The first discussion of this request was here:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/DYrrxCsD6CA/9y8a5NnshRgJ
The discussion was closed because one of the root certificates under
consideration had been recently created and not audited. WoSign has
determined that they would
On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 03:34:13PM -0700, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
> >
> >But I know that we already have such super CAs in the root program
> >now. From the top of my head:
> >- UTN UserFirst signs Gandi
> >- CyberTrust Global signs the Belgian government CA
> >- GeoTrust gives google a CA
> >- Bal
On 4/8/14, 3:07 PM, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
Here's the pending and included Super-CAs that I'm aware of.
KISA (Government of Korea, Bug #335197)
ICP-Brasil (Government of Brazil, Bug #438825)
SUSCERTE (Government of Venezuela, Bug #489240)
CCA (Government of India, Bug #557167)
US FPKI (Government of
On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 01:25:31PM -0700, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
> On 4/7/14, 4:27 PM, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> >On Mon, Apr 07, 2014 at 04:18:17PM -0700, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
> >>
> >>If I'm understanding the input on this correctly, then an outside auditor
> >>needs to be involved in some way. But
On 4/8/2014 1:25 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
> I'm still conflicted about whether a Super-CA can audit their
> subordinate CAs. And if they can, then what assurances do we have that
> the audit was done in an unbiased manner and according to the criteria
> that we require.
I expressed the same c
On 4/7/14, 4:27 PM, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
On Mon, Apr 07, 2014 at 04:18:17PM -0700, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
If I'm understanding the input on this correctly, then an outside auditor
needs to be involved in some way. But that can mean that the outside auditor
verifies that the audit criteria being u
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