Re: Request for feedback on crypto privacy protections of geolocation data

2013-09-09 Thread Chris Peterson
On 9/9/13 6:13 PM, Brian Smith wrote: I assume by "prevents people from tracking individual access points" means the following: Some people have a personal access point on them (e.g. in their phone). If somebody knows the SSID and MAC of this personal access point, then they could track this per

Re: Request for feedback on crypto privacy protections of geolocation data

2013-09-09 Thread Chris Peterson
On 9/9/13 4:25 PM, R. Jason Cronk wrote: On 9/9/2013 5:58 PM, Chris Peterson wrote: Our private database maps access point hash IDs to locations (and other metadata). Assuming: H1 = Hash(AP1.MAC + AP1.SSID) H2 = Hash(AP2.MAC + AP2.SSID) I assume + means concatenate. I might suggest XO

Re: Request for feedback on crypto privacy protections of geolocation data

2013-09-09 Thread Chris Peterson
On 9/9/13 6:41 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote: 1. How do I bootstrap? I turn on my device and want to get the coordinates of the aps I see. That requires a lat long for neighbors. What now? The device would scan for nearby APs and send the hash of each AP's MAC and SSID to our location server. Our s

Re: Request for feedback on crypto privacy protections of geolocation data

2013-09-09 Thread Brian Smith
On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 7:15 PM, Hanno Schlichting wrote: > On 09.09.2013, at 18:13 , Brian Smith wrote: >> On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 2:58 PM, Chris Peterson wrote: > [T]here's one crucial difference between Google and us: We would > like to make as much of this data public as possible, while Googl

Re: Request for feedback on crypto privacy protections of geolocation data

2013-09-09 Thread Hanno Schlichting
On 09.09.2013, at 18:41 , Eric Rescorla wrote: > 1. How do I bootstrap? I turn on my device and want to get the coordinates of > the aps I see. That requires a lat long for neighbors. What now? We build the database by having people use a stumbler application to sent us observations. The stumbl

Re: Request for feedback on crypto privacy protections of geolocation data

2013-09-09 Thread Hanno Schlichting
On 09.09.2013, at 18:13 , Brian Smith wrote: > On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 2:58 PM, Chris Peterson wrote: >> Google's Location Service prevents people from tracking individual access >> points by requiring requests to include at least 2-3 access points that >> Google knows are near each other. This "p

Re: Request for feedback on crypto privacy protections of geolocation data

2013-09-09 Thread Eric Rescorla
Chris, I have some basic and perhaps stupid questions. 1. How do I bootstrap? I turn on my device and want to get the coordinates of the aps I see. That requires a lat long for neighbors. What now? 2. As asked previously will the db be published or query able? 3. What is the lat/long resolutio

Re: Request for feedback on crypto privacy protections of geolocation data

2013-09-09 Thread Brian Smith
On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 2:58 PM, Chris Peterson wrote: > Google's Location Service prevents people from tracking individual access > points by requiring requests to include at least 2-3 access points that > Google knows are near each other. This "proves" the requester is near the > access points.

Re: Request for feedback on crypto privacy protections of geolocation data

2013-09-09 Thread R. Jason Cronk
I haven't done a full analysis but do have a few questions On 9/9/2013 5:58 PM, Chris Peterson wrote: Our private database maps access point hash IDs to locations (and other metadata). Assuming: H1 = Hash(AP1.MAC + AP1.SSID) H2 = Hash(AP2.MAC + AP2.SSID) I assume + means concatenate

Request for feedback on crypto privacy protections of geolocation data

2013-09-09 Thread Chris Peterson
I'm looking for some feedback on crypto privacy protections for a geolocation research project I'm working on with the Mozilla Services team. If you have general questions or suggestions about the project, I'm happy to answer them, but I'd like to focus this thread on crypto. Our team is proto