-traps received the following message (I've elided the MIME boundary values just in case...): Subject: We make a business offer to you MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary=[...] [...] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=Windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Hello! It is not spam, so don't delete this message. We have a business offer to you. Read our offer. You can increase the business in 1,5 times. We hope you do not miss this information. Best regards, Keith [...] Content-type: application/octet-stream; name=agreement.zip Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=agreement.zip encoded ZIP file data There are a few trivial differences between the messages to the different addresses I checked, so don't anyone try to turn the above into a totally literal filtering rule... Anyway, the agreement.zip attachment held only one file, apparently called agreement.txt, but on closer inspection it turned out the file was called agreement.txt where the apparent trailing space was actually a 0xFF character. This pseudo-TXT file was, in fact, an OLE2 format file (originally a Word document file) with the OLE2 Root Entry CLSID set to that of the Microsoft HTML Application Host (MSHTA). This was all done as per the description in the iDEFENSE advisory announcing this vulnerability: http://www.idefense.com
RE: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit
Title: Message Declude Virus will *not* detect abuse of MS05-16 with the Declude CLSID vulnerability detector. They are entirely different animals, which happen to have CLSID at their heart. The only way to attack MS05-16 abuse with Declude Virus is with a) keep your virus scanner up to date, and/or b) to watch for virus news and ban extensions that are deliberately crafted as bogus, e.g. .d0c or .doc_ instead of .doc The only way to attack MS05-16 abuse with Declude JunkMail is to dream up ways to tell apart MIME filename lines that are valid from the ones that are bogus. Given that Macintoshes will send files to PC users without a file extenstion, and given the lack of regular expressions and fine control over substring matching, I think this is a fool's errand. Leave it up to your antivirus scanner. Ok, John, get back to fixing that mirrored drive set. Andrew 8) -Original Message-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of MattSent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 2:21 PMTo: Declude.Virus@declude.comSubject: Re: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 ExploitThis is the one that Andy pointed out: Microsoft Windows Shell Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilityhttp://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13132/discussion/Microsoft Windows is prone to a vulnerability that may allow remote attackers to execute code through the Windows Shell. The cause of the vulnerability is related to how the operating system handles unregistered file types. The specific issue is that files with an unknown extension may be opened with the application specified in the embedded CLSID.The victim of the attack would be required to open a malicious file, possibly hosted on a Web site or sent through email. Social engineering would generally be required to entice the victim into opening the file. I can't say whether or not it is a broad enough threat to be exploited in a mass-mailing virus. Declude defaults to BANCSLID ON which may or may not protect from such an attack. Some CSLID calls are entire valid and normal for Outlook/Office generated E-mails, and I'm not totally sure what Declude considers to be good to ban with this switch. Andrew previously indicated that he had never seen it triggered.Anyway, these things pop up about once a month and most are never exploited in E-mail viruses, so there is probably no reason to not treat all of them the same. I see no reason why virus scanners wouldn't detect the infected attachments once they were updated with definitions for known threats.MattJohn Tolmachoff (Lists) wrote: Since I am pressed for time and am presently unable to completely digest what the vulnerability is and how to stop it, how can we configure our Declude installs to protect/find/stop these messages? John T eServices For You -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Andy Schmidt Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 11:30 AM To: Declude.Virus@declude.com Subject: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit Hi, Enclosed a notice for the MS05-16 Exploit. For the record: I'm actually in favor of using STRICT interpretation of vulnerabilities - no matter how seldom one might actually occur. Whether a violation of standards is due to an actual virus - or just a poor mass-mailer application, I gladly use the reason of "vulnerability" of a potential virus to reject these messages early. As far as some features suggested here: - I do agree that it might be helpful for some people not to scan for viruses, if a vulnerability is found (to conserve CPU). - I do agree that there