Re: disableScripts function for DOM Objects

2019-04-24 Thread joris
Hey Craig, I did open this discussion somewhere else: https://discourse.wicg.io/t/xss-prevention-in-the-browser-by-the-browser/3518/4 On 4/24/19 5:55 PM, joris wrote: Yes, in a way it would do the same job as a sanitizer, but it is more than that. I think that a simple sanitize function could

Re: Policy 2.7 Proposal: Clarify Section 5.1 ECDSA Curve-Hash Requirements

2019-04-24 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 6:20 PM Brian Smith wrote: > There are three (that I can think of) sources of confusion: > > 1. Is there any requirement that the signature algorithm that is used to > sign a certificate be correlated in any way to the algorithm of the public > key of the signed

Re: disableScripts function for DOM Objects

2019-04-24 Thread joris
Yes, in a way it would do the same job as a sanitizer, but it is more than that. I think that a simple sanitize function could be wrong. A function to disable JS would be the last barrier for an XSS. While a sanitize function would just be another barrier between XSS Code and the Browsers JS

Re: disableScripts function for DOM Objects

2019-04-24 Thread Craig Francis
Hi Joris, I think we should follow Anne's advice and discuss this elsewhere. But what you're suggesting is starting to look a lot more like a browser provided sanitiser function: document.getElementById('xss_output').innerHTML = *sanitize*(*user_input*); There is some discussion about it at:

Re: disableScripts function for DOM Objects

2019-04-24 Thread joris
Yes. But: this would still shrink the masking/sanitizing efforts, because you could just use a tag that nobody else should use inside user input like:    onload="disableScripts(document.getElementById('xss_output')">           let user_input; //Load user_input without masking     let pattern

Re: Policy 2.7 Proposal: Require EKUs in End-Entity Certificates

2019-04-24 Thread Dimitris Zacharopoulos via dev-security-policy
On 24/4/2019 10:18 π.μ., Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy wrote: On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 09:13:31AM +0300, Dimitris Zacharopoulos via dev-security-policy wrote: I support this update but I am not sure if this is somehow linked with the scope of the Mozilla Policy. Does this change mean

Re: Policy 2.7 Proposal: Require EKUs in End-Entity Certificates

2019-04-24 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 09:13:31AM +0300, Dimitris Zacharopoulos via dev-security-policy wrote: > I support this update but I am not sure if this is somehow linked with the > scope of the Mozilla Policy. Does this change mean that after April 1, 2020, > any Certificate that does not have an EKU

Re: Policy 2.7 Proposal: Require EKUs in End-Entity Certificates

2019-04-24 Thread Dimitris Zacharopoulos via dev-security-policy
On 24/4/2019 2:09 π.μ., Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 7:12 PM Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 01:22:59PM -0700, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy wrote: Okay, then I propose