is little reason (other than statistics) to run the second scanner after the first scanner already found a virus. - I do agree that it is desirable for some people, if there was an option that would delete vulnerabilities rather than "isolate" them in the Virus folder. - I do NOT agree that Declude should NOT detect certain vulerabilities, just because they only occur very rarely. Best Regards Andy Schmidt Phone: +1 201 934-3414 x20 (Business) Fax:+1 201 934-9206 -Original Message- From: Nick FitzGerald [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Sunday, May 29, 2005 9:31 AM To: Bugtraq@securityfocus.com Subject: Spam exploiting MS05-016 Yesterday at least two of my spam-traps received the following message (I've elided the MIME boundary values just in case...): Subject: We make a business offer to you MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="[...]" [...] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Hello! It is not spam, so don't delete this message. We have a business offer to you. Read our offer. You can increase the business in 1,5 times. We hope you do not miss this information. Best regards, Keith
Re: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit
Title: Message Hi Andy, Colbeck, Andrew wrote: Declude Virus will *not* detect abuse of MS05-16 with the Declude CLSID vulnerability detector. They are entirely different animals, which happen to have CLSID at their heart. You are sure up to date with this stuff! The only way to attack MS05-16 abuse with Declude Virus is with a) keep your virus scanner up to date, This is good news. That can be easily accomplished - and/or b) to watch for virus news and ban extensions that are deliberately crafted as bogus, e.g. .d0c or .doc_ instead of .doc Well this won't be effective becase folks now rename extensions as a matter of course to get clean files through eg - .exe .e_x_e :) Leave it up to your antivirus scanner. Perfect and thanks for the insight. -Nick
RE: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit
Title: Message Perhaps a new feature in Declude that can be implemented during an outbreak(before the slow AV guys create defs)which reverses the logic of the BAN module,making it an ALLOW module. For instance, ban all extensions except those specifically allowed-this creates its own problems such as forcing users to conform to renaming files in a specific way to get them through, but may solve part of the CLSID issue. -Original Message-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of NIck HayerSent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 2:55 PMTo: Declude.Virus@declude.comSubject: Re: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 ExploitHi Andy,Colbeck, Andrew wrote: Declude Virus will *not* detect abuse of MS05-16 with the Declude CLSID vulnerability detector. They are entirely different animals, which happen to have CLSID at their heart. You are sure up to date with this stuff! The only way to attack MS05-16 abuse with Declude Virus is with a) keep your virus scanner up to date, This is good news. That can be easily accomplished - and/or b) to watch for virus news and ban extensions that are deliberately crafted as bogus, e.g. .d0c or .doc_ instead of .docWell this won't be effective becase folks now rename extensions as a matter of course to get clean files through eg - .exe .e_x_e :) Leave it up to your antivirus scanner. Perfect and thanks for the insight.-Nick
RE: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit
Title: Message Putting in 2 new drives was the easy part. Recreating 43 websites in IIS because the backup drive on the backup server departed for parts unknown the week before and proceeded with the tape drive (Onstream) finally giving out a month ago leaving my backup solution in shambles is what has been fun. Fortunately, both the actual website data drives and their separate backups on zip disks are fine. When it rains it pours. I must be in Southern California. Needless to say, I am revamping my backup and disaster recovery solutions. John T eServices For You -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Colbeck, Andrew Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2005 2:42 PM To: Declude.Virus@declude.com Subject: RE: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit Ok, John, get back to fixing that mirrored drive set. Andrew 8)
Re: [Declude.Virus] MS05-16 Exploit
a mass-mailing virus. Declude defaults to BANCSLID ON which may or may not protect from such an attack. Some CSLID calls are entire valid and normal for Outlook/Office generated E-mails, and I'm not totally sure Plus the other question is does Declude look for the CSLID calls in files in zip's. Darrell -- DLAnalyzer - Comprehensive reporting on Declude Junkmail and Virus. Try it today - http://www.invariantsystems.com --- This E-mail came from the Declude.Virus mailing list. To unsubscribe, just send an E-mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED], and type unsubscribe Declude.Virus.The archives can be found at http://www.mail-archive.com.
